MCHS 0514 - Administrative History of 21 Army Group - 6 June 1944 - 8 May 1945

The book provides an account of the administrative problems that faced the staff and services of HQ 21 Army Group during the period and the ways in which they were surmounted. The whole book is reproduced here to show the entire context within which Movements operated. That would be too much for one website page so it has been split as follows:-

Chapters I to III    -   This page

Chapters IV and V

Chapter VI and Appendices

CHAPTER I

PART I - INTRODUCTION

1. PREFACE

At 0800 hours on 6 June 1944 the first elements of the Allied Expeditionary Force operating under the direct command of the C-in-C 21 Army Group to whom the Supreme Commander had assigned the responsibility for the assault and opening phases of the campaign, had landed successfully on the coast of NORMANDY. At 0800 hours on 5 May 1945, eleven months later to the day, the order to cease fire became operative on the BRITISH fronts as all the GERMAN forces opposing 21 Army Group in North-West GERMANY and HOLLAND had surrendered unconditionally to Field Marshal Montgomery. On 8 May 1945 the GERMAN High Command surrendered all their remaining land, sea and air forces unconditionally to the Allies, thus giving up their conquered territories of DENMARK, NORWAY and the CHANNEL ISLANDS without a battle. In these eleven months the Allied Armies had broken through the Atlantic Wall, liberated the countries of FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and LUXEMBOURG, and advanced halfway across GERMANY to make contact with the RUSSIAN Armies in the SOUTH and centre and reach the BALTIC in the NORTH.

2. Scope of Administrative History

Behind these operational triumphs lay many achievements of logistical planning and support of this greatest combined operation of all time. The object of this history is to provide an account of the administrative problems that faced the Staff and the Services of HQ 21 Army Group during this period and the ways in which they were surmounted. While in certain instances it will be necessary to describe in detail the measures taken by specific formations, as a general rule the administrative efforts of the Second British and First Canadian Armies and HQ L of C, can only be dealt with summarily since their activities were necessarily controlled and encompassed by the policy formulated by HQ 21 Army Group. Similarly, although Civil Affairs/Military Government was formed to facilitate and aid the operations of the land forces by controlling and administering the civil populations, this history makes no attempt to describe its activities in detail, as it is considered that they were conducted on such totally different lines from the normal support of the Armies, that they can best be portrayed in a separate account. Included in this history is a chapter comprising the main lessons learnt during the campaign. Although in certain cases these refer specifically to single phases, normally only those lessons learnt from the campaign as a whole have been included in order to avoid drawing false conclusions through over-emphasis of any one particular aspect.

3. Division of the History

The history falls into four phases:-

phase I comprises the assault, the battle of CAEN and the completion of the build up for the breakout from the beach head. The approximate dates of this phase are from 6 June to 25 July 1944.

phase II includes the break-out from the NORMANDY bridgehead, the pursuit of the enemy across the SEINE and up to the line of the MEUSE-ESCAUT canal, the capture of ANTWERP and finally the airborne operation (Operation MARKET GARDEN) which was a supreme effort to force river crossings over the MAAS and the RHINE, and thus turn the right flank of the GERMAN defence line. This phase can be said to have been completed on 26 September 1944.

phase III covers the establishment and stocking of the Advance Base in BELGIUM including the opening of the great port of ANTWERP and the measures necessary to oppose the GERMAN winter offensive. The approximate date of completion of this phase is 14 January 1945 when stock-piling for Phase IV began.

phase IV. This phase, commencing on 15 January 1945 and ending on 8 May 1945, may be entitled "The Last Round". It contains the operations to cross the River MAAS and capture the territory up to the River RHINE (Operations VERITABLE and GRENADE) and also Operation PLUNDER which was the assault across the RHINE. It concludes with the advance to the BALTIC by Second Army, the operations of First Canadian Army in Northern GERMANY and HOLLAND, and the final surrender of the GERMAN forces opposing 21 Army Group on 5 May 1945.

At Appendix "E" will be found a map illustrating the outline of administrative development in support of the campaign from NORMANDY to the BALTIC.

4. Composition of the BRITISH Force

At the moment when the Supreme Commander gave the order for the operation to commence, Second Army and First Canadian Army, both of which remained throughout the campaign under the command of HQ 21 Army Group consisted of:-

SIX armoured divisions (including one POLISH armoured division)
TEN infantry divisions
TWO airborne divisions
NINE independent armoured brigades
TWO Special Service (Commando) brigades
GHQ, Army and Corps Troops
Certain Allied Contingents.

Clearly a force of such size required a considerable number of administrative troops to operate the ports, railways, communications and installations on its lines of communication. The operation of ports and railways and IWT was controlled centrally from HQ 21 Army Group in accordance with normal practice, but HQ L of C relieved HQ 21 Army Group of the onus of local administration and of the control of certain other installations.

5. Administrative Responsibility of HQ 21 Army Group

HQ 21 Army Group was responsible for:-

(a) Co-ordinating the general administrative planning of ALL Services both AMERICAN and BRITISH in the early stages.
(b) Informing Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force or War Office of the special needs of the Forces until such time as the Armies could formulate firm demands, thus enabling action to be taken to ensure that there were sufficient stores in UK to meet these demands when they were received.
(c) Maintaining the BRITISH Forces and making the appropriate demands for this purpose on the War Office.

Responsibility for the co-ordination of the detailed administrative planning and formulation of administrative policy was delegated by the Commander-in-Chief to the Major-General i/c Administration.

During the planning stage it was considered desirable to attach an AMERICAN administrative element to HQ 21 Army Group in order to ensure that US and BRITISH planning marched in step. This element consisted of a Brigadier-General assisted by representatives of the G-1 and G-4 Sections of the AMERICAN General Staff. The Brigadier-General was appointed deputy to the MGA and his administrative staff section worked alongside, but not integrated with, the 'A' and 'Q' staffs of HQ 21 Army Group.

During the course of this history it is proposed to deal with the US administrative planning and arrangements only when they directly affect the BRITISH administrative picture.

PART II - OUTLINE OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR THE ASSAULT

6. The initial plan for Operation OVERLORD provided for an assault on the NORMANDY coast from immediately NORTH of the CARENTAN estuary to the River ORNE with the object of securing as a base for further operations a lodgement area which included airfield sites and the port of CHERBOURG. See sketch map at Appendix "A".

7. The operation was a combined BRITISH, CANADIAN and UNITED STATES undertaking by all Services of the three nations. The Naval forces involved were under command of the Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force (ANCXP). HQ Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) commanded all Air Forces taking part in the operation while all the land forces participating were initially placed under command of HQ 21 Army Group.

8. The Naval Forces operating in the assault were divided into two separate task forces:-

Eastern Task Force in support of the BRITISH Forces.
Western Task Force in support of the AMERICAN Forces.

Their tasks were as follows:-

(a) Provision of protection from enemy naval forces,
(b) Clearance of enemy mines and minefields.
(c) Bombarding enemy defences.
(d) Supporting the assault by fire as necessary.

9. The RAF and US Air Forces were responsible for:-

(a) The strategic bombing of enemy lines of communication before and during the assault.
(b) In conjunction with ADGB the air defence of the bases and troop concentrations in the UK and protection of coastal convoys, warships and shipping.
(c) The tactical bombing of enemy troop concentrations, reinforcements, strong points and other targets in the vicinity of the assault.
(d) Establishing complete air superiority and thus protecting the ground forces.

10. The general plan for the Army's part in the operation was:-

(a) To carry out airborne landings on the night D-1/D with the object of protecting the flanks of the area in which the assault was to take place.
(b) To assault on the NORMANDY coast between VARREVILLE and OUISTREHAM on a five divisional front from landing ships and landing craft with two BRITISH, one CANADIAN and two UNITED STATES divisions.
(c) To land the follow-up divisions, one BRITISH and one UNITED STATES on the second tide on D-day and on D + 1.
(d) Thereafter to build up our forces in divisions as follows:-

(e) The initial objectives were the towns of CAEN, BAYEUX, ISIGNY, CARENTAN, and airfields in the vicinity.
(f) Second Army was to protect the left flank of UNITED STATES First Army, while the latter captured CHERBOURG, ANGERS, NANTES and the BRITTANY ports.

The Order of Battle of 21 Army Group for the assault is shown at Appendix "B"

PART III - OUTLINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING

11. Preface

It will be noted that both in this outline administrative planning and in each of the four phases the problems and achievements of the "Q" Staff and Services are dealt with prior to those of the "A" Staff and Services. This change in accepted staff procedure does not in any way mean that the activities of the "A" Staff and Services are any less important than those of the "Q" Staff and its associated Services but is made deliberately because the work of the latter follows on more naturally and in a more logical sequence from the outline of operations than would be the case if the work of "A" and the "A" Services was described first.

12. Staff Responsibilities

On the HQ 21 Army Group Administrative Staff which carried out the planning for Operation OVERLORD were three senior appointments responsible to the MGA as follows:-

(a) DQMG who co-ordinated the work of Q (Plans), Q(Maint) and Q(AE) and under whose direction the "Q" Services functioned.
(b) DQMG (Mov & Tn) who was responsible for all movement planning, the movement of personnel vehicles and stores by air, sea and land, and for the co-ordination of the work of the Movements Staff and the Transportation Service.
(c) DAG who was responsible for all "A" Planning and Organisation, "A" Personal Services and activities of the "A" Services.

The detailed organisation of the administrative staff is set out at Appendix "C".

Second Army was charged with all planning from D-day to D+14 (subsequently extended to D+17) under the general direction of HQ 21 Army Group. This involved the assessment of the requirements of administrative units and stores from D to D+41 and the phasing in of daily maintenance requirements and administrative personnel for the period D to D+17 including the requirements of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. HQ 21 Army Group took over these responsibilities from Second Army from D+18 onwards.

Although AMERICAN forces were being employed alongside BRITISH forces, in view of the inherent differences in BRITISH and AMERICAN administrative procedure the US forces were made responsible for their own maintenance and build-up subject to the over-riding approval of the C-in-C 21 Army Group.

13. Control of Movement

During the planning period an organisation was set up for the control by the Royal Navy of both a ferry service to land personnel and stores from vessels at anchor off the beaches and a cross-channel shuttle service of ships and other craft. The control of this was to be assisted by Movements officers both ashore and afloat. In the initial stages control on the far shore was to be de-centralised to Beach Sub Areas with their appropriate naval increment but as soon as possible the control of shipping in the whole BRITISH assault area was to be exercised by FOBAA (Flag Officer British Assault Area) in conjunction with Q (Mov) Shipping, 21 Army Group.

To implement the policies laid down by HQ 21 Army Group, ANCXF and AEAF in regard to alterations in the build-up, an organisation entitled BUCO (Build Up Control Organisation) was established in UK to control the movement of ships and craft from the UK and of personnel and vehicles into them from the concentration and marshalling areas. This organisation was also responsible on the BRITISH side for the post D-day concentration plan and for ensuring that all units were ready in time to move to marshalling areas for embarkation, although the actual mounting of the operation was the responsibility of the War Office acting through the Home Commands. The BUCO staff contained representatives from HQ 21 Army Group, ANCXF, AEAF, War Office Q (Mov), Ministry of War Transport, Second Army, First Canadian Army, 2 Tactical Air Force and representatives of the US "users" who acted as liaison links with HQ ETOUSA which controlled the US concentration and build up. While BUCO was concerned with the movement of personnel and vehicles, HQ 21 Army Group controlled directly, in conjunction with War Office, all alterations or additions required in the stores shipment programme.

14. Outline Maintenance Plan

The BRITISH Forces were to be maintained over the beaches until such time as sufficient ports were captured and developed on the assumption that beach maintenance could cease on the opening of the SEINE ports. As the BRITISH sector contained only four small ports, PORT EN BESSIN, COURSEULLES, CAEN and OUISTREHAM, the capacity of which, even if captured intact, would not be sufficient for dealing with the tonnage requirements of the BRITISH Forces, it was decided to construct an artificial port at ARROMANCHES. This artificial and prefabricated port was known by the codeword "MULBERRY B" and its object was to reduce the degree of dependence on maintenance over open beaches in the early stages of the operation. A similar artificial port "MULBERRY A" was to be constructed in the AMERICAN sector. In addition, small havens of sheltered water for the discharge and protection of the ferry craft were to be formed by sinking chains of ships off the coast prior to the development of the MULBERRY and the codeword "GOOSEBERRY" was given to them.

Second Army was to be maintained for the first few days from Beach Maintenance Areas and subsequently from two Army Roadheads one of which would ultimately be handed over to First Canadian Army. As soon as possible a Rear Maintenance Area was to be established. It was not intended that the beach maintenance areas should develop into the Rear Maintenance Area but they were either to close down or be retained as Stores Transit Areas on the opening of the RMA.

As well as the planning, the administrative responsibility for the early stages of the operation devolved upon Second Army. An important point to notice is that no reliance was placed on any railways being available for at least the first three months of the operation and so the L of C was planned to be entirely road operated. Whilst the development of the administrative organisation was planned to fall into three main phases, the dates of each phase could only be approximate as they were dependent on the tactical situation.

Stage I - D to D+4

During this stage maintenance was to be entirely over the beaches except for the possibility of a small tonnage being discharged through MULBERRY B on D+4. It was not anticipated that any appreciable tonnage would be unloaded at the MULBERRY until D+9. The beaches were organised into three sectors each controlled by a HQ Sub Area and each containing a beach maintenance area. A total of eight Beach Groups (two as reserve formations) were placed under command of the Beach Sub Areas which in turn were placed under command as follows:-

101 and 102 Beach Sub Areas - 1 Corps
104 Beach Sub Area - 30 Corps

HQ 4 L of C Sub Area was responsible for the area of ARROMANCHES where MULBERRY B was to be constructed as soon as the tactical situation permitted. It was planned to use PORT EN BESSIN for the reception, storage and distribution of bulk petrol and HQ 10 Garrison was made responsible for its local administration under the direction of HQ 4 L of C Sub Area. HQ 11 L of C Area was given the overall responsibility for the developing of MULBERRY B and PORT EN BESSIN through the agencies of 4 L of C Sub Area and 10 Garrison respectively and were placed under command Second Army. The proposed administrative layout during this stage is shown at Appendix "D".

Stage II - D+5 to D+17

With effect from D+5 Second Army through HQ 11 L of C Area were to take over from Corps the responsibility and control of the beaches and beach maintenance areas. HQ 11 L of C Area would then be responsible through the HQ of the beach sub areas for the clearance of all beaches in the BRITISH Sector and, as above, through 4 L of C Sub Area for the operation and local administration of MULBERRY B and PORT EN BESSIN. Two army roadheads were planned during this period of which No 1 in the area of CAEN was to be prepared to start issues on D+5 whilst No 2 in the area of BAYEUX was to open on D+7. Second Army was to be responsible for the operation and control of both roadheads until No 1 was handed over to First Canadian Army. It was anticipated that CHERBOURG would be captured by the US forces on D+8. As it was improbable that certain awkward loads for the BRITISH forces could be brought across the beaches it was planned in agreement with the US to unload them at CHERBOURG, and HQ 12 L of C Area was detailed to provide a detachment under command of First US Army to represent BRITISH interests and operate a transit area for BRITISH stores. The administrative layout during this stage is shown at Appendix "D".

Stage III - D+18 to the capture of the SEINE ports

The majority of Second Army units were planned to have disembarked by D+17 and on that date the remainder of First Canadian Army would commence their move to the Continent. The presence of the two armies would necessitate a co-ordinating and controlling headquarters. HQ L of C with an increment from HQ 21 Army Group would move to the Continent between D+17 and D+20 for this purpose until the arrival of the complete HQ of 21 Army Group which was not anticipated to take place before D+30. 11 L of C Area with its units under command would revert to under command HQ L of C from the date of the latter's assumption of administrative control. HQ 5 L of C Sub Area under command HQ L of C would be responsible for developing the RMA while 7 and 8 Base Sub Areas were to move to the Continent so as to be readily available when the capture of the SEINE ports of LE HAVRE and ROUEN appeared imminent. The detachment of HQ 12 L of C Area operating at CHERBOURG would then be released and HQ 12 L of C would take over command of 7 and 8 Base Sub Areas. In addition 11 Garrison was held in reserve to operate and administer MULBERRY A as it had been arranged that this artificial port would be transferred to 21 Army Group if CHERBOURG was captured more or less intact by the US forces. The administrative layout at this stage would thus be as shown at Appendix "D".

15. Build up of Reserve Stocks

The rapid build-up of reserves was clearly a matter of paramount importance throughout the early stages if the fighting formations were to be afforded liberty of action in the event of a sudden crack in the enemy's defences. The urgency was at its greatest in the initial few days when sufficient reserves would have to be landed not only to allow for a rapid advance but to be available for resisting the fierce and lengthy counter attacks which might be launched against the shallow bridgehead. In addition to normal maintenance, therefore, reserve stocks were to be landed at the following scales:-

(a) By midnight D+3
Ammunition - Four days expenditure at 21 Army Group rates for the forces ashore by D+5
POL - Fifty miles per vehicle ashore on D+5
Supplies - Two days supplies for the forces ashore on D+5
Ordnance Stores - Maintenance from D+1 to D+9 would be dependent on Landing (less ammunition) Reserves. A specially scaled Landing Reserve Set would be landed as early as possible for each brigade group or equivalent formation ashore. From D+10 maintenance would be by Beach Maintenance Pack. Each pack was scaled for a division or an equivalent formation and contained first and second echelon spares plus equipment for thirty days at special wastage rates.
(b) ByD+41
Fourteen days initial stocks of all commodities were to be held in the RMA.
(c) By D+90
Fourteen days initial stocks of all items plus working margins not exceeding seven days were to be held in the Advance Base depots.

The RAF reserves were to conform with the above.
In calculating the holdings the following scales were used:-
Ammunition - 21 Army Group Rates (See Appendix "P")
POL - 50 miles per vehicle per day
Ordnance Stores - Beach Maintenance Pack scales and controlled stores calculated at (less ammunition) FFC intense Rates.

16. Army and RAF Responsibilities

The basic principle that services of common usage in the Army and RAF should be provided by one service for the use of both was to be followed. In order to ensure the most economical arrangements having regard to the respective scales of requirements, it was agreed that the majority of services of common use should be provided by the Army. Thus the Army agreed to provide supplies, petrol, oil and lubricants, ammunition and equipment common to both Services, labour and other services of a like nature.

17. Replacement of Vehicles

The General Staff requirement for heavy 'A' vehicles was that twenty-five per cent of unit entitlement should be available behind the armoured formations at all times. This is greater than the Contact Rate of wastage for 'A' vehicles but until workshops were established and their output afforded a compensating reduction, the replacement demands from formations were higher than the Contact Wastage rate.

The requirement for light 'A' and 'B' vehicles was to produce in the beach-head between D-day and D+42 the calculated rate of wastage for that period, plus one month's reserve to cover exceptional losses in the assault and the creation of a repair pool.

There was considerable conflict in priorities between shipment of reserve vehicles and fighting formations in the build-up. The General Staff were, however, advised and agreed that reserve vehicles to maintain the force ashore should have priority in shipment over fighting formations where conflict between the two arose.

All vehicles due to be landed up to D+42 were to be waterproofed. As regards reserve vehicles this work was undertaken in War Office depots with the assistance of 21 Army Group Ordnance and REME personnel from units or reserves of low priority in the Order of Battle.

Replacement vehicles were to be shipped unaccompanied, Ordnance drivers meeting them on the beaches in order to clear them.

18. Reinforcements

For planning purposes it was assumed that normal reinforcements demands could not be expected from formations and units before D+18. To overcome this difficulty it was planned that reinforcements would be provided until then by means of predetermined drafts, based on an estimate of casualties, which would be despatched until D+9 direct to Corps Reception Camps and after that date to Second Army Reinforcement Group.

The policy governing the build up of reinforcements from D to D+2 was to ensure:-

(a) that there would be a reserve of personnel in each beach-head to replace casualties in the beach groups as quickly as possible in order that the important work of off-loading would not be impeded by lack of manpower. The policy was to be put into effect by sending out drafts numbering ten per cent of the Beach Group strength to land in FRANCE on D+1 even before it was known whether they were necessary or not.
(b) that there would be a supply of specialist and vital personnel to replace such casualties in assault divisions.

It would not be possible to send any other reinforcements at this stage.

From D+3 to D+9 reinforcements were to consist of first line reinforcements of units which it was estimated would have suffered serious casualties and standard drafts for each arm of the Service. Arrangements were made to permit variations in the predetermined drafts at short notice in order to cover unexpected shortages of key tradesmen and specialists.

As soon as practicable after D+9 a reserve of reinforcements was to be built up on the Continent. These reserves were to be held in Reinforcement Holding Units for the BRITISH and in Reinforcement Holding Battalions for the CANADIANS and were to be supplied to units under the normal system.

19. Casualties

The estimates of casualties for the BRITISH and CANADIAN forces were based on the official War Office casualty rates known as the Evetts Rates. In determining the estimate of casualties which might be sustained in the operation the following categories were considered:-

(a) dRowned
It was estimated that sixty per cent of the personnel in any craft lost or damaged would become casualties.

(b) sick and non-battle casualties
For planning purposes it was estimated that the sick who would be evacuated to hospital would amount to 0.17 per cent per day of the total forces ashore.

(c) battle casualties
The Evetts Rates are divided into three, the "Intense", "Normal" and "Quiet" depending on the degree of fighting involved. It was thought, however, that the most severe of the above rates was not sufficiently high to represent the anticipated casualties of some assault formations and therefore a new rate "Double Intense" was applied. The estimated total of battle casualties at these rates was divided into:-

D-day and D+1
Killed, captured and missing - 30% of casualties
Wounded - 70% of casualties
D+2 and thereafter
Killed, captured and missing - 25% of casualties
Wounded - 75% of casualties

The numbers of wounded were further calculated to be:-
Litter cases - 50%
Walking cases - 50%

20. Evacuation Policy

For D-day and until hospital accommodation was adequate for retention of casualties, the medical plan was based on:-

(a) the evacuation to the UK of all casualties, except those whom it was dangerous to move
(b) the provision of life saving surgery by the medical units in the beach organisations.

As soon as hospital accommodation ashore was adequate, all cases requiring not more than seven days treatment were to be retained on the Continent. As the build-up of hospitals permitted, this period was to be extended to fifteen days, thirty days and ultimately to such longer periods as the Army Group Commander decided.

LSTs and hospital carriers were to be used for evacuation over the beaches and from artificial ports, and hospital ships were to be used for evacuation from major ports.

21. Basis for Administrative Plan

The entire administrative plan for this operation was based on the Joint Outline Maintenance Project for Operation OVERLORD and the detailed instructions on each specific subject were issued to formations in the form of Administrative Instructions.

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CHAPTER II

PHASE I   6 JUNE - 25 JULY

1. The BRITISH Operational Picture

Although weather conditions were far from ideal for a sea-borne assault and had already necessitated a twenty-four hour postponement of D-day, the Supreme Commander decided to launch the operation on the night of 5/6 June 1944. Whatever may have been the private thoughts as to the wisdom of this decision by those actually on the landing craft in the heavy swell that was running at the time, there is no doubt that the prevailing conditions led to the assault proving to be an even bigger surprise to the enemy than had been hoped. Resistance was fierce in many localities but was generally less formidable than had been anticipated.

During the night 6 Airborne Division made a successful landing with comparatively light casualties They seized the bridges at BENOUVILLE and RANVILLE intact and thereafter proceeded to establish and hold a limited bridge-head across the river ORNE. At H-hour the assaulting divisions went ashore on the beaches with 50 Infantry Division on the right, 3 Canadian Division in the centre and 3 British Division on the left. Although the village of LE HAMEL was strongly defended and held out until 1700 hours, 50 Division quickly established a-bridgehead and by nightfall had made contact with 3 Canadian Division on the left and were on the high ground EAST of BAYEUX, from VAUX-SUR-AURE T7884 to BRECY T8878. Despite a considerable amount of mortar and shell fire on the beaches, 3 Canadian Division advanced inland in the centre sector to reach the line CREULLY T9080/BENNY-SUR-MER T9680. On the left 3 British Division captured OUISTREHAM, made contact with 6 Airborne Division on its left and established itself on the line PERRIERS-SUR-LE-DAN U0576-BENOUVILLE U0974.

On 7 June BAYEUX was captured and 30 Corps attempted to advance SOUTH on the axis TILLY-SUR-SEULLES/VILLERS BOCAGE. 7 Armoured Division actually outflanked TILLY-SUR-SEULLES and reached VILLERS BOCAGE but were compelled to withdraw again to the high ground North-West of the town. On the 1 Corps front the enemy had delivered several counter attacks both EAST and WEST of the ORNE without success. In fact EAST of the ORNE our positions were improved by the capture of BREVILLE U1374 on 13 June by 6 Airborne Division reinforced by 51 Division.

From 16 to 30 June operations were directed to the capture of CAEN so that a strong left flank could be provided for the bridgehead. On 19 June 30 Corps finally captured TILLY-SUR-SEULLES after very fierce fighting. Regrouping now took place and 8 Corps came into the centre between 30 and 1 Corps. On 25 June 30 Corps attacked SOUTH across the road CAUMONT-CAEN and by 27 June after repeated counter attacks and a slight withdrawal had secured a firm hold on the RAURAY feature some three quarters of a mile NORTH of BRETTEVILLETTE T8864. On the same day 15 Division under 8 Corps had secured a bridgehead over the River ODON NORTH of GAVRUS T9262, while the following day the high ground around Point 112 T9562 was captured by 11 Armoured Division. On the left of the BRITISH front 51 Division improved the bridgehead over the ORNE by capturing SAINT HONORINE but any move by 3 British Division in the direction of CAEN met with the fiercest resistance.

It was planned that from now on Second Army was to continue to contain the main enemy force and even draw further enemy formations towards it, while the US forces made a wide sweep on the right against what was hoped would be weak opposition. Second Army therefore had three main tasks -

(a) to contain the main enemy forces in their present area
(b) to capture CAEN as soon as possible
(c) to repulse all counter attacks with its own resources so that the AMERICAN sweep SOUTH and WEST could continue unhampered.

After an attack by 450 heavy bombers of Bomber Command on 7 July, CAEN was finally captured on 9 July. From 10 to 18 July only limited progress was made, but on 18 July a powerful thrust was launched EAST of CAEN preceded by an air bombardment from over two thousand heavy and medium bombers. At the start excellent progress was made by the armour, but after three days heavy fighting a strong anti-tank screen brought the advance to a halt. The CAEN suburbs EAST of the ORNE had been cleared and the advance had reached the general line SAINT MARTIN-DE-FONTENAY U0260-BOURGUEBUS U06-CAGNY U1164. In order to oppose our attack the enemy had concentrated almost all his armour EAST of the ORNE and Second Army had achieved its object of containing the main enemy forces thus smoothing the way for the US advances.

2. Administrative Development

The period from D-day to 25 July saw the support of the armies develop from hastily stacked dumps on the beaches in the first few hours of the operation to the final establishment of the vast and intricate organisation of the Rear Maintenance Area. The various changes and improvisations that contributed to this result can only be described here in the briefest outline so that a general picture of this development can be obtained. The final layout of the RMA as compared with the first key plan, which had to be altered due to CAEN not being captured in the early days of the operation, is shown at Appendix "F".

3. Division of Assault Area

Both for operational and administrative reasons the BRITISH assault area had been divided up into three beach sectors. On the right was GOLD Sector on to which 50 Division was to assault as the advance formation of 30 Corps. In the centre was JUNO Sector and on the left SWORD Sector on to which 3 Canadian Division and 3 British Division were to assault respectively, both under the command of 1 Corps. These Beach sectors were further sub-divided down to beaches called in the case of GOLD Sector and reading from WEST to EAST, ITEM, JIG, KING, in the case of JUNO Sector, LOVE, MIKE, NAN and OBOE and in the case of SWORD Sector, PETER, QUEEN and ROGER. Yet another sub-division was made in each of these beaches whereby the EAST half of the beach was entitled "GREEN" and the WEST "RED". Thus the eastern half of KING beach would be known as "KING GREEN". See map at Appendix "A". For the administration of its beach sector 30 Corps had 104 Beach Sub Area under command under which again were 9 and 10 Beach Groups operating on JIG and KING beaches respectively. For the JUNO Sector 102 Beach Sub Area with 7 and 8 Beach Groups operating MIKE and NAN beaches was placed under command of 1 Corps, while for SWORD Sector, also under 1 Corps, was 101 Beach Sub Area with 5 and 6 Beach Groups in command of QUEEN and ROGER beaches. From the dumps to be formed on these beaches, Beach Maintenance Areas were to develop and these were given the code words "SUN" in the GOLD Sector, "STAR" in the JUNO Sector and "MOON" in the SWORD Sector. From D-day until the establishment of the rear army boundary (which did not take place until 23 July), all the operations in the 21 Army Group area were under command of Second Army.

The general picture is one of heavy fighting along the whole of the BRITISH front with only limited advances being made but, fortunately, just sufficient to give the necessary space for the requisite administrative layout although this was very restricted as compared to the area originally planned. In addition to these difficulties, the administrative operations in the SWORD Sector on the eastern beaches were further complicated by the fact that the beaches were under observation and fire from the enemy and that the CAEN-OUISTREHAM canal could not be used or cleared owing to the proximity of their forces. The canal lock-gates at OUISTREHAM had, by good fortune, been captured intact but there was constant anxiety as to their safety from enemy artillery fire.

4. The Beaches

The initial stages of the operation on the BRITISH Sector went according to plan and all the beach sub-areas landed on D-day. There were two main difficulties about the beaches, firstly that the slopes were not steep which meant that except at high water all craft and LSTs had to dry out and secondly that owing to this gentle slope the nearest anchorages for shipping would be some distance off-shore. Fully laden stores ships for instance would have to drop anchor some five miles from the beach and this imposed considerable delays and difficulties in the turn-round of ferry craft and DUKWs. There was no serious bombing but a gradually increasing number of attacks by E boats and explosive devices were launched particularly against the eastern end of the assault beaches. The work of the beach sub-areas deserves mention as upon their exploits depended the continued existence of the forces ashore.

104 Beach Sub Area under command of 50 Division landed on time despite the bad weather. Opposition on ITEM beach considerably delayed the commencement of the administrative operations across the beaches as the beach group personnel were busy clearing up a pocket of the enemy and rounding up prisoners until late in the afternoon of D-day. In order to provide immediate reserves on landing, two initial dump areas were organised immediately behind the beaches into which the pre-loaded vehicles deposited their loads. These dumps were also to be built up from stores loaded in LCT but owing to the weather these did not land as planned and the dump areas had to be built up mainly from stores from the pre-loaded vehicles. Even so they proved invaluable. The whole of KING beach was planned to be developed by 9 Beach Group and JIG GREEN and ITEM RED beaches by 10 Beach Group. Owing to large patches of peat and soft clay on parts of the beach KING GREEN had to be given up with the exception of making a pontoon causeway for landing personnel and to compensate for this abandonment it was decided to make a hard for LCT on LOVE GREEN beach. ITEM RED and JIG GREEN beaches were developed as planned. The main depots of the beach maintenance area were not finally ready to receive stores until late on D+2 by which time a considerable quantity of stores had accumulated in the initial dump areas. Once the beach maintenance area depots were established they worked well and no major alterations proved necessary to the pre D-day first key plan. 104 Beach Sub Area also had 36 Beach Brick under command which was provided to replace casualties which were anticipated to be heavy. In actual fact casualties proved negligible and 36 Beach Brick was used as a reserve of labour.

102 Beach Sub Area consisted of 7 and 8 Beach Groups with 4 Beach Group in reserve and had landed under command of 3 Canadian Division slightly behind time owing to the rough weather. It had been planned only to develop the MIKE and NAN beaches, MIKE beach by 7 Beach Group and NAN by 8 Beach Group. The development of MIKE beach was held up owing to fire from an enemy strong point at VAUX. This strong point was eventually eliminated by an. attack by one company from the beach groups supported by tanks on D+2. The beach maintenance area was laid out in accordance with the first key plan and only minor alterations proved necessary. Owing to bad weather the arrival of four coasters on D-day was delayed until early on D+1 and seven more coasters due to arrive on D+1 did not do so until D+2. Luckily COURSEULLES was captured virtually undamaged and the utmost use was made of the facilities that this small port provided. Up to 1,000 tons a day were unloaded at this port but the discharge of coasters there proved unsuccessful and was abandoned after D+4.

101 Beach Sub Area landed on QUEEN beach under command 3 British Division, having 5 and 6 Beach Groups under its own command. 5 Beach Group landed with the assault brigade of the Division while 6 Beach Group came in with the follow-up brigade. 5 Beach Group's role was to command the beaches while 6 Beach Group, having passed through them, was to reconnoitre and control the maintenance area. In order to meet the maintenance requirements of 3 Division on D-day, four pre-loaded LCTs each containing 200 tons of high priority stores were beached at H+4 hours. These stores were unloaded into sector stores dumps close to the beaches from which the units drew as required. Unfortunately, owing to minefields the area for these sector stores dumps was very restricted and during the first few days considerable congestion ensued which was increased by the fact that, due to enemy action, the beach maintenance area depots were not ready to accept stores until D+3. It had been planned that maintenance from the sector stores dumps would only last for 24 hours but as the beach maintenance area was not ready to receive stores by the evening of D-day DUKWs and pre-loaded vehicles which should have discharged into the BMA then were switched to the sector stores dumps. Owing to enemy shelling to the EAST from behind the River ORNE the PETER beaches were gradually developed in the hope that these would be out of accurate gun range. It had been hoped that OUISTREHAM which had been captured on D-day with the locks virtually intact would be operated by 101 Beach Sub Area and would have compensated for the limited capacity of the beaches but this never materialised as the port area was under constant shell fire from enemy positions on the EAST of the CAEN canal. On D+2 disaster nearly overtook the maintenance build up in this area as a stick of bombs hit one of the four sector stores dumps and 100,000 gallons of petrol and 400 tons of ammunition were lost. A new site was immediately reconnoitred for ammunition and petrol and the latter was brought in on a high priority from a cased petrol carrier lying in the anchorage. In actual fact, enemy interference with the unloading over this sector continued throughout this phase. In spite of the great gallantry and hard work displayed by all ranks which resulted in as high a daily average weight of stores per beach group being brought in as any other beach group achieved in the beach-head, the SWORD beaches were abandoned on 12 July.

5. The Ports

In addition to the unloading over the beaches and at the small ports already mentioned, considerable use was made of PORT EN BESSIN and of MULBERRY B as the latter developed.

In the planning stages it had been considered that PORT EN BESSIN could only be used for shallow draft coasters and would therefore be developed as the bulk petrol port for tankers discharging from within the port and from ship-to-shore lines up to a distance of three miles out. After its capture on D+1 the port was found to be better than expected and capable of taking tankers up to 14' draft in the outer harbour. The quays also were relatively undamaged and it was forthwith decided to use it for mixed cargoes in addition to bulk petrol, and also for heavy lifts unloaded in the GOLD Sector. The first cargo was unloaded on D+5 although due to various delays imposed by the weather bulk petrol was not discharged until 24 June (D+19). Both BRITISH and US tankers used the port, the BRITISH pipeline being on the EAST of the harbour and the AMERICAN on the WEST. The first ship-to-shore petrol line was opened on 1 July.

Meanwhile, the initial development and construction of MULBERRY B proceeded according to plan. The various tows of floating pier-heads etc arrived from UK without serious incident despite the somewhat unfavourable weather. Commander 4 L of C Sub Area reconnoitred a transhipment area which proved to be suitable although the approaches to it were difficult owing to the high ground immediately behind the beaches. The first coasters commenced to discharge their loads on 11 June which was four days after work on the port began. From 19-22 June a gale of unprecedented force raged. To a large degree the import of personnel, vehicles and stores ceased as a result of its violence. The delay in the discharge of shipping resulted in a back-log being built up in the UK and convoys had to be stepped back while the time of turn-round of shipping was considerably lengthened over that planned. But even more important was the damage that was done to the installations of MULBERRY A and MULBERRY B. The MULBERRY A in the AMERICAN sector was so badly damaged that further work on it was abandoned. Without this decision it would have been impossible to complete MULBERRY B to the scale envisaged owing to the damage it incurred and to the number of component parts which were lost in transit across the Channel. However, the portions salvaged from the AMERICAN MULBERRY and those destined for it were diverted to enable MULBERRY B to be completed to its full scale. Despite this severe set-back the construction proceeded and in actual fact the port achieved its target figure of 4,000 tons per day on 22 June. A special appendix describing the lay-out and achievements of MULBERRY B will be found at Appendix "G".

6. Administrative Command and Control

Prom D+5 HQ Second Army controlled the beach sub areas through the Corps HQs but as it was obviously desirable that corps should not have to look over their shoulders for longer than was necessary, HQ 11 L of C Area took over the local administration of the beach sub-areas on the same date. HQ Second Army Troops simultaneously took over command of the depots in the BMAs which were now being expanded into two L of C terminals later called army roadheads. The technical control of the depots, however, remained under the appropriate Services of HQ Second Army. Meanwhile, 4 L of C Sub Area, under command 11 L of C Area, had assumed the responsibility for the administration of MULBERRY B and of PORT EN BESSIN through HQ 10 Garrison.

On the arrival of First Canadian Army it became necessary to establish a co-ordinating HQ for the administration of the rear areas. On D+37, assisted by a staff and service increment from HQ 21 Army Group, HQ L of C assumed this responsibility until HQ 21 Army Group took over administrative control in the theatre on D+44. Also on D+37 the second key plan for the RMA was produced. Throughout this period, and actually until D+46, the armies retained operational control of their respective roadhead depots. 5 L of C Sub Area was made responsible for the local administration of the RMA as it developed from No. 2 Army Roadhead in the BAYEUX area. On 23 July the rear army boundaries of Second Army and First Canadian Army became effective. On 25 July 7 Base Sub Area, originally scheduled to operate the SEINE ports when captured, took over the ports of CAEN and OUISTREHAM relieving 101 Beach Sub Area which had assumed this responsibility on 11 July, two days after the capture of CAEN. The latter HQ relieved HQ 10 Garrison at PORT EN BESSIN who were placed under command Second Army for duties in the forward areas.

On the assumption of administrative control on the Continent by HQ 21 Army Group, the RMA was formed from Nos. 1 and 2 Army Roadheads which were referred to respectively as RMA EAST and RMA WEST. First Canadian Army continued to draw from RMA EAST and Second Army from RMA WEST, but 21 Army Group co-ordinated the issues in order to regulate the stocks. Ammunition and ordnance stores in the RMA EAST were gradually to be eaten down as eventually the RMA would be centred around BAYEUX by which time armies would have established new roadheads.

7. Achievement

An illustration of the enormous expansion is the fact that on D-day 59,900 personnel, 8,900 vehicles and 1,900 tons of stores were landed while by D+50 631,000 personnel, 153,000 vehicles and 689,000 tons of stores, in addition to 68,000 tons of bulk POL had been transported into the bridgehead.

8. The Movements Problem

Clearly in an amphibious operation of this nature the movements aspect looms very large and in the early stages the principal interest rests on the shipping side. An advanced element of the shipping branch of HQ 21 Army Group was sent over with HQ Second Army. As the latter formation moved forward this element was attached to HQ 11 L of C Area until the arrival of HQ L of C. Initially it was solely concerned with shipping problems but very soon the necessity for central co-ordination of all movement was realised and the element was appropriately increased.

(a) personnel and vehicles
The conveyance of personnel and vehicles to the Continent was carried out by means of LCT Marks III and IV, LST, MT ships, LSI and, on D+1 and D+2, in large personnel ships transporting over 2,000 personnel each. It is interesting to note that the only casualty apart from minor damage, was one MT ship which was hit by gun fire when passing through the Straits of DOVER on D+1. Although the Royal Navy was apprehensive of the results, LCT were beached for discharge and as no serious damage ensued this practice continued for a very considerable time. The discharge of LST had been planned to be by the use of Rhino ferries which were floating rafts of naval pontoon equipment with their own engines and tugs. Owing to rough seas a number of Rhino ferries were lost or damaged en route and therefore insufficient were available to discharge the LST as planned. The beaching of LST was then resorted to and proved successful. This practice naturally resulted in a larger number of LST having to be repaired, but the advantages gained by the rapid disembarkation of troops and embarkation of casualties for evacuation more than off-set this handicap. Casualty evacuation by LST proved most successful. MT ships were unloaded by their own derricks into LCT Marks V and VI, LCM and Rhino ferries which were then either beached or brought to one of the special causeways for discharge. The first MT ship discharged on D+1. The unloading of personnel ships and LSI presented no serious problem. The first hospital carrier for the evacuation of casualties was brought over on 14 June and after that there was almost always one hospital carrier off the BRITISH beaches.

(b) stores
The main difficulty in the programming of stores was the continual delay owing to weather and other causes which upset the bids that had been made before the operation began. Stores discharged tended to be 25 per cent behind schedule throughout the early stages. Due to the storm and other causes there was a serious lack of ferry craft which affected the rate of discharge so barges, pontoons and tugs had to be brought across to increase the resources available. In general the DUKW proved the most efficient means for the discharge of stores. The handling of heavy and awkward lifts both in vehicles and stores was an acute problem. CHERBOURG, where it would have been easier, was in no state to receive heavy lifts alongside berths until late in August, so they had to be brought across the beaches. Non-mobile loads were either placed on tank transporters and then discharged from LCTs or else were stowed on lighters and unloaded by shore cranes at PORT EN BESSIN or COURSEULLES. An Express Coaster Service was inaugurated to meet urgent stores demands with the priorities for them controlled by "Q".

(c) roads
Every road in the bridgehead area was used to its fullest capacity, and the main movement problem was making the best utilisation of all the roads available.

(d) rail
The limitations of the beach-head reduced the rail problem, but those railway lines that were captured were soon put into working order. A quantity of stock and a few locomotives, mainly in the BAYEUX area, were utilised and the first train ran on 4 July.

(e) Air
Dakota aircraft were used for the evacuation of wounded but this was not arranged through Movements channels. Personnel traffic for the first 30 days was limited to special visits due to the shortage of airfields but a regular service was instituted by SHAEF in mid-July while an Anson service for officers of HQ 21 Army Group began on 20 July. On 6 July a regular service carrying mail, newspapers, medical stores and a limited quantity of essential items was begun with transport aircraft. A big air lift was available for emergency use if a unit became isolated but was not employed by the BRITISH during this phase.

9. Roadheads

During this phase no army roadheads were opened other than Nos 1 and 2 which later together formed the RMA. Formations drew their maintenance requirements direct from these roadheads in first and second line transport as directed by army HQ. As soon as operations and distances from the roadheads warranted it corps opened their own Field Maintenance Centres which were all established by 26 June except in the case of 12 Corps, the last corps to land. 1 Corps and 30 Corps were based on 1 and 2 Army Roadheads respectively throughout this period, but the other corps were maintained from either roadhead as the operational and administrative situation dictated. In general 2 Canadian Corps was based on No 1 Army Roadhead which was taken over by First Canadian Army on 23 July while 8 and 12 Corps were maintained from No 2 Army Roadhead. In the case of certain items, particularly ammunition, it was often necessary especially in the earlier stages, for corps to draw certain natures from one roadhead while being based on another, due to the stock position; this unfortunately resulted in a certain amount of cross movement which could not be avoided until reasonable reserve stocks had been built up in the roadheads

10. Ammunition

It was possible to maintain the force during the attempts to break out of the bridgehead without serious difficulty except in the case of ammunition. It became necessary to restrict the issues of certain natures due to the fact that the stores landing programme was behind schedule chiefly because of the storm and the fact that expenditure of artillery ammunition had been very heavy, as the break-out was not achieved as quickly as had been expected in the planning stage. Every effort was made to improve the situation by selective discharge of ships and all ammunition ships were given top priority for unloading, the more important types required being 25 pr and 5.5 BL gun ammunition. It was also agreed with the Navy on 20 June that ammunition ships would be off-loaded within the inner harbour of MULBERRY B although this was regarded as a highly dangerous procedure. At the same time it was decided to cut the shipments of POL of which good reserves had been built up in order to provide space for artillery ammunition.

Large reserves of tank and AA ammunition had now accumulated, the former because there had been no tank battles as might have been expected had there been a break through and the latter because enemy air attacks were on a far smaller scale than anticipated. It was therefore found possible to cut 3,600 tons from the ammunition shipping programme for certain tank and AA ammunition and allot this tonnage to field artillery natures. This, added to the cuts in import of POL and to the extra shipping made available specially for ammunition, increased the normal artillery ammunition shipping programme by 10,000 tons all of which arrived by 27 July and averted the temporary crisis.

11. Maintenance of Vehicle Strength

In general, replacement of vehicles in NORMANDY worked according to plan. Owing to the small losses in the assault and immediately afterwards, serious consideration was given to the phasing back of the replacement vehicle programme. It was, however, decided that no substantial alteration would be made to the planned programme and this was found to be a wise decision, because by the time the battle of CAEN was finished all vehicle losses suffered by formations in the early days had been made good. It proved possible to maintain the vehicle strength of all formations then in the bridgehead and a small GHQ reserve stock was also beginning to build up.

The initial reserves of "A" vehicles arrived in the theatre with Corps Delivery Squadrons between D+8 and D+18. After D+18 "A" vehicles were shipped unaccompanied in bulk to depots in the bridgehead from which they were available for issue to the Armoured Replacement Group organisation. Small numbers of "B" vehicles were taken into the bridgehead by Corps Ordnance Field Parks until D+18 after which "B" vehicles were also shipped unaccompanied in bulk. The despatch of replacement vehicles unaccompanied by drivers led to complications, as on occasions due to lack of information about arrivals ordnance drivers were not available to meet the craft carrying them on arrival on the far shore. In some cases replacement vehicles were driven off the craft by individuals who had never driven before! Due partly to the anxiety of the Royal Navy to turn round their craft they were forced into the driver's seat, the engine was started, first gear engaged and they were precipitated into three feet of water - somewhat to the detriment of the vehicles' condition. Thus the most careful control had to be exercised over the arrival of replacement vehicles especially as the first Black Market in liberated EUROPE showed signs of starting on the beaches. Units who wanted to "make" a vehicle sent back drivers to meet craft and if the opportunity presented, drove off what they fancied.

12. General

By 25 July the general level of reserves in the theatre had been built up considerably and was more than adequate to support the final successful efforts to break out of the bridgehead. The 21 Army Group and army depots were holding a total of fourteen and a half million rations including over nine million Compo rations, an average of twelve days wastage at 21 Army Group rates for the main artillery natures of ammunition and nearly 70,000 tons of MT 80. The considerable stock of POL at this stage gave rise to a certain amount of criticism but subsequent events proved the necessity for such holdings. With this firm administrative base at their backs the Second Army and First Canadian Army commenced their task of breaking through the hard crust of the GERMAN resistance - a task which ended in hectic pursuit of the enemy in his headlong flight through FRANCE and BELGIUM.

13. RE Works

(a) general
All Works Services were initially placed directly under Chief Engineer, Second Army who was provided with a small increment from HQ 21 Army Group to assist him. On 14 July HQ L of C took over the beaches and an area including BAYEUX directly under 21 Army Group. Engineer stores dumps were established at TAILLEVILLE (No 1 Army Roadhead), BAYEUX (No 2 Army Roadhead), VER-SUR-MER and LUC-SUR-MER, while the Engineer Base Workshop were sited at LE BERGERIE. The Engineer Stores Base Depots were located one each at TAILLEVILLE and BAYEUX.
It had been expected that the major demands for RE stores would be for purposes of road making and repair, constructing airfields, building bridges and erecting bulk petroleum installations. For these purposes some 42,000 tons of engineer stores had been phased in during the period under review in addition to nine thousand personnel. In actual fact, due to the bad weather and operational factors, only some 22,000 tons of the above, was landed while the number of personnel that were landed only amounted to 6,500. The limited advances made compensated for this shortage of personnel and stores as less bridging materials were required, fewer airfields could be constructed in the space available, the initial establishment of the rear maintenance area had also to be deferred and several field units became available for work in the rear areas. As against this, however, the slower rate of advance placed an enormous strain on the roads in that very restricted area of operations, consequently road repair and improvement became the major engineering problem of the day.

(b) roads
The number and condition of the roads in the coastal sector was better than had been anticipated but even so, due to little or no maintenance having been carried out on them for some years, they soon commenced to break up badly under the continuous traffic. The constant passage of heavy traffic also greatly impeded the progress of repair work but rough patching, widening and the filling of potholes was carried out whenever and wherever possible. One of the first measures to relieve the congestion on the narrow and tortuous roads which, at any rate through the villages, were only suitable for one-way traffic, was the construction of many round-abouts and by-passes. These detours were made at the following places:-

and proved invaluable in speeding up the passage of traffic. In addition to this many miles of track reserved entirely for tracked vehicles Were constructed parallel to the main routes. This naturally greatly assisted in the prolongation of the life of the actual roads themselves. Lastly, duplicate bridges were constructed to relieve the bottle-necks of GRAVE-SUR-MER and REVIERS. Owing to the impossibility of constructing the full number of airfields mentioned above, airfield construction troops were diverted to work on the roads. Considerable improvement was made in the exits from the beaches and a comprehensive scheme initiated for improving those from MULBERRY B.

(c) airfields
The total force available for the construction of forward airfields was initially five Airfield Construction Groups RE and one Airfield Construction Wing RAF. By the end of June, excluding the emergency landing strip, ten airfields had actually been constructed in the beach-head area. This number rose to seventeen by the end of July of which eight had tracked runways of square meshed steel (SMT) and one had bitumenised hessian runways (PBS). Thirteen airfields in the area were being operated by the RAF by 24 July. A serious problem arose as a result of the dust on these airfields causing excessive wear on any aircraft engines not fitted with air-intake filters. This occurred even with the SMT and the PBS runways, but not to so marked a degree in the case of the latter. Water was piped to three airfields in attempts to lay the dust and, rather more successfully, experiments were also made with the use of oil. The general wet weather experienced in July, however, proved the most satisfactory means of solving the problem.

(d) bulk petroleum installations
Very considerable construction work was carried out at PORT-EN-BESSIN, the petroleum port, through which 36,000 tons of bulk spirit were received and 27,500 tons issued during the period under review. By 25 July the status of RE work at this port was approximately as follows:-

(i) Two ship-to-shore lines had been completed.
(ii) Six tanker berths were in operation with pipe connections laid.
(iii) Balance tank installations and LP pumps had been completed for MT and aviation spirit.
(iv) Tankage had been erected for 9,800 tons of MT fuel and 2,000 tons of aviation spirit.
(v) Three 6" pipelines were laid to BLARY in No 2 Army Roadhead where 1,040 tons of storage had been erected, and another pipeline to ISIGNY was nearly finished while work was proceeding on storage and pumping stations. In addition one 6" aviation fuel pipeline had been completed to COULOMBS.

(e) local resources
It was possible to reduce the phasing in of certain stores, particularly for airfield and road construction, as the area of the beach-head was found to contain quantities of limestone that was suitable for airfields if treated with bituminous material, and also gravel deposits and sand. Small stocks of cement, timber and other stores were also found and made use of in addition to a few concrete mixers, excavators, road rollers, and one small factory which was adapted into a sawmill. The water situation proved to be generally satisfactory and about fifty water points were established supplied from rivers, streams or wells. The BAYEUX water system which had a pumping station at BARBEVILLE was undamaged but its operation was partly dependent on the rehabilitation of the CAEN power station.

14. Transportation

The main task which devolved on the Transportation Service was to discharge and clear in conjunction with S & T the planned tonnage of 900,796 tons of stores in addition to hundreds of vehicles over the beaches or through ports, during the months of June and July.

As stated elsewhere, due to bad weather and difficulties in establishing the Ferry Craft Control, this figure was not quite reached. As it was, over 750,000 tons were brought ashore without the aid of a proper port.

Unlike other Services, Transportation normally controls all Tn troops on the ground direct from HQ 21 Army Group. This course was not possible at the beginning of operation OVERLORD. During this first phase, therefore, all Tn activities were controlled by an advanced HQ of Tn 21 Army Group which was placed first under command of HQ 11 L of C Area and then under command of HQ L of C until the arrival of HQ 21 Army Group in the theatre.

It may be said that from a Tn point of view, this operation was largely successful, but the complexities of the problems and all the technical planning and execution by the Tn Service, in conjunction with the Movements Staff of HQ 21 Army Group are too great to enable a complete picture to be given in the brief space available.

During the first few days the responsibility for discharging ships was that of the beach group commanders who were assisted by their port operating staffs. In addition the craft ferry service run by the Navy and the DUKW ferries organised by the RASC were controlled through the same channels. Initial difficulty was experienced in evolving a proper ferry organisation and cases of serious delays to ships occurred. As the weeks passed the anchorages became more centralised, control became easier and a definite split in functions was made so that MT was passed over GOLD beaches and stores were centred on JUNO. As the operation proceeded, the Port Operating Groups took over complete responsibility for the discharge of ships and for controlling the unloading of craft when beached. An improved turn round of ferry craft was already being obtained in the first week of July by centralising control of ferry services. The phasing in of Port Operating Companies kept pace with the tasks that they were set.

Port Construction and Repair units were landed at the same time as port operating units to repair the small ports of PORT-EN-BESSIN, COURSEULLES and OUISTREHAM. A special port construction task force was also landed at the same time to carry out the construction of MULBERRY B. An account of this will be found at Appendix "G". Small coasters were unloaded in PORT-EN-BESSIN and preloaded barges discharged there and at COURSEULLES. OUISTREHAM and CAEN could not be developed until cleared of the enemy and out of range of gunfire.

For some time after the capture of CAEN, the coastal defences at CABOURG continued to dominate the approaches to OUISTREHAM. The port of CAEN is reached by the OUISTREHAM-CAEN canal. The domination of OUISTREHAM therefore delayed the opening of CAEN.

The IWT organisation which did yeoman service with its tugs, PBRs and Rhinos loaded with MT, was faced with great difficulties during the stormy weather which prevailed during most of the first three weeks of the operation. IWT workshops were quickly set up and repairs put in hand, but the fact is that during bad weather the Rhinos were not really suitable for their task, being under-powered. They functioned more satisfactorily during the better weather later, but generally proved a continuous source of trouble.

The railway personnel were phased in after the ports and IWT personnel, but apart from reconstructing minor lines, repairing wagons and developing one or two rail served depots, it was impossible to do much during this phase. The railway signals branch of Tn began to function during this period, but their work can better be discussed later.

By the end of this phase, 16,000 tons of Tn stores had been landed and two Transportation Stores Depots set up. In addition a number of small stores dumps were established at important centres of Tn activity. Without going into details of all the various types of equipment used in this operation by Tn, it can be stated that generally the equipment provided was found to be adequate in spite of the difficulties of weather which were encountered. It should be borne in mind, however, that every combined operation must be regarded as an individual problem and treated as such, and no hard and fast conclusion as to the suitability of equipment for all combined operations can be drawn from the experience gained in OVERLORD.

15. Postal

Prior to the operation formations had assumed a closed address "APO ENGLAND" and the Home Postal Centre NOTTINGHAM was carrying out the functions of Concentration Office for the force. In addition the Postal branch of CANADIAN Section GHQ 1 Echelon 21 Army Group had joined the Postal Directorate of HQ 21 Army Group. In view of the fact that the distance to UK was so short and casualties were being evacuated direct to UK from the outset, it was decided not to establish a Postal Tracing Section for units other than CANADIAN. Instructions were therefore sent out to units to return to the Army Post Office for return to senders all correspondence addressed to individuals who were deceased or missing, or whose address was not known or who had been evacuated to hospital and in respect of whom no redirection card had been received within fourteen days. The usual safeguards to prevent premature return of such correspondence in the case of deceased or missing personnel were applied.

The first postal personnel to land in the theatre were those of 6 Airborne Division who landed by parachute and glider well before H-hour. The postal personnel of 1 and 4 Special Service Brigades followed about an hour after the sea assault began, just prior to the arrival of the beach group detachments personnel. The next to arrive were the personnel of 50 Division, 1 and 30 Corps postal units, who established their "D" (divisional) and "HT" (corps) offices and future "S" (static) offices. Second Army Postal Unit followed and established an "S" office which also acted as a cross post centre for the formations ashore. DAD APS 1 and 30 Corps were in sole charge of the postal services in their own sectors until D+5 when Second Army took over. Locations Control (21 Army Group) was established on the Continent on D+6. HQ L of C with a staff increment from 21 Army Group took over the Base and L of C Area on 13 July and HQ 21 Army Group Advance Section took over from them on 29 July.

Arrangements had been made for the delivery of mail to assault units on D+1. In fact deliveries did not commence until D+2 due to shipping difficulties, but the placing of mail was found to have been generally satisfactory. In the case of follow-up formations cut-offs of unit mail in the UK had worked well and all formations found their mail awaiting them on arrival in the theatre. The first despatch from the theatre was made by Beach Group APO S688 on 8 June. On 20 June all despatches to UK were taken over by 8 Base Army Post Office at CREPON, which had the CANADIAN Base Post Office adjoining it. On 6 July a two way airlift of first class letter mail only, was established between the theatre and UK, leaving parcel mail to be convoyed as before by surface routes. The first day's lift to the theatre consisted of 8,100 lbs of BRITISH mail and 1,600 lbs of CANADIAN mail, while the first despatch by air from the theatre amounted to 7,000 lbs of mail. This resulted in an immediate improvement in the service to the troops, but the service to the UK continued to be unsatisfactory, and many complaints were voiced both by the troops and in the Press. It had been thought that shipping delays were responsible but when the introduction of the airlift failed to improve the homeward service, further investigations were carried out and the cause of the trouble was discovered to be dislocation of the civil postal services in LONDON as a result of damage from flying bombs. The maximum amount possible of correspondence was immediately diverted to provincial distribution centres and an instant improvement was noted.

The establishment of firm and efficient surface links had proved to be more difficult than expected. Loading in the UK was delayed by the failure of lighters to find the correct coasters, while on the theatre side it was held up by the inability of the authorities on shore to locate the ships containing mail until thirty-six to forty-eight hours after they had anchored. An officer was given the full time job of patrolling the anchorages in an amphibious jeep to locate the mail ships, and thus hasten unloading which was normally carried out with DUKWs. This resulted in an improvement in the service.

During this first phase the force changed its address three times. At the outset it was "APO ENGLAND"; on 22 June this was altered to "British Western European Forces (BWEF)"; and finally on 14 July as a result of a high level political decision, the addresss was again changed to "British Liberation Army (BLA)", which title was retained throughout the campaign.

16. Supply and Transport

In the early stages of the campaign a considerable proportion of the stores which had to be imported into the beach-head consisted of supplies and petrol. The Directorate of Supply and Transport was faced with the problem not only of providing them on a very large scale but of transporting them from coasters to beach dumps and later to roadheads, the distance to which increased as the campaign progressed. Provision of the commodities was carried out without any great departure from normal principles but careful planning was necessary in order to solve the difficulties of their conveyance across the beaches in proper quantities and sequence.

(a) supplies
Each man in the force landed with two twenty-four hour packs which were for consumption during the first forty-eight hours ashore. Apart from these the only rations employed for a considerable time were "fourteen-man Compo packs", which proved to be very successful. Airborne supplies for the two parachute brigades of 6 Airborne Division were carried initially by packing normal first-line scales on the man and in containers, in addition to which all spare space in the aircraft and gliders was used to stow such stores as supplies and ammunition.

Supply maintenance through BMAs was carried out according to plan and two DIDs were allotted to each beach sub area, while 33 and 38 Port Detachments and another DID were established in 4 L of C Sub Area. The sites chosen in 101 and 102 beach sub areas were suitable but those for Nos 2 and 5 DIDs at CREPON were cramped and unsatisfactory. Depot sites in 101 Beach Sub-Area were moved three times, having sustained shell fire, and the majority of the stocks landed into the DIDs in that area were destroyed. Morale was good from the outset and casualties were light but it was found that there was insufficient labour at all depots. As no Corps FMCs were yet open rations were drawn by first or second line transport direct from BMAs.

By D+6 approximately two day's reserve of Compo had been built up by means of a planned rate of one third of a day's reserve per day from D-day onwards. An extra fifty tons of shipping space was allotted to S & T on the express coaster which sailed on D+5 and this was used for shipping urgent additional requirements. The express coaster service was also used for shipping bread for hospital patients daily after D+13.

Owing to the operational situation the supply depots in No 1 Army Roadhead were formed in the area of LA DELIVRANDE by the amalgamation of depots in 101 and 102 BMAs. This was not a satisfactory location but no alteration in site was possible before the capture of CAEN. No 2 Army Roadhead however, formed from 104 BMA was located NORTH, EAST and SOUTH of BAYEUX and proved to be an excellent site for supplies with plenty of room, good natural cover and a suitable traffic circuit. Base Supply Depots, from which formations were maintained, were established in both roadheads.

By the end of this phase the Field Service Ration had been introduced but it was wholly a preserved ration except for bread which was available in limited quantities from the beginning of July. It had not proved possible to provide frozen meat during this period although steps were taken to provide cold storage at ARROMANCHES in anticipation of it becoming available.

The storm which lasted from 19 to 22 June caused a virtual cessation of unloading but fortunately substantial reserves had already been built up and 8,200,000 rations, representing approximately fifteen days reserves for the force ashore, were in depots in addition to formation holdings on 19 June against the planned figure of 7,200,000.

(b) coal
Since it was impossible to estimate the precise uses for which coal would be required and in order to have as few different qualities as possible, it was decided to select a coal suitable for several purposes called "GP" or general purpose coal. To facilitate handling all solid fuel was packed in 70 lb bags. About 20,000 tons of coal had been packed in the UK and moved to various ports in ENGLAND and WALES ready to be shipped as required and during the period 6 June-25 July approximately 8,000 tons were shipped to the BRITISH sector and taken on charge by 67 and 73 DIDs. As all cargoes shipped were mixed commodities no vessels were loaded with solid fuel only. These DIDs had been given instruction in handling coal prior to D-day by working for a period with civilian coal merchants.

(c) transport
The planned phasing in of MT units was based on certain known factors such as the minimum tonnage and mileage required to support the assault and the maximum planned capacity of the beaches. There were, in addition, certain forecast factors which were not as certain, such as the build-up of reserves, the progressive build-up of personnel and the forecast of dates for the progress of the operation. In planning these forecasts were treated as firm facts from which the amount of transport required and the dates of landing were calculated. For the many other imponderables, such as rate of depreciation of MT coys by vehicle casualty, the amount of bridging to be undertaken or the requirements for troop carrying at different stages etc., only estimates could be made. Planning proceeded on that basis and Second Army were to be responsible up to D+17 for the phasing in of such units as they thought necessary for normal Base and L of C transport work, beach work, medical etc in addition to their own requirements. For tasks which were not a Second Army responsibility eg construction at PORT EN BESSIN and motor craft for Tn HQ 21 Army Group nominated a few units for phasing in by Second Army. On completion of Second Army planning HQ 21 Army Group phased in all remaining transport units up to D+60.

The most interesting feature concerning transport was undoubtedly the operation of the 2½ ton amphibious truck known as DUKW. Eleven General Transport Companies were equipped with DUKWs, ten of which were employed exclusively in transportation of stores from coasters and other craft lying off the beaches or from MULBERRY B to dumps ashore. Part of the remaining company was used to evacuate casualties from the beaches to LSTs while the rest of it was used to bring stores ashore. The companies were an outstanding success and contributed greatly to the maintenance of the forces over the beaches.

During the 24 hours ending 1800 hours D+5 the quantity of stores carried over the three beaches, SWORD, JUNO and GOLD, by amphibians exceeded 10,850 tons. Thirty-six DUKWs were in need of replacement due to damage: of these, about 60 per cent were damaged by mines, 30 per cent by shell fire and 10 per cent by the torpedoeing of an LST. Drivers of amphibious vehicles had great difficulty in recognising and locating ships in the smoke but managed to achieve five turn-rounds between 0500 hours and 2300 hours daily, which was at times more than shore arrangements could handle. DUKW tyres sustained heavy wear and the need for replacements became acute. Otherwise the spares situation was generally good due to the fact that parts that were urgently required were despatched by air.

The work of the DUKW companies, and of the Tn units, who were already engaged in the construction of MULBERRY B was considerably assisted by two motor boat companies which arrived during the first two days. One equipped with fast launches was employed in the control of DUKWs while the other, equipped with harbour launches, was employed chiefly in the ferrying of Tn personnel. The motor boat companies had a very low incidence of casualties losing only one launch in the operation.

In addition to stores landed by DUKWs RASC transport was employed both to clear beached craft after they had dried out and, to a lesser extent, the stores brought ashore by Rhino ferries. These were taken to sector stores dumps which were sited just off the beaches and later, to BMA depots when they opened on D+2. When roadheads were formed the distance from the beaches to depots was too great for DUKWs and it became necessary to establish transhipment areas into which DUKWs delivered their loads. Those units which were to constitute the basic army transport of Second Army remained under control of army and were allocated to lift stores forward from transhipment areas to roadheads. The remaining general transport was placed under HQ L of C who became responsible for movement of stores in rear of the army roadheads. From the transport point of view this period was characterised by the long hours of the drivers and the bad road conditions which were to have their effect on the vehicles at a later stage.

After D+9 the transport situation changed considerably and there tended to be a surplus of transport for the immediate task, but this reserve was essential in case of a break through. As casualties had been very much lighter than expected the two Ambulance Car Companies in the theatre were only 25 per cent employed during this phase. However, such units as Tipper Companies employed mainly on RE tasks were in great demand and distinguished themselves by their hard work.

(d) pol
It was planned to maintain the forces on the Continent up to D+18 by fuel products packed in UK. The total tonnage involved amounted to 63,000 tons which included the requirements of the RAF. From D+18 onwards although the maximum quantity of packed POL would continue to be imported so that the largest number of containers would be available in the theatre, it was proposed to concentrate on importing increased quantities of bulk petrol.

To make the plan effective, small depots were landed in the early stages to receive packed products and to issue them subsequently as required. By D+1 there were two Petrol Depots type "C" in each of the beach sub areas. The heavy demand for ammunition as early as D+1 caused a reduction in POL tonnage but even though imports were considerably decreased and 100,000 gallons of petrol and derv were lost by enemy action on D+2 a reserve of POL was rapidly built up because the consumption in the small bridgehead was one third of the planned figure. By D+6 1,000,000 gallons of POL were stacked in the depots representing a reserve of approximately 2| days for each vehicle ashore.

While these stocks were accumulating a reconnaissance party had confirmed that PORT EN BESSIN, the small port planned to be used for bulk petrol storage, would be excellent for the purpose. By D+6 the construction of Tombolas, which were pipelines running some hundreds of yards from the water edge to permit deep draught tankers to discharge off-shore, was put in hand. In spite of bad weather and high seas which retarded the construction work the first tombola was working by 24 June and the first load of bulk petrol was discharged from ship to storage at the pumping rate of 80 tons per hour on 30 June. By the end of July storage tanks capable of holding 9,800 tons of MT80 and 2,000 tons of aviation spirit had been completed on shore by the Engineers assisted by Pioneers.

When the army roadheads were functioning the packed petrol imports were divided between them most, however, going to No 2 Army Roadhead at BAYEUX as this was to be the first part of the RMA to be developed.

By 5 July, although bulk petrol was beginning to flow steadily into the theatre, packed products were also arriving in large quantities and in order to deal with this tonnage extra petrol units were landed so that by this time there was one petrol depot type "A", nine type "B" and nineteen type "C" working within the beach-head. Units to handle bulk fuel were also necessary and the first Mobile Petrol Filling Centre arrived on 30 June and the first Bulk Petrol Transport Company on 5 July.

It was confirmed on 20 June that work in UK on PLUTO which was a scheme for laying cross channel oil pipelines on the ocean bed was so far advanced that the project could be launched on the capture of CHERBOURG, where the first lines were to be connected. In the meantime work had proceeded in laying the pipelines in the RMA.

17. Printing and Stationery

The Order of Battle of P & SS on D-day was as follows:-

One mobile duplicating section was allotted to HQ 21 Army Group and one to HQ Second Army. The two BRITISH advanced stationery depots served Second Army and L of C while the CANADIAN advanced stationery depot served First Canadian Army and CANADIAN units on L of C. The remaining units worked as GHQ installations except for the CANADIAN mobile printing section which accompanied HQ First Canadian Army.

Demands for P & SS stores, the first of which emanated from the theatre on 11 June, were met by express coaster consignments until the advanced stationery depot for Second Army began to function on 7 July. By 16 July the depot was functioning to capacity but the unprecedented rate of consumption of certain items especially those used in the production of fire plans necessitated the shipment of a considerable quantity of stores by express coaster after that date. On 20 July the depot which was to serve L of C arrived but the CANADIAN advanced stationery depot was delayed some weeks.

Considering the size and nature of the operation, the number of typewriters lost or damaged beyond repair during the assault, or by subsequent enemy action, was surprisingly small.

The only printing unit in the theatre during the period under review was the mobile duplicating section attached to HQ Second Army. It arrived on 2 July and started functioning at VAUX-SUR-SEULLES on 6 July when it produced the first issue of "Second Army Troops News" which was produced daily thereafter. All other printing required by the force was produced in UK and all military publications, including the weekly 21 Army Group General Routine Orders, C-in-C's messages of 6 and 10 June and 11 July etc., were distributed from UK.

18. Ordnance

(a) maintenance
For the first four weeks the force was maintained from special packs of stores known as "Landing Reserves" each one comprising approximately 8,000 cases calculated to maintain a brigade group or equivalent formation in ordnance stores for thirty days. For planning purposes and to allow for losses, delays in off-loading and to ensure adequate reserves to meet possible heavy demands, it was assumed that one of these sets would maintain a brigade for fifteen days only. The quantity and nature of the stores in each set was based upon experience gained during previous operations and included special sets to maintain such equipment as AVsRE and Flails.

From D+26 the force was maintained from Beach Maintenance Packs, similar to LRs, but containing a more comprehensive range of stores sufficient to maintain a division or equivalent formation for thirty days, plus some special packs for the maintenance of particular equipments. One BMP for a division weighed approximately 500 tons and contained some 12,000 cases.

From approximately D+100 onwards, maintenance was to be carried out in the form of Standard Maintenance Packs which included spare parts for heavy artillery, signal and wireless stores, clothing and general stores, sufficient to cover the needs of the force apart from fourth line repairs of vehicles and equipments which were not in any case carried out in the theatre.

The residue of stores from one period of maintenance was used in succeeding periods.

In addition to the stores held by OBDs, all formations ashore were supported by the Ordnance Field Parks who landed complete with spare parts and complete equipments such as guns, small arms, wireless sets etc. and vehicles for issue to units of their formation. The OFPs were mobile and sited well forward in order that their stocks would be readily accessible to units. Replenishment of stocks of the OFPs was made from the BMA and RMA depots.

Maintenance of the force in ordnance stores was based on the fact that UK would remain the base and that only advanced depots holding a limited range of stores would be located in the theatre of operations. It was realised therefore that not all of the stores required by units would be available from theatre reserves, either because stocks were temporarily depleted or because they did not come within the range of LRs, BMRs or other phased programmes.

To meet such demands a special arrangements was made with UK depots whereby the indents were sent by fast boat or air to an Indent Clearing Centre in UK, whence they were sent to the depots in UK holding the type of stores concerned. Priority was given by these depots to the despatch of such stores, which were sent to a transit depot in UK for co-ordination and shipment to this theatre in a small coaster known as the "Ord Ship". Such stores were handled by a Stores Transit Sub Depot in the AOD who assembled all stores for a formation and arranged direct delivery. In the case of operationally urgent stores fast coaster or aircraft were used to bring the stores over.

(b) ordnance build-up
The first ordnance units to land on D-day were six OBDs capable of handling all types of ordnance stores, two Independent Ammunition Companies to assist the ammunition sections of the OBDs, two Port Ammunition Detachments and one Port Ordnance Detachment for supervising the unloading of ammunition and stores from the ships. These units had the task of maintaining the assault troops with stores from the LRs. In the first place however, dumps were established just off the beaches on D-day and D+1, comprised mainly of ammunition, survivors' kits, blankets and stretchers.

By D+1 reconnaissances were being made of the sites for BMA dumps to be established a few miles inland to hold the LRs and ammunition.

Throughout the campaign all units in the theatre had left in the UK some of their unit equipment not immediately required, thus ensuring full mobility on landing. This remaining equipment was shipped separately as "unaccompanied G1098" which was assembled in ordnance depots on arrival in the theatre and issued to the units concerned.

On D+2 and D+3 detachments of 17 BAD, 17 Vehicle Company of 17 AOD and two Ordnance Maintenance Companies landed to recce sites for permanent depots in what was to become the RMA. Unfortunately the recce party of 17 AOD was torpedoed and almost completely lost but another was organised and landed with the advance party on D+7. The three Stores Companies of 16 AOD also landed with 17 AOD and were merged and operated with the latter.

The site chosen for 17 AOD near VAUX-SUR-AURE proved satisfactory but initial difficulties were experienced because that area was occupied at the same time by two divisions and a tank transporter column. It opened however, for issues on D+26 from BMPs and LRs, the latter having been diverted from OBDs from D+7 onwards. The stormy weather at this period seriously delayed the build-up of ordnance reserves to the extent that by D+23 only 19,139 tons out of the planned 39,240 tons of stores had been landed. Arrangements were made to open OBD stocks in the BMA to OFP and for Ordnance Sub Parks to commence demanding on the AOD.

Final disbandment of the OBDs was carried out at a much later date and the personnel then became available for other duties such as tank kitting sections for corps, staffing Officers' Shops etc. On the closing down of the OBDs all stocks of their controlled stores were transferred to No 1 Ordnance Maintenance Company to form an initial army reserve of two days' wastage of stores for Second Army. The other ord maint coy (No 1 Canadian Ord Maint Coy) subsequently became the army roadhead depot for First Canadian Army.

17 Veh Coy brought in their first reserve vehicles on D+7 and set up a vehicle park in the vicinity of 17 AOD. Another vehicle company landed on D+18 with the first of the phased programme vehicles, the drivers then returning to UK to bring over more vehicles.

The first Mobile Laundry and Bath Units landed on D+12. The bath sections of these units operated with forward units, often under shell and mortar fire, providing a change of clothing and baths for the troops. The laundry sections in the early stages of the campaign concentrated on providing clean linen and clothing for hospitals until relieved by base hospital laundries. One MLBU is capable of providing clean underclothing and a bath for every man in a division once per week.

An Army Industrial Gas Unit landed on D+18 to produce oxygen and acetylene for workshops, RE Services and medical Units, which helped the shipping problem by reducing the back-loading of empty cylinders to UK for refilling.

On D+22 the recce party of 14 AOD which was to be the main ordnance depot in the RMA landed; it was planned to open the depot in the CAEN area but as this was still in enemy hands and it was necessary to press ahead with the preparation of the depot, it was sited at AUDRIEUX. An immense amount of work was necessary to transform the open countryside into a semi-permanent depot. It was necessary to drain the whole area and then erect 200 steel framed canvas huts. Roads were made and railway spurs run into the depot from the adjacent main line.

During the time 14 AOD was building up its depot and preparing to issue stores from standard maintenance packs, 17 AOD continued to maintain the force from BMPs and the residue of LRs.

(c) ammunition
Ammunition requirements for the force were phased in at special assault rates to replace estimated expenditure until D+3, with reserves calculated at 21 Army Group rates of wastage. Then, both replacement of expenditure and reserves were phased in at 21 Army Group rates until after D+31 when FFC intense rates were used. Initially ammunition was received by the ammunition sections of the OBDs assisted by the ammunition companies under the direction of corps acting through the beach sub areas. HQ 17 BAD landed on D+5 to co-ordinate the activities of all ammunition depots ashore under the direction of HQ Second Army who assumed administrative responsibility for all stores depots and ammunition depots in the theatre on that day. On D+12, 15 BAD took over the ammunition dump in 104 Beach Sub Area, thus forming the ammunition dump for No 2 L of C Terminal (No 2 Army Roadhead) leaving 17 BAD free to take over the two ammunition dumps in 101 and 102 Beach Sub Areas, thereby forming the ammunition dump for No 1 L of C Terminal (No 1 Army Roadhead). 12 BAD landed on D+18 and was sited adjacent to 15 BAD but did not open for issues until D+32 owing to the fact that operational troops were located within the BAD area.

All ammunition dumps in the bridgehead were laid out in accordance with the "User Type Principle" which was found to be most satisfactory, and speeded up the handover of ammunition to formations and units when collecting ammunition. Briefly this principle involved dividing dumps into areas each capable of holding ten to twenty thousand tons. These areas were then subdivided into the following groups:-

Group 1 - AA ammunition
Group 2 - Fd arty ammunition
Group 3 - Tk and A.tk ammunition
Group 4 - Med and hy arty ammunition
Group 5 - Inf ammunition
Group 6 - Demolitions and associated RE stores

Very little ammunition was lost due to enemy action except for a total of about 400 tons in the 101 Sub Area dump hit by shell fire during June.

Very heavy tonnages were handled by all ammunition units in the bridgehead. On D-day alone, 6,500 tons were landed and during the first ten days over 80,000 tons were landed to say nothing of heavy issues being handled at the same time. The average daily tonnage handled by the two BADs during the first two months of the campaign was 8,230, the peak day being 16,600, in comparison with the figure of 2,000 tons per day normally expected to be handled by a BAD. The maximum tonnage held at any one time during this period was 125,765 tons.

Extensive use was made of pioneer companies in handling this enormous tonnage.

19. REME

The first REME elements ashore were the beach armoured recovery vehicles of the beach recovery sections which landed immediately after the assault to be closely followed by D-8 crawler tractors and wheeled recovery vehicles. These beach recovery vehicles worked extremely hard under most adverse conditions as in places they were under shell fire and at night recovery work was made even more difficult by the presence of mines and explosive charges secured to under-water obstacles, to say nothing of the nightly visits from enemy aircraft. "Drowned" vehicle parks were established near the beaches for the repair of drowned tanks, guns and "B" vehicles. In actual fact less than five per cent of the vehicles landed were drowned and even these were due not so much to faulty waterproofing but to a tendency for the craft carrying them to be beached in more than four feet of water. It was conclusively proved that well trained unit drivers are fully capable of waterproofing their own vehicles.

Under command of 1 Corps for the assault were eleven 2nd line workshops and four 3rd line workshops in addition to three beach recovery sections and one recovery company, consisting of three light and one heavy sections. Armoured brigade workshops were given first priority in the phasing in, followed by corps troops workshops scaled for gun repair work. By D+3 seventy-five per cent of these workshops had landed and on the afternoon of D+1 three complete workshops, on assault scales, were already functioning.

30 Corps controlled units consisting of three beach recovery sections, one light recovery section and two composite workshops which were responsible for all repair and recovery in the BMA leaving the LADs and brigade workshops free to follow up their own units and formations. The composite workshops including attached specialist personnel for dealing with such equipment as AVsRE and Flails accompanied by the light recovery sections landed on the first and second tides of D-day. Between D+2 and D+11 669 vehicles were brought into the workshops of 30 Corps, 509 were repaired and returned to units and 130 classified as beyond local repair, the remainder being written off.

During the relatively static period after the initial assault the build-up of REME continued and the layout of its units in the RMA was planned in detail. 1 Corps were fortunate in that they had a suitable area of hard ground of which they made the best use by forming a "REME Workshop Area" which contained the corps troops workshop, two brigade workshops, four 3rd line workshops, a recovery company and a corps back-loading point. It was found that the constant moves of divisions during this period from one sector to another considerably reduced output as they took their 3rd line workshops with them. It was therefore arranged that as a general rule 3rd line workshops would not move from one corps to another but that each would have under command two armoured troops workshops and two infantry troops workshops whatever formations happened to be under command.

Due to lack of MT and gun spares it was necessary to cannibalise to a considerable extent and as a result 2nd and 3rd line workshops carried out work in excess of that laid down in permissive repair schedules. However, cannibalisation was essential in view of the urgent necessity of getting fighting equipment back into action and more than justified itself by the results obtained by the LADs of 6 Airborne Division, who, working under heavy shell and mortar fire to the EAST of the River ORNE, got equipment back to the division which could never have been repaired in time had spares been awaited. The scrap section of 1 Corps' back-loading point was called a "Help Yourself" park at first and was extremely useful to unit fitters who obtained many spares direct from the park. It was estimated that twenty per cent of all spares used in the early stages were obtained from this source which continued to prove invaluable when properly controlled for the use of REME and RASC only. In the main, however, spares were obtained from BMPs which functioned well except that identification was slow.

AFV Servicing Units whose task it was to service reserve "A" vehicles before being passed forward to the Armoured Replacement Group were not functioning until D+20. They were due to land on D+12 but bad weather conditions and alterations in the build-up delayed their arrival. In consequence a considerable number of reserve tanks awaiting servicing had accumulated and this back-log was never caught up.

The 8 Corps armoured thrust during this period involved about one thousand tanks operating on a narrow front. There were twelve bridge crossings over the River ORNE and CAEN canal necessitating much recovery work and most of the recovery company was sited near the bridges. During the battle which followed most of the work of this company had to be carried out under very difficult conditions.

21 Advance Base Workshop which landed complete over the beaches on D+40 was working within four days of landing. This unit, although nominally 4th line heavy repair workshops and under normal conditions static, was in fact made fully mobile with all heavy machinery mounted on trailers.

Two special projects undertaken at this time are of interest. The AMERICANS were successfully using heavy fork-like attachments on the front of Sherman tanks for clearing hedgerows and undergrowth from the path of the tanks in the heavily wooded Bocage country. REME were asked to produce twenty-four samples for trial with BRITISH units. These twenty-four were made in three days from steel girders forming part of GERMAN underwater obstacles.

The second unusual task was a demand for the manufacture of one hundred and fifty penicillin sprays. These were made in fourteen days although no drawings were available. A sample sent from UK was used as a guide. Over one hundred more were manufactured at a later date.

20. Claims and Hirings

The Directorate of Claims and Hirings was responsible for the disposal of all claims other than those arising out of contract or war damage and for the requisitioning and or hiring of land and buildings within 21 Army Group area. During June and July a total of 1,185 claims were received and 728 disposed of. In the same period 1,291 requisitions of real estate were recorded.

The first Claims and Hirings District Office was opened at BAYEUX on 16 June with sub offices at ARROMANCHES, COURSEULLES, PORT EN BESSIN, LUC-SUR-MER and CREPON. Subsequently it was found that the existence of the sub offices involved complications, particularly in the matter of records and finance, and from the middle of July onwards these offices were gradually closed and the personnel absorbed by the district offices as the bridgehead was expanded.

The Claims and Hirings detachment for Second Army reported to Rear HQ at BANVILLE on 2 July and officers were attached to Adm HQ First Canadian Army from 22 July. Elements were also attached to the various corps HQ. The presence of these officers with army and corps HQ proved to be of considerable assistance in regard to quartering, and their presence in the forward areas enabled them to dispose of certain claims which, had they remained outstanding, might have caused some ill-feeling between the inhabitants and the operational troops.

Intelligence summaries were also prepared from reconnaissance made of recently captured towns and villages with a view to ascertaining the proportion of loss attributable to GERMAN or civilian looting or to war damage. These reports proved of considerable assistance when claims were subsequently made under more static conditions.

In this phase the technical policy regarding both Claims and Hirings remained as it had been developed in ENGLAND and laid down in the Claims and Hirings manuals issued to all the officers of the Directorate. It was based on the assumption that FRENCH local administration would be found to be considerably disrupted, but this was not the case and it was decided that it would be able to function with reasonable efficiency within a short time. Discussions were begun with representatives of the FRENCH Intendence with a view to the Directorate confining itself to the service of requisition demands on the local authorities leaving the FRENCH Government to carry out all subsequent regularisation including the assessment and payment of compensation for the occupations in accordance with the normal Intendence practice. These discussions were satisfactorily concluded in August.

21. Labour

The policy for the employment of labour was to retain as great a proportion as possible on a pool basis. The only exceptions to this rule were fixed allotments of:-

(a) Ten companies to airfield construction
(b) Fourteen companies to Tn
(c) Four companies to Smoke Control
(d) Four companies for pipeline construction.

On D-day thirteen pioneer companies landed on the beaches on the first tide and ten more on the second. By the end of D+2, the finish of the initial assault, three Pioneer Group HQs and forty-two companies had landed and by D+5 the total had increased to ten groups and sixty-three companies.

The role of one assault company is typical of the rest. The men were divided into serials each with a particular task and on separate landing craft. The first serial was made up of one officer and seventeen men who landed at H+20 minutes to clear mines and to dig the command post in readiness for the beach group commander and his staff. Eight serials, each with one corporal and 6 men landed with REs at H+45 minutes to establish eight exits from the beaches to a lateral road by laying down Sommerfeld track. Three serials, each commanded by an officer, landed at H+100 minutes to reconnoitre two miles inland for a place to establish and dig in the beach sub area HQ.

Other companies which landed later on D-day, unloaded and assembled bridging equipment and assisted in the preparation of bridge approaches. Some felled timber to construct corduroy roads while others demolished road blocks. Three companies specially trained in first aid and stretcher bearing were allotted to the beach sub areas and other companies off-loaded assault craft and began the build-up of beach stores depots.

All anticipated commitments for the initial stages had been covered in the plan but the ways in which labour would have to be used in the first few days could not be entirely foreseen and therefore an Assistant Director of Labour was appointed to each of the two corps to act as labour adviser and to co-ordinate the work of Group HQ. As these were phased in they quickly took over operational command of their companies and brought back into the general labour pool those which had been married to a particular service for the assault.

By 25 July all but ten companies of the entire Pioneer Corps Order of Battle comprising thirty-five groups, two hundred and fifteen companies and twenty Administrative Units (Civil Labour) totalling 63,000 officers and men, had been phased into the bridgehead. During the build-up ten companies were employed on making tactical air landing strips and one group and four companies were used on constructing the landward extension of PLUTO. Casualty Clearing Stations and hospitals received an allotment of Pioneers for general duty work and stretcher bearing. Four companies were used initially for unloading ships at MULBERRY B and others were employed unloading ammunition, petrol and supplies in the transhipment area, the army roadheads and corps FMCs. At one time twenty companies were employed repairing roads in the beach-head and constructing new by-passes. Other companies were attached to divisional REs for forward road work and bridging, and REME employed sections for repairing and salvaging landing craft and tanks.

When First Canadian Army arrived in the bridgehead it assumed command of all pioneer companies employed with Canadian Army formations and roadheads. For the assault seven groups and thirty-seven companies out of L of C pioneer resources were placed under command of Second Army, all of which were to be returned when control of the RMA became a L of C responsibility. Some of these units, however, had been necessarily committed to tasks of a forward operational nature. Thus, when L of C installations were phased in they had in some cases to employ units which were unaccustomed to their particular stores, habits and organisation.

It had always been the plan to supplement military labour by some form of civil labour and for this purpose AUCLs were formed and were responsible for employing and paying all available civil labour required by the employing Services in liberated territory. As NORMANDY was largely agricultural with a small population, only 756 civilians were employed by D+30 but also working within the bridgehead at the same time were two mobile labour groups employing 500 civilians recruited from those who had been bombed out or who were ready to leave their homes.

During this phase the multiplicity of commitments which could not be foreseen in planning and which the Labour Directorate was called on to fulfil at short notice, was met by phasing forward units from UK before the L of C installations they had been planned to work with were required in the beach-head.

22. Veterinary and Remount

There were no V and R units included in the Order of Battle of 21 Army Group at this stage except a HQ staff consisting of a lieutenant colonel, major and three clerks. As there were no veterinary officers on the staff of Civil Affairs the V and R staff was sometimes called upon for technical advice concerning civilian owned stock. In July V and R 21 Army Group assumed veterinary responsibility for all dogs on the strength of units in the Order of Battle. As far as possible all dogs had been inoculated against rabies before despatch to BLA.

In order to cope with the large number of horses which it was expected would be captured, mobilisation of a Veteninary and Remount Conducting Section was requested, to serve as a war dogs hospital in addition to its normal functions.

No animals were held by any units except war dogs which were employed by certain CMP(VP) companies and by special RE dog platoons for mine detection. Approximately 400 RUSSIAN and POLISH ponies were captured but not being suitable for employment with the BRITISH Army were handed over to FRENCH farmers. Release of a supply of drugs and instruments to the FRENCH was arranged from army veterinary stores in UK.

23. Salvage

Until the arrival of a Field Salvage Unit and a Salvage Collecting Centre Unit on D+8 small dumps along the beaches were manned by beach group personnel under the direction of the AD Salvage, Second Army and an Area Salvage Officer with HQ L of C. By D+23 there were six dumps in operation including those at No 1 Roadhead and No 2 Roadhead and the latter had handled over 1,000 tons of material.

Large quantities of airborne equipment were sorted at the dump at OUISTREHAM and shipped to the UK before the end of June. The recovery of parachutes was not good however, as many of them were retained by troops and civilians for the silk.

Early in the operation it was decided that ammunition empties would be returned through salvage channels. Extra pioneer labour was permanently allotted to FMCs and roadheads for this commitment which continued throughout the campaign.

The first Base Salvage Depot was opened at CANCAGNY in the RMA on 24 July. The total tonnage of serviceable stores returned to Ordnance during this period was 7,328 tons.

24. Fire

Fire protection on land during the assault was provided by six Fire Fighting Companies, each consisting of a HQ and two First Class Fire Brigades. One company was responsible for each of the three beach sub areas, two companies for MULBERRY B, the RMA and No 2 Army Roadhead while the sixth was responsible for the defence of PORT EN BESSIN and the bulk petrol installations.

The plan for sea fire defence provided for one Fire Boat Company of nineteen fire boat sections to operate as follows:-

This plan was not implemented in full owing to the fact that fire boats were not completed by contractors in time and during the early stages of the campaign there were not more than six army fire boats operating at MULBERRY B, PORT EN BESSIN and off the beaches. The company HQ was located at MULBERRY B.

During the dry weather in June the main problem was the provision of adequate water supply in the vicinity of dumps and depots. This was solved by the use of static tanks and basins among the depots in the RMA and by filling shell holes and bomb craters in No 2 Army Roadhead. A water pipe line was run from ARROMANCHES harbour to feed static basins in the transhipment area and a similar line from PORT EN BESSIN provided the water necessary for the protection of the petrol storage tanks in that area. In No 1 Army Roadhead it was necessary to depend almost entirely on the water carried in fire tenders.

Control centres for the receipt of fire calls and despatch of AFS units were established at PORT EN BESSIN, BAYEUX, ARROMANCHES, COURSEULLES, OUISTREHAM and DOUVRES-LA-DELIVRANDE.

The total number of fires attended by Army Fire Service during this phase was 109 of which 44 were caused by enemy action: six of these were major fires. During the critical weather period in June sections of MULBERRY B were kept afloat by continual pumping from fire boats which also carried out much salvage work among shipping.

25. NAAFI/EFI

The first EFI personnel were landed on D+17 and on the following day they established the first Base Canteen Depot (BCD) under canvas at SULLY. Within six days the BCD was being supplied direct from MULBERRY and arrangements made with RASC for the handling of EFI stores.

To supply troops who arrived up to D+30 issues of NAAFI/EFI special packs were made. These packs were designed to provide cigarettes, matches, stationery, razor blades, soap etc for thirty men for twenty-one days and were in addition to 17,500,000 cigarettes and 3,140 lbs of tobacco issued free during the early stages of the campaign.

On 13 July eight Bulk Issue Stores were opened and the first two mobile canteens started operating while on 20 July the first "Nobby Bar" opened in CAEN, and a further eighteen mobile canteens were on the road.

26. Reinforcements

As foreseen, it proved impossible in the early stages to submit formal demands for reinforcements by arms of Services and trades and it was not until D+28 that GHQ 2nd Echelon was able to render the first full return to the War Office. Subsequently these demands were made at intervals of fourteen days. Reinforcements supplied by the War Office were despatched to four reinforcements groups which, although in UK, operated under the control of 21 Army Group. Personnel drafts were called forward from these groups to the Continent as required.

From D-day until D+8 reinforcements were despatched from UK to Corps Reception Camps located in the BMAs and then distributed to units in the corps. In order to help the control and documentation of reinforcement personnel, a small clerical staff from GHQ 2nd Echelon (BRITISH) was attached to each CRC, while a representative of GHQ 2nd Echelon (CANADIAN) was attached to 1 Corps Reception Camp to control the postings of CANADIAN personnel. When HQ Second Army arrived in the theatre the Advance Reinforcement Sections of GHQ 2nd Echelon (BRITISH) and GHQ 2nd Echelon (CANADIAN) also established themselves in the beach head. These arrivals made adjustments to the predetermined planned drafts possible and also provided machinery for demanding personnel that were urgently required. HQ 21 Army Group arranged facilities for the despatch of such reinforcements at twelve hours notice from the UK. On D+8 101 Rft Gp which previously had been allotted to Second Army landed on the Continent and set up in the area of BAYEUX. From that day reinforcements were despatched from the beaches to 101 Rft Gp and therefore came under control of HQ Second Army who authorised their postings to units.

For the period D to D+17 drafts of reinforcements had been prepared in accordance with the planning demands of divisions. In addition, 101 Rft Gp was scheduled to land with 6,000 officers and men by D+8. For the first few days the build-up of reinforcements proceeded according to this plan but on D+8 there were sufficient reserves in the beach-head to warrant the postponement of the scheduled landings for two days.

From D-day to 26 July, 44,563 BRITISH and 13,323 CANADIAN reinforcements were despatched from UK to the Continent for 21 Army Group. These totals fell far short of the planned figures as, owing to the casualties being lighter than was expected, the wastage during the first month was reduced by fifty per cent of the estimate.

101 Rft Gp experienced great difficulty at the start as it had been allotted only three platoons of transport to convey reinforcements to units in different parts of the beach-head. Furthermore some drafts from UK arrived badly kitted and no stocks existed in the holding units at this time to make up any deficiencies.

27. Discipline

(a) policy
While the units and formations of 21 Army Group were stationed in the UK the responsibility for the detailed administration of discipline was placed on the Home Commands but all matters of policy affecting them were the responsibility of HQ 21 Army Group.

The Commander-in-Chief received from His Majesty a warrant to convene General Courts Martial and to confirm findings and sentences in the field. Delegated warrants were issued to the Commanders of First Canadian Army, Second Army, and to Corps Commanders and Commander L of C.

It was the policy of 21 Army Group to retain in the theatre any soldiers who were convicted of a military offence and sentenced to detention, imprisonment or penal servitude and to hold them in 21 Army Group penal establishments. It was considered essential, however, that up to the time these penal establishments arrived in the theatre, soldiers under sentence should be evacuated, and by the middle of July the following numbers had been despatched under escort to the UK:-

Sentenced to penal servitude - 48
Sentenced to imprisonment of over one year - 19
Sentenced to punishment other than the above - 38

The escorts were provided from the theatre and the soldiers were handed over to Garrison HQ SOUTHAMPTON who became responsible for their disposal.

A certain number of troops absented themselves from their units prior to D-day. The policy of HQ 21 Army Group in dealing with these absentees was to despatch them when they were apprehended to a Reinforcement Holding Unit and to ensure that they were sent overseas with their unit or with an early reinforcement draft.

(b) military prisons
One Military Prison large enough to hold 500 soldiers under sentence and five Field-Punishment Camps each to hold 150 were allocated to 21 Army Group. First Canadian Army was to establish its own field punishment camp but was not to have a military prison as all soldiers sentenced to one year's detention or more were to be evacuated from the theatre. No 5 Field Punishment Camp arrived on the Continent on 23 June, opened on 18 July and held forty-six soldiers under detention on 26 July.

(c) courts martial
HQ 21 Army Group had planned to have two Court Martial Centres at its disposal. The objects of these centres were:-

(i) To relieve units in the line of the responsibility of paper work in connection with trials.
(ii) To hasten the disposal of cases.
(iii) To hold courts which would sit permanently and be presided over by a permanent president.
(iv) To relieve units of the responsibility of guarding soldiers awaiting trial, promulgation or committal.

A centre accommodated 150 soldiers and was designed to try 100 cases a week. Fifteen permanent presidents of FGCsM were allocated to 21 Army Group.

It was decided to utilise permanent presidents for the following reasons:-

(i) To relieve fighting units of the responsibility of providing a senior officer as president of FGCsM.
(ii) To ensure that similar sentences were awarded in all formations for similar offences.
(iii) To endeavour to prevent technical errors in procedure which often lead to the quashing of convictions.

Permanent presidents landed with the assault corps and were required to preside at FGCsM almost immediately. Some of the officers chosen for this responsibility were proved to be too old or of a too low medical category to conduct trials under the battle conditions which prevailed during the early days, and were consequently relieved of their appointments.

28. Prisoners of War

In order to relieve the fighting troops of the administrative task of looking after prisoners of war, it was decided that in the initial stages, until PW camps were established, all prisoners would be evacuated to the UK as they accumulated day by day. Escorts provided by the War Office from D+1 were based on SOUTHAMTON and crossed to the beach-head in specified LSTs to collect prisoners. The arrangement did not always work smoothly. This was due to the LSTs being unable to wait off-shore long enough to allow the escorts to land and locate their prisoners, and also to the fact that owing to the irregular arrival of LSTs, prisoners were not always ready to be embarked when required. In the early stages no documentation was carried out until the prisoners reached UK.

Six PW camps, each scheduled to accommodate 200 officers and 2,000 ORs were put at the disposal of 21 Army Group. The first of these arrived on the beaches on D+1 and was employed under command of Second Army as a collection and transit centre. Another arrived on D+5 and set up a transit cage at ARROMANCHES. When these camps were established documentation was carried out on the Continent for those PW who were to be retained in the theatre for labour. The policy of evacuating prisoners to the UK continued.

Plans had been made to handle PW in the initial stages on the following scale:-

This estimate however, far exceeded the total number of captured, which by 26 July amounted to only 12,153.

One unexpected problem arose when it was discovered that many prisoners were in possession of large sums of FRENCH currency, some having as much as 15,000 francs in their possession. PW are usually allowed to retain all their property until they reach the base camps and are registered. It was undesirable to allow them to retain these large amounts because the money was a potential aid to escape and also tempted soldiers to trade with prisoners at exorbitant prices. The bulk of this money was therefore withdrawn at army PW cages and handed to the field cashier for retention on behalf of the prisoner concerned.

The prisoners taken during this period were amenable to control, assisted in making their own cages, and made few attempts to escape. They included persons of nationalities other than GERMAN, with RUSSIANS and POLES predominating.

29. Chaplains

Two DACsG and forty to fifty other chaplains landed during the first 24 hours. The work of spiritual ministration to troops was carried on in the forward areas with good effect on morale.

During the whole of this first period it was noticeable that units were punctilious about burying their own dead, but unwilling to dispose of fatal casualties of other units, even though the bodies were within the unit area. This had an adverse affect on the morale of those in the area.

30. Medical

(a) medical build-up
A diagram illustrating the medical layout at D+24 is shown at Appendix "L1".

In the assault stage of the operation Field Ambulances landed with brigades and battalions as planned, and each beach group landed on D-day with a self-contained medical organisation comprising two Field Dressing Stations, two Field Surgical Units and a Field Transfusion Unit supplemented by small surgical teams. With the exception of the right flank where the landings met opposition at LE HAMEL, field dressing stations were working and surgeons were performing operations in all the beach groups by H+90.

By D+2 it was possible to concentrate the Casualty Clearing Stations and the hospitals which began to arrive at the beach-head into three principal medical areas, HERMANVILLE, REVIERS and RYES. By D+6 it was necessary to close down the area at HERMANVILLE to make way for the expansion of a neighbouring ammunition depot, and a new medical site was chosen at LA DELIVRANDE. In the latter part of June a fourth area was developed near BAYEUX. The field dressing stations within the corps were situated near the casualty clearing stations and attended to the lightly wounded, exhaustion cases and sick, leaving the CCS clear to handle major casualties. The hospitals in the rear medical areas received casualties from the corps CCS. Early in July BAYEUX developed into the main L of C hospital area, and when HQ L of C took over administrative command of the bridgehead on 13 July it also took over the RE VIERS concentration of hospitals. The RYES area was closed down, and when, in the meantime, First Canadian Army assumed responsibility for the LA DELIVRANDE group, there remained two main hospital areas. For most of July the Second Army hospitals remained static and in the latter part of the month closed in readiness to move forward.

(b) evacuation by sea and Air
Casualty Evacuation Posts were established on each of the three beach sectors on D-day but enemy shelling caused the CEP on SWORD sector to close down after the first few days, and all its casualties for evacuation were sent to the CEP on MIKE beach. Later the evacuation of casualties was further simplified by concentrating the casualties in JIG and MIKE beaches. This central CEP at COURSEULLES was enlarged and formed out of two FDS, two FSU and one FTU. It had accommodation for 1,500 casualties and held cases until shipping and weather permitted evacuation. Evacuation to UK was carried out by means of LSTs modified to carry stretcher cases, hospital carriers and medically manned LSTs for walking wounded. These were loaded initially off-shore by DUKWs specially allotted for medical purposes. On D-day and D+1 the rough sea made evacuation difficult and if a decision had not been taken to beach the LSTs, the evacuation of casualties would have ceased and the CEPs would have been overcrowded. The policy of using medically adapted LSTs, and setting aside DUKWs for medical purposes worked extremely satisfactorily; there were, however, misunderstandings and difficulties concerning the arrival of hospital carriers. Eventually it became routine for an officer of the CEP to meet the carriers in a DUKW and guide them to the proper anchorage. By 26 July 38,581 casualties (including sick) had been evacuated to UK by sea. Evacuation by air began on 13 June which was a week earlier than had been anticipated in planning. Air evacuation was more uncertain than sea evacuation because the airfields on which suitable aircraft arrived changed constantly and there was always uncertainty as to the number of aircraft available. The problem was also complicated because no facilities existed on the air strip for holding casualties. Consequently no preparations could be made for evacuation until the aircraft had landed, and in a congested beach-head it was not always possible to deliver casualties at the air strip on time. The necessity for dual documentation was another factor which caused a heavy strain on fighting units. On 18 June ,however, the whole evacuation scheme was centralised under 11 L of C. A Medical Air Liaison Officer was attached to 83 Group RAF, 81 General Hospital, and later, 77 General Hospital at REVIERS was made the principal collecting centre for casualties to be evacuated by air, and a single air strip was selected for evacuation purposes. RAF Casualty Air Evacuation Units began to arrive at this time arid assisted in holding casualties on the airfield until aircraft were available. The holding capacity of these units was not large enough to deal with the numbers to be evacuated and on several occasions a FDS or CCS was sited to help out in this task. The number evacuated by air up to 26 July was 7,719.

(c) medical stores
There was no shortage of medical stores in the assault period and only minor losses of equipment occurred. The system of supply over the beaches depended on the daily delivery of Medical Beach Maintenance Blocks, each composed of two half blocks weighing 25 cwts and containing items of medical equipment designed to meet all reasonable demands until Advance Depots Medical Stores were established. Two of these were sent over in split loads of five and ten tons between D+3 and D+10. This was considered necessary in view of possible sinkings. In addition six tons of medical equipment were preloaded on RASC transport to augment the medical maintenance blocks.

(d) blood transfusion
To meet the expected demands for transfusion fluids in the early days of the operation, the following arrangements were made:-

(i) Special issues of blood were made to the assault forces.
(ii) FTUs landed with an estimated supply to last two days.
(iii) Transfusion fluids were included in the maintenance blocks.
(iv) Two Advance Blood Banks were landed on D+3 and allocated to each of the corps fronts.
(v) Supplies of whole blood were sent initially from UK by naval despatch launch and later from D+16 by air.

In a later stage of the campaign the two blood banks which had been allocated to the assault corps were put at the disposal of First Canadian and Second British Armies. These were supplied with blood from No 1 Blood Transfusion Unit which landed on D+16 and set up at BAYEUX. The supply to corps and divisional medical units was maintained by a daily service of trucks carrying blood from the army advanced blood bank. Penicillin was also distributed through the agency of the Blood Transfusion Service. During this phase the following quantities of blood, plasma and penicillin were used:-

Blood - 18,000 pints
Plasma - 15,000 pints
Penicillin - 2,400 mega units

(e) exhaustion
The incidence of cases of exhaustion rose steeply from the beginning of July (2.5 per 1000 per week) to the week ending 22 July (5.63 per 1000). Enemy mortar fire was stated to be the main cause of the collapse of these psychiatric cases. To deal with them Divisional Exhaustion Centres were opened, where casualties who could be quickly cured were admitted for four or five days. Corps Exhaustion Centres admitted casualties evacuated from divisional level for seven days' treatment. Beyond these at the Army Centres and at the Second Army Rest Camp men were treated and then given a period of convalescence. Over 65 per cent of exhaustion casualties were returned to duty in the theatre. Of these 50 per cent returned to full duty, and the other 15 per cent to duty in a reduced medical category. A note on psychiatric cases is at Appendix "L3".

(f) dental
The employment of Mobile Dental Units at a distance of two or three miles in the rear of troops engaged in battle was fully justified, for the dentists were able to give treatment in the battle zone and retain the services of men of operational units, who would otherwise have been evacuated to the rear areas.

(g) hygiene
The solution of hygiene questions did not present any serious difficulties. The water supply was not tampered with by the enemy, but required strict supervision. Flies began to appear in large numbers and anti-fly precautions were improvised until fly-proofing materials arrived.

(h) female nursing
Nursing sisters began to arrive in the theatre from D+10 onwards. Their arrival was much appreciated because they improved the standard of post-operation treatment tremendously.

A graph illustrating battle casualties is at Appendix "M".

31. Pay

Throughout the early days of the operation the work of Imprest holders in operational units, the supply of funds, and the accounting for expenditure, worked smoothly and on simple lines, because the change-over to the Active Service System of accounting had taken place as soon as units entered the concentration areas. All the difficulties which the change entailed had been met and overcome before the operation began. Each officer landed with an advance of pay book and every Imprest holder had previous contact with the appropriate cashier, and was familiar with the procedure for drawing and accounting for Imprest funds in the field.

As there was a possibility that the enemy in retreat would destroy large quantities of FRENCH currency notes, supplemental FRENCH francs were specially printed in AMERICA to meet the emergency. Of the total number printed the share allotted to 21 Army Group was 2,899,500,000 francs. By agreement with the FRENCH Provisional Government the rate of exchange was fixed at 200 francs to the pound sterling.

Immediately prior to embarkation all ranks were paid 200 francs. Corps and divisional Field Cashiers embarked with a set of seven boxes of currency specially prepared in suitable note denominations and waterproofed. The value of each set was 4,750,000 francs which was estimated to cover the formations' expenditure for two weeks. On 21 June the Base Cashier disembarked at MULBERRY with 5½ tons of preloaded currency to the total value of 335,440,000 FRENCH francs. This bulk supply was safeguarded in the cellars of the Chateau de COURSEULLES which had been specially reinforced by concrete. Further supplies of preloaded currency were landed during the period 29 June to 17 July. In all a total of 65½ tons of francs, amounting to a sterling equivalent of £21,750,000 was despatched to FRANCE without the loss of a single franc.

Corps and divisional Field Cash Offices landed with their formation HQ. Between D+2 and D+12 eleven Field and one Area Cash Office arrived and commenced to operate. No 3 Forward Base Pay Office, which disembarked on D+13, took over the buildings of a bank in BAYEUX for the purposes of distributing funds to forward cashiers and payment of military bills. Later this unit moved to DOUVRES and made the underground passages of the radar station there into vault accommodation for the bulk supply of currency. During the period D+18 to D+24, a further seven field cash offices arrived in the beach-head together with an advance detachment of No 9 Command Pay Offices.

32. Provost

(a) organisation
Elements of all three wings of the Corps of Military Police were planned to land with the assault forces on the first and second tides of D-day. They comprised:-

(i) Three Divisional Provost Companies (each of HQ and six sections) whose task was to regulate and control traffic of the assault and follow-up brigades.
(ii) Six Beach Provost companies (each of HQ and four sections) and several Traffic Control Sections, which were responsible for control of traffic and signing of routes in the beach transit and assembly areas.
(iii) Ten sections of CMP (VP) who were responsible for guarding PW, detaining suspect civilians and Constructing cages.
(iv) Two Corps Provost Companies who were deployed to control the area between the beaches and the forward divisions.

During the build-up the provost strength in the beach-head increased by the addition of:-

(i) A provost company for each division phased in after the assault.
(ii) Four provost companies, four TC companies and one VP company for each of the armies.
(iii) Seven provost, seven TC and three VP companies for L of C areas. L of C Provost were phased in earlier than planned, to assist in the main problem of organising traffic.

With the exception of beach provost companies who had more work than four sections could adequately handle, the allotment would have been sufficient had it landed according to plan, but owing to the failure of the Rhinos and the rough sea conditions, only divisional and corps provost companies arrived on time. The result was that there was no proper supervision of assembly areas on the morning of D+1 and the narrow exits from the beaches were inadequately controlled. On the afternoon of D+1, when the LSTs were beached and a flood of delayed traffic was released, there was considerable congestion on the beaches and far too few Provost to control it. By D+2, however, more Provost had landed and the situation was greatly improved. By D+3, although the volume of traffic was steadily increasing the forward and return routes in the BMA were working satisfactorily. With minor alterations the original traffic circuits were found to be successful.

(b) traffic
During the subsequent build-up the problem of maintaining an easy flow of traffic was complicated because a modern mechanised army was attempting to manoeuvre on a system of narrow and badly maintained roads which had been designed to carry the slight traffic of an agricultural area. Within a few weeks of landing, the beach-head, which at that time measured only a little more than twenty miles broad and ten miles deep, contained 115,000 vehicles. At one check post 18,836 vehicles passed by in one day, giving an hourly average of 785 vehicles, or nearly one vehicle every four seconds of the night and day. The policy at this time was to accept any vehicle on the road at any time, and the general object of all concerned was to keep traffic moving at all costs. Despite every effort the towns of COURSEULLES, BERNIERES, LA DELIVRANDE and BAYEUX quickly became bottlenecks. The problem was eventually partially solved by:-

(i) Building tank tracks, lateral cross country roads and by-passes.
(ii) Instituting a system of movement control. In the absence of a firm plan for traffic control, movement tended to take place during the hours of daylight, leaving the roads relatively free at night, but after the institution of movement control all operational traffic was timed to take place during the hours of darkness, when administrative traffic was less heavy.

(c) signing
Although each provost company carried into the beach-head a reserve of signs and signing material, so that there would be little delay in laying out routes, the task was so tremendous that each company had to resort to improvisation at an early stage. During the build-up period the congestion of formations, depots and installations in the beach-head produced a confusing multiplicity of signs. To make the system of signing uniform, Provost became responsible for co-ordinating all route signing. Each company set up a sign factory operated in the initial stages by its own personnel but later by Pioneers, civilian carpenters and sign writers.

(d) communications
Each corps and army was allotted a CMP (TC) signal section which proved to be invaluable, for by operating their own network of signal communications the police were greatly assisted in their problem of controlling traffic.

(e) crime
There was little crime recorded during this phase, but it is difficult to say how far this was due to the fact that everyone was busily occupied and how far to the fact that the time and attention of the Provost was almost entirely taken up with traffic control. One Special Investigation Section was allotted to Second Army and during the build-up was fully occupied in investigating cases of looting and illegal disposal of WD stores.

33. Education

The main function of the Education Service during the early stages of the operation was to stimulate and maintain morale by the early dissemination of news. Each formation issued a daily broadsheet compiled by the Staff Officer Education, based on the BBC broadcasts and close liaison with the General Staff of their HQ. The first of these to be published on the Continent was that of 3 British Infantry Division on D+3 and the aim was to get the broadsheets containing the previous day's news to the front line troops early each morning.

Quite early on there arose a demand for classes in FRENCH and, to a lesser extent, in GERMAN. The chief difficulty about this was the lack of text books as the entire stock of the FRENCH and GERMAN series allotted to 21 Army Group was destroyed in LONDON by enemy action. Classes were held, however, and glossaries of the more common words and phrases required in daily contact with the FRENCH people were published. In the case of several formations lists of GERMAN technical terms were produced for the benefit of technical units dealing with captured enemy material.

At least two Study Centres were established, one at the Second Army rest camp near ARROMANCHES and the other at OUISTREHAM which functioned in spite of enemy shelling from across the river. In addition to the libraries contained in these study centres, boxes of fifty books, eighty per cent fiction and twenty per cent of a more serious type, were distributed to units on demand and ten thousand Penguin editions were allocated within 21 Army Group.

34. Graves

At the outset the scale of graves units in the beach-head was as follows:-

 The first BRITISH GRUs landed on D+3 and by 20 July 44 the number of graves registered was 8,000 out of a total of 12,500 burials reported by formations.

It is considered that these figures would have been improved if GRUs had been allotted territorially instead of, as in Second Army, one GRU per corps and one for Second Army Troops, since it was found that formations and units would often report burials to their original GRU after changing from one corps to another, even though the original GRU was not in a position to register their graves in the new area.

The only other difficulty experienced at this stage was due to the failure of the manufacturers to complete on time their contract for delivery of ten thousand prefabricated metal crosses. As a result graves units had to improvise with small wooden crosses, assisted whenever possible by crosses made from RE sources.

35. Welfare

Welfare stores, including sports equipment, were issued before D-day. Sports equipment was specially packed in "composite" cases, as for example, the football "composite", which contained cases, bladders, laces, repair outfits, inflators, lacing-awls and dubbin. In addition, there were soccer and rugger match packs, each pack containing a complete outfit of clothing, including boots.

1,000,000 cigarettes and a supply of pipe tobacco, the gift of members and friends of the Oversesa League, were shipped to the theatre each week.

Arrangements were made through the War Office with the Newspapers Association for the provision of BRITISH daily newspapers on a scale of one per ten men. Papers were packed in standard packs by a military unit and were despatched to the Continent, first by sea and later by air. The first despatch was on D-day, but owing to cancellations in sailing, boats going to the wrong beach etc., arrivals of newspapers in NORMANDY were irregular for the first week, but some forward units did receive their newspapers on D+2. The total number supplied on D-day was 56,000 which was stepped up a month later to 96,000. The cost of provision of the newspapers was borne by NAAFI.

Five "Stars-in-Battledress" parties, phased in with corps troops, landed on the beaches on D+8. They gave programmes within a mile of the front line, on a stage which was usually a 3-ton lorry with the sides down. Six ENSA mobile parties arrived on D+5.

Towards the end of July, the first mobile canteens arrived, and they began at once to operate among the forward troops.

Between D-day and 26 July, 5,500 wireless sets were issued.

Five Army Kinema Service sections, each consisting of two dual 35 mm and eight 16 mm cinemas landed in the bridgehead between 15 June and 26 July, and cinema shows were successfully given for eight hours each day to large audiences.

36. Civil Affairs

Although as previously stated it is not intended to discuss the organisation or activities of Civil Affairs in detail in this history, mention must be made of the very considerable assistance that was rendered by them during this phase. The thirty detachments comprising one Civil Affairs Group placed under command of Second Army were deployed either with divisions or on specific tasks of civilian importance. They coped with the refugee problem and thereby removed any anxiety on that score from the fighting staffs, although the problem proved smaller than had been anticipated. In addition the information that they gleaned from civil sources was invaluable in discovering the limitations of live and dummy minefields. The siting of the depots in the RMA was in many instances greatly facilitated by the co-operation they achieved with the FRENCH farmers in ensuring an early cutting and harvesting of their crops and fields. The above are only examples of ways in which the progress of the armies was directly assisted by the work of Civil Affairs.

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CHAPTER III

PHASE II   26 JULY-26 SEPTEMBER

1. Outline of Operations

The operational picture during this phase (from 26 July to 26 September) can be divided into four stages:- Firstly the combined BRITISH, CANADIAN and AMERICAN operations in the area of FALAISE leading up to the crossing of the SEINE, secondly the pursuit of the enemy through FRANCE and BELGIUM by Second Army, thirdly the operations of First Canadian Army up the coast of FRANCE and BELGIUM, and fourthly the operations to extend EAST and NORTH in BELGIUM and HOLLAND culminating in the combined US and BRITISH airborne operation in the neighbourhood of NIJMEGEN andARNHEM.

25 July saw the beginning of the break-out from the bridgehead as the AMERICAN attack between PERRIERS and ST LO, which had been co-ordinated with an attack by 2 Canadian Corps across the road CAEN-FALAISE and another thrust SOUTH by 12 Corps, developed with great momentum and by 30 July the advance into BRITTANY had begun. On that day Second Army began a drive from the CAUMONT area SOUTH and EAST towards the River ORNE with 8 Corps on the right, 30 Corps in the centre, and 12 Corps acting as a pivot on the left. By 19 August, despite heavy enemy resistance, this attack had progressed as far as the road PUTANGES-FALAISE. On 1 August 12 US Army Group had become operational with First and Third US Armies under its command but all US land forces remained under the overall command of the C-in-C 21 Army Group. First Canadian Army launched a heavy attack towards FALAISE supported by one thousand heavy bombers on 7 August and was only halted some four miles NORTH of FALAISE. On 12 August a junction was made between the CANADIANS and 12 Corps who had successfully crossed the River ORNE. FALAISE was entered on 16 August but in the meantime the GERMANS launched a heavy counter attack against the First US Army in the vicinity of MORTAIN. First US Army held this attack and so Third US Army continued its drive on LAVAL and LE MANS from which it was ordered to turn NORTH and help Second Army trap the GERMAN forces. On 19 August they met the CANADIANS and the FALAISE "pocket" was closed. Amongst the equipment that was subsequently checked were 571 guns, 358 tanks and SP guns and 4,715 vehicles of various natures. As Second Army advanced into the "pocket" First US Army was ordered to attack NORTH-EAST to capture ELBEUF on the SEINE about ten miles SOUTH of ROUEN. They reached this town on 25 August, by which date Second British and First Canadian Armies were closing on to the SEINE and the mopping up of the FALAISE pocket was completed. On 26 August orders were issued for 21 Army Group to advance NORTH with the intention of eventually capturing ANTWERP.

30 Corps crossed the SEINE on the right of the BRITISH line in the vicinity of VERNON (R47) with 12 Corps on the left forcing a crossing between LES ANDELYS (R39) and LOUVIERS (R28). The bridgeheads over the SEINE were quickly established and by 31 August 30 Corps were crossing the SOMME at AMIENS and had elements across the road ALBERT (M36)-AMIENS after an advance of eighty miles. 12 Corps began their advance on 30 August and by the next day had reached POIX (M84). During the next four days the advance continued rapidly and BRUSSELS was captured by Gds Armoured Division on 3 September, while 11 Armoured Division by an advance of sixty miles on the same day was in the area of ALOST. On 4 September 11 Armoured Division captured ANTWERP but the northern suburbs close to the docks still remained to be cleared.

Meanwhile, 2 Canadian Corps crossed the SEINE on 26 August near ELBEUF. On 30 August ROUEN and FLEURY were captured. By 1 September DIEPPE was liberated and the port rapidly put into limited operation. On 4 September the area of BOULOGNE was reached and by 10 September OSTEND and NIEUPORT had been occupied after DUNKIRK had been by-passed on 8 September. BRUGES was cleared by 11 September and in conjunction with the Polish Armoured Division the GHENT-BRUGES canal was crossed after which an advance was made up to the LEOPOLD canal and the area up to the SCHELDT estuary between ANTWERP and TERNEUZEN (D21) was cleared. 1 Corps had meanwhile crossed the SEINE and were engaged with the enemy outpost positions near LE HAVRE. The main defences of this port were contacted on 6 September. After a heavy naval and air bombardment the attack on LE HAVRE began on the evening of 10 September and was ended by the surrender of the garrison on the morning of 12 September. 3 Canadian Infantry Division had the task of clearing both BOULOGNE and CALAIS. The former was attacked on 17 September but all resistance in the town was not finally crushed until the 22nd. This was followed by the attack on CALAIS which commenced on 25 September. The town was entered on 28 September and after an armistice for the evacuation of civilians all organised resistance ceased on 30 September. CAP GRIS NEZ area was captured at the same time and so cross-channel shelling of the BRITISH coast was over, while bases for the enemy V-weapons were pushed back into HOLLAND.

The Supreme Commander assumed direct command of the Allied Expeditionary Force on 1 September and 12 US Army Group was placed under command of SHAEF. Operating on the right flank of 21 Army Group it was directed on the ARDENNES and the inter Army Group boundary was an approximate line BEAUVAIS (M90)-DOUAI (H60)-ATH (J23)-HASSELT (K36).

On 8 September the Gds Armoured Division secured a bridgehead over the ALBERT canal and advanced rapidly up to BOURG LEOPOLD. On 11 September a bridgehead over the MEUSE-ESCAUT canal was established in conjunction with 11 Armoured Division, while further WEST another bridgehead over that canal was secured at AART on 14 September by 15 Infantry Division. It seemed that a great opportunity now presented itself of out-flanking the GERMAN defence line and advancing EAST provided bridgeheads could be secured over the MAAS and the RHINE. On 10 September it was decided that Second Army assisted by an airborne corps should attempt to advance to the ZUIDER ZEE and thereafter swing EAST into GERMANY.

The operations entitled MARKET GARDEN commenced on 17 September. 101 US Airborne Division achieved complete surprise in their landings and occupied SON, ST OEDENRODE and VEGHEL. They captured and held intact all bridges in their area except that over the WILHELMINA canal which had been previously blown. 82 US Airborne Division also landed successfully and seized intact the bridge over the MAAS at GRAVE and the bridge over the MAAS-WAAL canal at HEUMEN. 1 Brit Airborne Div made a generally successful landing and captured the NORTH end of the road bridge across the NEDER-RHINE at ARNHEM. Meanwhile the attack by Second Army began with 30 Corps advancing to six miles short of EINDHOVEN, with 8 Corps on the right and 12 Corps on the left exploiting their bridgeheads across the canal with a view to bridging it. 101 US Airborne Division captured EINDHOVEN and together with Guards Armoured Division pushed on to the southern bank of the WILHELMINA canal while 82 US Airborne Division continued to drive for the bridges at NIJMEGEN. Unfortunately, at the crucial moment the weather turned against the allied forces and the operational situation which at the beginning seemed so rosy began to deteriorate. Enemy resistance was rapidly stiffening and the flying in of reinforcements and supplies for the hard-pressed airborne troops near ARNHEM got progressively more and more difficult as the weather grew worse. After four days of very gallant fighting 1 Airborne Division had to relinquish its hold on the road bridge at ARNHEM and despite heroic advances by Guards Armoured Division and 43 Division contact was never firmly made between 1 Airborne Division and 30 Corps. On 22 September 43 Division reached the RHINE and made contact with the Polish Para Brigade but owing to the strenuous reaction of the enemy and the steep banks of the river at that point, only a very small quantity of stores could be ferried over. By 25 September 8 Corps had captured HELMOND and GEMERT and had made contact with 30 Corps near ST ANTONIS, while on the left 12 Corps had cleared the area between the road EINDHOVEN-TURNHOUT and the road EINDHOVEN-'sHERTOGENBOSCH. During the night 25/26 September 43 Division managed to evacuate over two thousand men of 1 Airborne Division and the operation came to a halt. Although it had not been one hundred per cent successful a deep thrust of some sixty miles had been made into country occupied and stubbornly defended by the enemy and the capture of the bridge at GRAVE and of NIJMEGEN with its road bridge intact proved invaluable in later operations.

2. Administrative Picture

Although the operational aspect of this phase divided itself into four distinct parts, two of these, the operations of Second Army up to BRUSSELS and ANTWERP and of First Canadian Army along the Channel coast, were taking place concurrently, the division was made more for the convenience of the reader than for the sake of necessity. The administrative side of the picture can more conveniently be described by dividing the history of this phase into three stages:-

(a) The break-out from the NORMANDY bridgehead to the line of the SEINE.
(b) The crossings of the SEINE up to the capture of BRUSSELS and ANTWERP on 3 and 4 September respectively.
(c) The operations to exploit EAST and NORTH terminating in operation MARKET GARDEN (airborne landings).

In order that a better background may be given with which to study the separate activities of the various Services, it is proposed to give a brief description of the salient features during these three stages that together form Phase II.

3. Moves of Higher HQ

Now that the feat of landing large assault forces together with all the administrative support necessary for the retention of the bridgehead on a heavily defended coast had been successfully achieved, the "A" and "Q" staffs of HQ 21 Army Group addressed themselves to the next main task of developing an administrative organisation on the Continent that would enable the C-in-C to carry out any operations that might be required. Rear HQ 21 Army Group moved over to the Continent in August and opened at VAUCELLES on 11 August. Until that time the base installations in NORMANDY had been controlled through the medium of an advance section of HQ 21 Army Group stationed with HQ L of C. Later in August the forward element of SHAEF containing the administrative staff also moved across and set up at JULOUVILLE near GRANVILLE preparatory to assuming overall command of 21 Army Group and 12 US Army Group on their split into two separate forces which was scheduled for 1 September. As soon as BRUSSELS and ANTWERP were captured in September preparations were immediately made for the transfer of HQ 21 Army Group from NORMANDY to BRUSSELS where it could be established in a position to take executive control of the build-up of the advance base which would now be in the area of those two cities. This move actually took place on 23 September, only nineteen days from the first entry of our troops into BRUSSELS. At about the same date SHAEF Forward moved to VERSAILLES where it was shortly joined by the large element still remaining in UK and was redesignated SHAEF Main.

4. Stage I

(a) plans for winter in bridgehead
The policy of drawing the bulk of the GERMAN forces towards the BRITISH sector, thus paving the way for the AMERICAN advance round the right flank, was proving successful, but as a result our progress had not kept pace with the planning estimates. At the end of July there seemed little hope of an early capture of the SEINE ports and the BRITISH forces would probably have to rely on maintenance through the RMA for some time yet to come. In fact, at this period, GERMAN resistance was proving stubborn, little sign of a crack was appearing and the possibility of having to spend the whole winter SOUTH of the SEINE had to be faced. Stocking of the RMA continued therefore in order to cater for this eventuality and for all the breaks in day-to-day maintenance that winter conditions would impose on the unloading programme, but at the same time in the full knowledge that the stores discharged would be required to support the advance if a breakthrough was achieved. Work had been proceeding on the development of the ports of CAEN and OUISTREHAM and as soon as the operational situation would permit, the CAEN-OUISTREHAM canal was to be opened. In addition to this MULBERRY B was improved and extended and preparations for its winterisation put in hand with the object of extending its life beyond the planned date of 1 October until at least the end of the following January, as a further insurance against winter weather. The narrow confines of the bridgehead limited the number of administrative units that could be accepted in the area and so only those units urgently required at the time were moved over to the Continent at this stage.

(b) supporting the break-out
At the same time, however, preparations had to be made for any possible sudden break in the enemy's resistance which could be rapidly exploited. Should operations become more fluid the necessary mobility to support the armies in their advances could only be found by the presence of sufficient administrative, and particularly transport, units. Early in August it became apparent that the pendulum of the battle was gradually swinging in the allied favour. Immediate steps were taken therefore to phase in extra transport units, an example of this being on 1 August when a decision was made that six further general transport companies could be accepted in the theatre as soon as they could be shipped across. It was decided also to begin to cut down the import of stores and reserves through the RMA in order to release transport from port and beach clearance duties and thus make it available for mobile operations. This decision was supported by the fact that the stocks in the RMA had now reached satisfactory levels as approximately fourteen days reserves plus fourteen days working margins or equivalent stocks of all commodities were now held in its depots.

(c) ROADS AND ROADHEADS
Both armies and all the corps had been ordered to develop all the roads that they required but the eventual main maintenance routes for the force starting from the RMA were to be developed, numbered, controlled and maintained by HQ 21 Army Group. No attempt was made at this stage to sign any other than the main routes. As the armies moved forward to the line of the SEINE two roadheads were established, No. 3 in the area of LISIEUX for First Canadian Army which opened on 24 August and No. 4 for Second Army near LAIGLE which opened on 26 August, although No 1 Cushion had been previously formed by the latter at FALAISE five days earlier. Later No 3A Roadhead, which was an advance portion of the Canadian Army roadhead, was opened at ELBEUF on 2 September. It had been decided that all First Canadian Army roadheads should be designated with odd numbers while Second Army roadheads would have even numbers for their nomenclature.

(d) transport
When the break-through occurred "Q" branch HQ 21 Army Group who controlled the allocation of all road transport saw to it that every available lorry was mobilised and given to the armies with the exception of a bare minimum of general transport companies that had to be retained for port and beach clearance. In order further to help the transport situation practically all L of C units were grounded and their transport diverted to support the advance.

(e) planned advance base
It had been considered certain that the enemy, even though he might be pushed back from the line of the SEINE, would impose a delay on our advance at that point and would inevitably turn and fight again on the line of the River SOMME and other obstacles throughout NORTH FRANCE and BELGIUM. It had been planned, therefore, that the area in a rough triangle DIEPPE-ROUEN-LE HAVRE should be laid out as an advance base although even at that time it was appreciated that operations might progress with such speed that the full development of this advance base would never become necessary.

5. Stage II

(a) lengthening of L of C
During this stage the rapidity with which the advance was carried out meant not only that the BRITISH L of C lengthened to an alarming extent, but also that all question of the establishment of an advance base in the area of ROUEN as originally planned could be abandoned. The entries into BRUSSELS and ANTWERP on 3 and 4 September respectively increased the length of the L of C by approximately three hundred miles but at the same time gave the opportunity of establishing the advance base in central BELGIUM with a first-class port in good condition through which the supplies could be landed as soon as the approaches could be cleared of all hostile elements. For the moment, however, this huge advance in little more than a week produced administrative problems of no ordinary size. Such a complete disintegration of the GERMAN army had not been envisaged. It had always been expected that somewhere a certain delay would be imposed which would have afforded an opportunity for the build-up of essential stores. This check however, never occurred. Our dumps remained back in the RMA and the problem of supplying two corps advancing at an average rate of over forty miles per day had to be faced. It was obviously vitally necessary to exploit to the full the disorganisation and retreat of the enemy. 8 Corps, therefore, was grounded and all its second line transport, as well as fifty per cent of its first line transport was temporarily removed from it in order to supply the two corps who were racing forward in the advance. The opposition that they were meeting was not of great account but even so contact had to be continuously maintained and the momentum of the pursuit kept up so that the enemy would have no opportunity of again taking up a defensive position.

(b) restriction of imports
On 30 August a weighty decision had to be taken to rely on the early capture of a Channel port such as DIEPPE or BOULOGNE and to cease bringing in large quantities of stores and vehicles through the RMA. Stores that it had formerly been considered essential to bring over from the UK were now phased back until such time as a port or ports nearer the battle area became available for their reception. Bearing in mind the satisfactory levels of supplies of all natures in the RMA, it was decided to cut down imports from an average of some sixteen thousand tons per day to only seven thousand tons per day. With the co-operation of the War Office this decision became effective in seven days. It proved invaluable as much transport was released for the direct support of the armies whereas had the original stores programmes been carried out they would have been occupied on clearing them from the beaches and ports into the depots of the RMA. This freeing of transport enabled the advance to be continually supported and contributed in no small measure to the early consolidation of our hold on the area which was eventually to become the advance base.

(c) petrol
Napoleon said that an army marches on its stomach but the prime necessity at this moment was not supplies but petrol. Three armoured divisions were taking part in this hunt and petrol was being consumed in enormous quantities. Away on the right, also, General PATTON, commanding the Third US Army, was crying that his men could eat their belts but he must have "gas". The transportation of POL was a matter of the utmost urgency and the vast majority of the transport available was used for this purpose. Fortunately, however, it remains a truism that the expenditure of ammunition is almost always in inverse ratio to that of petrol and the demands for transport of ammunition did not often conflict with those of petrol.

(d) control of roads and transport
Most careful control of the roads was essential if big hold-ups on the improvised bridges over the SEINE and the numerous other rivers were not to occur. Tank transporters, formerly only allowed on the roads for a few hours at night, now had to travel in large numbers by day and urgent convoys of essential ammunition and ordnance stores had to be personally shepherded along agreed routes by personnel of the military police. To achieve the necessary flexibility all third line transport was pooled and placed directly under army control and the tasks of all supply columns had to be extended. First line transport collected from the FMCs, second line transport from the army roadheads, and third line army transport and GHQ transport brought supplies from the RMA to the army roadhead. The RASC columns concerned sometimes covered two hundred miles a day during this period. In order to augment the L of C lift, it was decided on 1 September to issue certain L of C units temporarily with reserve three-ton vehicles to enable them to carry out the long moves forward without having to jeopardise maintenance lifts by calling on GT companies for help. The whole of the GHQ reserve was absorbed in this way, and some 1,700 three-ton vehicles were issued for this purpose. One of the greatest difficulties in this ever-lengthening L of C was the lack of communications, as no lines were available and distances soon became too great for wireless. This meant the despatch rider had to be frequently used and this is a slow and not too reliable method over so many miles. This lack of communications also affected the flexibility of supply as it was impossible to switch suddenly from petrol to ammunition had the tactical situation demanded it.

(e) ROADHEADS
No 4 Roadhead was so far behind the front line that cushions had to be formed before the next roadhead was made. These cushions are normally the dumped requirements of corps brought forward on third line transport to a position in front of the main roadhead, sited in relation to and in the direction of the next roadhead to be formed further ahead. In this advance they were established near BEAUVAIS on 1 September (No 2 Cushion) and near DOULLENS on 2 September (No 3 Cushion) until finally No 6 Roadhead was opened on 6 September SOUTH-WEST of BRUSSELS. This last roadhead was sited with a view to being served by rail as well as road. First Canadian Army established No 5 Roadhead between DIEPPE and ABBEVILLE on 3 September and this was served by a road L of C through DIEPPE. The final roadhead established by the CANADIANS during the whole of this phase was No 7 Roadhead which opened in the area of BETHUNE on 15 September.

(f) enemy dumps
It might have been expected that in such a lengthy advance the armies could have relied to a certain extent on getting supplies from a number of enemy dumps. Probably largely due to the accuracy of the air forces in bombing the railways, roads, bridges and known enemy supply dumps this expectation was largely not fulfilled. 21 Army Group had therefore to rely entirely on its own resources, initiative and improvisations. The decisions taken earlier on, firstly to cut down imports and phase back all but the most essential stores, and secondly to ground certain fighting formations, ensured the continued support of the pursuit.

6. Stage III

(a) ports
The numerous advances made, coupled with the capture of DIEPPE and OSTEND made it clear that is was no longer necessary to develop CAEN to its full capacity as it was situated too far away from the scene of operations. The plan for the development of this port therefore, was scaled down and its imports restricted chiefly to coal. DIEPPE was opened on 5 September and the first coaster arrived two days later. The port was used for bringing in stores that were essential for either army but as the majority of the transport had already been allotted to Second Army a proportion of these imports was relied on for the maintenance of First Canadian Army. The capacity of the port increased rapidly until it reached a daily figure of between six thousand and seven thousand tons by the end of the month. When the army rear boundary moved forward, HQ 21 Army Group took over control of the port.

LE HAVRE was captured on 12 September but was almost immediately allotted by SHAEF to the AMERICANS. This decision was not unwelcome as it was now very little nearer to the scene of operations than the RMA had been and therefore, it would not have been worth while for the BRITISH to develop it.

ANTWERP was in our hands but unfortunately it could not yet be developed as the GERMANS controlled the approaches to it. BOULOGNE and CALAIS were not captured until 22 September and 30 September respectively and so could not be opened during this phase. OSTEND, however, captured on 9 September was first opened on 28th of the same month.

(b) control of transport
The BRITISH L of C was now approximately four hundred miles long. In order that some of the grounded formations of Second Army could be lifted up before the next advance took place, a short breathing space occurred in which maintenance supplies were also brought up. Meanwhile, plans were being laid for further advances eastwards in BELGIUM and northwards across the MAAS and the RHINE in conjunction with an airborne operation. It was immediately realised that this would place an even greater strain on the greatly extended L of C and road transport. The main depots from which the armies were being maintained were still in the RMA and there were virtually no stocks on the ground between them and the holdings in corps FMCs in forward areas. The support of this advance and airborne operation was an administrative risk as it would absorb all the reserves in the pipeline. On the other hand, if it failed or was not entirely successful there would of necessity be a long pause while the L of C was re-organised and reserves built up. The closest supervision and control in order that the best use should be made of every means of transport was therefore necessary, but Second Army had got too far ahead and it was impossible to have adequate control from a HQ at either of the two ends of the L of C. About 10 September therefore it was decided to establish an organisation to be called TRANCO, which would co-ordinate all means of transport from the RMA to the army roadheads. It consisted of an integrated "Q" and "Q" Movements staff with Services representatives from RASC and Labour to assist, and was set up at AMIENS in time to take control on 19 September. AMIENS was selected for its location as being approximately half way along the L of C, a big rail centre and possessed of good communications. The establishment of TRANCO meant that a radical change in the road transport policy of 21 Army Group must occur. All GHQ transport would be withdrawn from armies and would operate under the direct control of HQ 21 Army Group both at the ports and on the L of C, leaving to the armies only sufficient for the traffic forward from the army roadheads. TRANCO directed and co-ordinated with other agencies movement of personnel, stores and transport for stocking army roadheads. It was also responsible for the transhipment of stores from railheads SOUTH of the SEINE to railtails NORTH of the SEINE. Armies submitted estimates of their daily maintenance requirements by commodities for five day periods five days in advance. TRANCO then issued an outline rail and road programme and by judicious use of the railtails NORTH of the SEINE and of the transport that was running through from the RMA, was able to adjust demands in accordance with ruling priorities. The flow of supplies for the two armies which had been gradually decreasing up to that period began to increase again and although the levels of all commodities and stores inevitably fell to a low ebb in the forward areas just after the airborne operation, the supply situation generally continued to improve.

(c) Air lift
This particular subject does not lend itself readily to discussion in each of the three phases but is described here as it was during Stage III that its importance became paramount. The first army freight was flown into the theatre on 26 June but up to the end of August the tonnage of stores imported by this method never exceeded 200 tons in any single week. On 7 August for instance, the air freight lift for 21 Army Group was increased from 12 to 25 tons per day. With the crossing of the SEINE airlift became all important and HQ 21 Army Group made a bid for the pre-planned airlift of 1,000 tons per day. During the week ending 9 September 1,600 tons of petrol and 300 tons of supplies were delivered to the AMIENS, VITRY and DOUAI group of airfields. The next week priority was switched to ammunition and 2,200 tons were delivered together with some 800 tons of POL and 300 tons of supplies. These airfields were soon found to be too far behind the front line to serve their full purpose and so within two days of the liberation of BRUSSELS three airfields, EVERE, MELSBROEK and GRINDBERGHEN were put into operation even before Second Army had time to establish a roadhead in that area. Subsequently with the exception of approximately 2,400 tons of bulk petrol delivered by bomber aircraft to the airfield at LILLE the entire lift of stores was brought in through EVERE. During a period of five weeks at this time, this airfield handled 18,000 tons of freight making an average of between 400 and 500 tons per day, not counting any allowance for non-flying days which occurred two or three times each week.

(d) effect of operation MARKET GARDEN
Operation MARKET GARDEN had to commence for operational reasons at a time when the administrative resources were barely able to support it. The estimates of rail and other capacities had proved too optimistic with the result that although it was supported with the major administrative requirements ie - rations, petrol and ammunition, this was only achieved at the expense of ordnance and other stores for Second Army and of the build-up for First Canadian Army. The situation, therefore, was that in spite of the opening of the port of OSTEND and the increase in the capacity of DIEPPE, this operation meant that a considerable back-log of ordnance stores and other items of equipment had to be made up if the formations were to have sufficient reserves to be restored to full fighting efficiency on its conclusion. A more detailed account of the administrative arrangements of operation MARKET GARDEN will be found at para 9 of this chapter.

7. Summing Up of Maintenance Problems

From the foregoing it will be seen, therefore, that throughout this second phase there was no anxiety as to the availability of supplies. Decisions were made in fact, temporarily to restrict the flow of them into the theatre. The crucial problem was how to get them up to the fighting formations and to keep pace with the tremendously rapid rate of advance. Transport was the big "Q" headache during the months of August and September and all the major decisions such as the restriction of imports, the grounding of formations and the setting up of TRANCO were made with a view to providing the necessary lift to sustain the momentum of the pursuit and to ensure that the BRITISH advance never faltered for lack of any commodity.

8. Equipment

During this phase the conversion of the seven 105 mm self-propelled field regiments in 21 Army Group to 25 pr regiments was completed in a re-organisation centre set up in 17 AOD. Conversion would have taken place in any case as these 105 mm guns were primarily intended for the assault period, but it was made the more necessary because of an acute shortage of 105mm ammunition provided from AMERICAN sources. First Canadian Army made good use of the hulls of these vehicles and equipped the first Armoured Personnel Carrier regiment to be formed in EUROPE with these modified hulls within five days, in time to be of great use during the FALAISE battle. The break-up of 59 Infantry Division threw up a large amount of equipment which was handed into 14 AOD under 59 Division arrangements, "A" and "B" vehicles, guns etc., being put through workshops before being taken into stock. On 12 August the decision was taken to set up the 21 Army Group Modification Committee, consisting of representatives from (G) SD, Q (AE), Ord, REME, WTSFF, AFV (Tech) and AD (Mech), to assess the relative importance of authorised or proposed modifications to equipment, and to allot priorities, so that the best possible use could be made of workshop facilities in carrying out the necessary work. The issue of equipment to allied liberated manpower now began in earnest as allied units were much needed for internal security on the L of C and other tasks.

A small advance section of the Q (AE) Statistics branch had arrived in NORMANDY on 8 July but the main body of this branch landed on 13 August and proceeded to VAUCELLES. The mobile Hollerith machinery (see Appendix "Q") was installed in deep pits protected from air attack. The weekly APV return had been functioning efficiently since 29 July and on 22 August the "A" Vehicle Census Record was completely mechanised on the Hollerith.

9. Operation MARKET GARDEN

This operation, which was really a combination of two, merits special mention for three reasons; firstly that it was undertaken at a time when the administrative resources of Second Army were strained to the utmost, but the administrative risk involved was considered to be worth the tactical advantage that might be gained; secondly it was the first large-scale operation by airborne troops in front of forces already established on the ground in an attempt to secure a large slice of enemy-held territory to which the advancing ground troops could come up to re-organise; thirdly two US airborne divisions were involved as well as 1 British Airborne Division. The airborne part of the operation was entitled operation MARKET while that of the ground forces was operation GARDEN for which 30 Corps was made responsible.

(a) build-up
In the middle of September stocks in No 6 Army Roadhead were not only low but the roadhead itself was too far behind and suffered from the dis-advantage of having BRUSSELS interposed between it and the forward troops. As already stated, the lines of communication to the RMA at BAYEUX were stretched to the limit. It would have been desirable to have had a pause in order to re-establish the administration of both Second Army and First Canadian Army on a sound footing. However, no such pause was possible if operation MARKET GARDEN was to be launched successfully before the enemy had fully recovered from the effects of their retreat. The administrative build-up was not helped by the fact that the operation involved heavy bridging commitments which meant that in addition to the bridging companies which had to be transported forward it was necessary to make available nearly eight hundred three-ton vehicles to assist in lifting forward bridging equipment from the RMA. This involved six and ten-ton lorries being employed on lifting supplies and other uneconomical loads for such vehicles. However, part of a fast road convoy designated "Red Ball" was made available by US forces to bring five hundred tons daily into No 6 Army Roadhead. The main delivery from this method consisted of MT 80 and special requirements of ammunition and stores for 82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions. Tank transporters modified for load carrying were also successfully employed and actually, in the eight weeks commencing on 14 September, they lifted a total of 22,450 tons over a distance of 194,000 loaded miles. These methods in conjunction with the air lift mentioned in para 6 proved successful in mitigating the administrative difficulties of the operation.

(b) maintenance of US forces
82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions were maintained from BRITISH stocks as far as common user items were concerned eg POL and supplies, although later US rations were obtained and issued. Non common user items such as ammunition, ordnance, signal and engineer stores were delivered from Communication Zone in daily packs either by the "Red Ball" route or by rail to No 6 Army Roadhead whence they were lifted to 161 FMC at BOURG LEOPOLD.

(c) general maintenance
Until 16 September all formations and corps troops under command 30 Corps were based on 160 FMC in the BRUSSELS area while ammunition was drawn from No 6 Army Roadhead. On 17 September 161 FMC was to be opened in the BOURG LEOPOLD area for the maintenance of the US airborne divisions, corps troops and the seaborne element of 52 Division. It was planned to open 162 FMC in the ARNHEM area on D+3 for the maintenance of Guards Armoured Division, 43 and 50 Divisions, 1 Airborne Division, 8 Armoured Brigade and corps troops forward of the river WAAL. The maintenance of corps, army and GHQ RE attached to divisions was the responsibility of the divisions concerned. With the exception of Guards Armoured Division who were ordered to hold eight days' supplies and two hundred miles of POL and all corps troops who were restricted to four days' supplies and one hundred and fifty miles of POL, all the formations within 30 Corps were to hold six days' supplies and two hundred and fifty miles of POL per vehicle. They were also ordered to carry double second line holdings of 25 pr ammunition but were warned that after that they might have to carry on with depleted second line holdings due to shortage of stocks.

(d) maintenance of airborne troops
The airborne formations were to be maintained by air from D to D+5 but plans were also made for maintenance in an emergency of 82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions from 161 FMC with effect from D-day and of 1 Airborne Division from 162 FMC with effect from D+3. In the event of extreme emergency First Allied Airborne Army were prepared to land one hundred and fifty tons of US ammunition at BRUSSELS airport which would then be carried forward to the US formations by road.

(e) transport
Owing to lack of army transport still stretched to the limit along the L of C, 30 Corps were made responsible for their own third line transport lift from the roadhead to FMCs. This extra responsibility was partially met by ordering first and second line transport of the seaborne element of 52 Division to dump its commodities and G1098 equipment, thereby providing eight platoons of transport lift. All troop carrying transport less DUKWs was ordered to revert to 30 Corps control after transporting formations to their areas. Each division was also ordered to be prepared to accept corps tasks for five platoons of transport for an indefinite period. In addition to the above four US truck companies had been ordered to report by 18 September to 161 FMC whence they would be used to deliver commodities to US airborne divisions.

(f) medical
An interesting point to note is that in addition to the normal medical arrangements on a corps level the help of the DUTCH civilian authorities was obtained through the medium of Prince Bernhardt. Evacuation from divisional medical units was to be initially to civilian installations at BOURG LEOPOLD and later to CCSs to be established at ARNHEM and NIJMEGEN. For airborne units evacuation was to be initially into field ambulances of 30 Corps or direct to the CCSs mentioned above, while 9 Troop Carrier Command prepared to evacuate up to 750 casualties daily from BRUSSELS on the return journeys from supply missions. Medical supplies for airborne troops were to be dropped until D+4 inclusive.

(g) ordnance
Ordnance stores were received by both road and air, and arrangements were made for maximum loads to be forwarded to divisional, armoured and infantry ordnance sub parks. These sub parks were attached to their formations and supplemented the tank and MT spares position. Arrangements were made for delivery by air of urgent demands such as MT spares, wireless valves etc. In addition, approximately one hundred tons of ordnance stores were landed at BAYEUX in three "bricks" each of about thirty-four tons. The critical transport situation delayed the arrival of these "bricks" in the operational area, but at least one was expected by D-day.

(h) REME
For repair work not more than one brigade workshop was to move with each formation but certain formation workshops were to remain on wheels while the remainder stayed in existing locations. The principle for recovery was that all casualties were to be removed from the road for forward recovery only. The APM 30 Corps was allotted two light recovery sections for work at traffic control posts.

(j) the movement problem
The movement problem for 30 Corps was a very difficult one as it involved the tactical movement of approximately 20,000 vehicles across HOLLAND along one route supplemented by a subsidiary route. This subsidiary route did not avoid bottlenecks and so was not a complete second route. Quite clearly the whole essence of the success of the operation lay in an efficient traffic control organisation and good march discipline. Traffic control was exercised through three regulating HQs each of which controlled three traffic control posts with wireless communications between the TCPs and the regulating HQ. The importance of speed in the advance was impressed on all ranks. It was laid down that movement would take place by day only. Formations and units would harbour along the road each night retaining their order of priority. They would be fed into the axis as road space became available. For the first forty-eight hours rearward movement was to be restricted to an absolute minimum.

(k) the operation
D-day was 17 September and the automatic drop for all formations of the airborne corps was successfully carried out. On 18 September, however, maintenance by air of 1 British Airborne Division was not successful owing to intense enemy flak making the dropping inaccurate. 82 US Airborne Division was successfully supplied while 101 US Airborne Division had taken with them sufficient supplies and ammunition for the first forty-eight hours. By 20 September the US truck companies had arrived. All three airborne divisions continued to be maintained by air although not adequately due to inaccurate dropping as a result of heavy flak and misty weather. On 21 September it was obviously operationally impossible to establish 162 FMC in the area of ARNHEM and so an alternative site was chosen in the GRAVE area. During this day the L of C was cut by the enemy but luckily a large GERMAN supply dump was captured at OSS and this proved of great value. On 22 September the maintenance lift for 82 US Airborne Division was held up owing to the "cut" across the L of C but the lift to 101 US Airborne Division arrived successfully. The L of C was cleared on 23 September and the lift was then delivered to 82 US Airborne Division. Tour platoons carrying POL which had been held up until the L of C was clear and seven ammunition platoons were despatched to stock 162 FMC at GRAVE. 10 CCS was established at NIJMEGEN as also was 3 CCS which had been originally scheduled for ARNHEM. 163 Field Ambulance moved forward to DRIEL (6875) to evacuate airborne casualties in DUKWs over the River NEDER RIJN. The L of C was again cut on 24 September and three of the ammunition platoons despatched the previous night failed to reach 162 FMC while the other four were prevented from returning. A Gilbertian situation occurred on this day at the GERMAN supply dump at OSS as the second line RASC company of 8 Armoured Brigade took seventy-five prisoners of war from enemy elements they routed whom they discovered trying to use the dump at the same time as they were. As forward maintenance was proving impossible, all available transport resources were concentrated on the task of building up stocks in 161 FMC. The L of C to GRAVE was eventually restored on the evening of 25 September but by this time it had been decided to withdraw 1 British Airborne Division and the operation came to a halt. The total number of prisoners of war captured during the period was, officers - 26, ORs - 1,040.

10. L of C Aspect

During the period in the bridgehead and until the armies had crossed the SEINE, the organisation of the L of C remained largely unchanged from the original layout. There were, however, one or two minor alterations involving local administrative changes of L of C formations. On 31 July HQ L of C assumed responsibility for the control of CAEN through 7 Base Sub Area, which relieved 101 Beach Sub Area there. On 3 August, 10 Garrison at PORT EN BESSIN was relieved by 101 Beach Sub Area and reverted to under command Second Army.

By the end of August, 102 Beach Sub Area became 6 L of C Sub Area and on 28 August 12 L of C Area took over direct responsibility for CAEN from 7 Base Sub Area. Meanwhile preparations were being made for establishing the advance base in the area NORTH of the SEINE and 7 and 8 Base Sub Areas were standing by ready to implement at the earliest opportunity the original plan whereby they would administer the SEINE ports under HQ L of C.

It became apparent, however, after the crossing of the SEINE and the rapid advance into BELGIUM, that the L of C would be stretched to its utmost and that the advance base would be established in the area of ANTWERP and BRUSSELS and not in the area of LE HAVRE. As a result many changes were effected; on 2 September 12 L of C Area took over from 11 L of C Area administrative control of all L of C formations in the bridgehead and subsequently assumed responsibility of all territory SOUTH of the SEINE within the boundaries of 21 Army Group; on 3 September 11 L of C Area moved forward to AMIENS and took over administrative control of the BRITISH sector of FRANCE NORTH of the SEINE to the FRANCO-BELGIAN frontier. This territory was divided into two departments, SEINE, INFERIEURE and PAS DE CALAIS, which were administered by 6 and 15 L of C Sub Areas respectively. Meanwhile 7 and 8 Base Sub Areas had moved into BELGIUM and were responsible for ANTWERP and OSTEND respectively, whilst 4 L of C Sub Area administered the area of BRUSSELS.

11. Movement Problems

A considerable amount of the work achieved by Q (Mov) HQ 21 Army Group during this phase is contained in this chapter in paras 4, 5 and 6 while the work of the Transportation Service is described in para 13. When the army rear boundary was established on 23 July a clearer division of the Movements staff became possible. In addition to the Movements staffs at the various HQ concerned, Movement Control staffs were allocated to army roadheads to act as the equivalent of RTOs in the depot areas and to the RMA where they performed similar functions in the base. There were also Movement Control staffs in the various beach sub areas, transhipment areas and transit camps. Traffic offices were established at both army roadheads and at HQ L of C.

(a) moves of staffs
Towards the end of August it was clear that Rear HQ 21 Army Group would not be able to move for some considerable time and therefore control of the L of C would be very difficult if it became greatly extended. An advanced echelon of Q (Mov) was therefore planned to move to the ROUEN area and at the same time preparations were made for RTO staffs for forward railheads and for a party for PARIS, should traffic be diverted that way. The advanced echelon was established in ROUEN on 31 August but during the first week in September it moved to AMIENS with a tentacle at LILLE to help in the handover from the FRENCH to the BELGIAN railway operating authorities. When 11 L of C Area HQ with its movement staff was brought up to AMIENS this advanced echelon moved on to BRUSSELS. Thus, in mid-September movement in the area SOUTH of the SEINE was controlled by 12 L of C Area up to the railheads in the area NORTH of the SEINE within PRANCE it was controlled by 11 L of C Area in conjunction with the FRENCH railway officials at AMIENS, while in the area in BELGIUM it was controlled by 21 Army Group Movements staff in BRUSSELS in conjunction with the SNCB. 11 L of C Area was also made responsible for rail movement out of DIEPPE.

Port Executive Committees for LE HAVRE, DIEPPE and the Channel ports were set up before the advance and the necessary naval and sea transport personnel and reconnaissance parties mobilised. They went forward with the armies to enter each port as soon as possible. These port parties were made available by the fact that, with the reduction in stores import, it was possible to start considering the closing of the beaches and thereby reduce the staffs at ARROMANCHES and CAEN.

One Transport Airfield Detachment RAF moved forward with each army complete with a Movements staff. With the establishment of a transport airfield at AMIENS a chain of transport airfields ran from the RMA to BRUSSELS.

The first MFO Port Depot was established at ARROMANCHES in the beginning of this phase and early in August a MFO depot was opened in the RMA. On 2 September special MFO detachments were stationed at army and corps HQs and in mid-September the MFO main depot was moved to DIEPPE.

(b) beaches and ports
Control of the beach and port areas was re-organised. The PMLO for JUNO now controlled the port of COURSEULLES and the bulk of the beaches while the port commandant at ARROMANCHES controlled MULBERRY B, PORT EN BESSIN, and a portion of the GOLD beaches at the eastern end of MULBERRY. No development of the beaches took place and work was confined to their maintenance. Enemy activity particularly against the JUNO area continued from long range guns until the capture of LISIEUX by First Canadian Army, The transhipment areas were re-organised and transportation officers placed in charge of the actual transhipment and handling of labour while RASC officers were responsible for the handling of transport, the whole area being controlled under the port superintendent, by Transportation with Movements assistance.

(i) caen
Work on minesweeping began at OUISTREHAM on 21 August but the development of the installations in the port of CAEN had started about a fortnight earlier. It was assumed that CAEN would be a major bulk coal port (up to 1,500 tons a day) and would handle up to 5,000 tons of dry cargo in addition. It soon became clear, however, that this full scale development of CAEN would be unnecessary so personnel and equipment were released for the development of ports further NORTH. The CAEN-OUISTREHAM canal was cleared on 3 September and two colliers began to discharge in CAEN on the same day.

(ii) arromanches
On 30 August the first LSI was berthed at the LST pier at ARROMANCHES and a trial was later successfully carried out to see whether a hospital carrier could berth alongside this pier. Preparations were immediately made to use this means of casualty evacuation whenever possible.

(iii) dieppe
The enemy's plans for demolishing DIEPPE went awry and it was possible to open the port within five days of its capture. The first coasters arrived on 7 September and the daily capacity of the port reached between six and seven thousand tons by the end of the month.

(iv) le havre
As already stated, this was captured on 12 September and almost immediately allotted to the US Army by SHAEF. As had been anticipated, the port was badly demolished and it was never necessary for the BRITISH to use it. The port parties scheduled for LE HAVRE had already been switched to ANTWERP.

(v) OSTEND
This port was captured partly demolished on 9 September but was expected to be open within three weeks, after a certain amount of mine clearance and the removal of a block of sunken shipping at the entrance to its harbour.

As stated in para 6 (a) of this chapter, BOULOGNE and CALAIS were not opened during this phase.

(c) railways
Train ferry terminals for rail-fitted LST and "Zeebrugge" and "Twickenham" type ferries were constructed at CHERBOURG by 4 August. The programme for supply of locomotives and wagons had been worked out in advance and the War Office allotted the ferries according to it. The use of LST for wagon ferrying meant a reduction in the shuttle service and in the facilities available for evacuation. Evacuation of casualties, however, was now proceeding smoothly by hospital carrier and air and the evacuation of PW was reduced when the decision to use them for labour in the base area was taken.

By 17 August rail lines from CAEN to BAYEUX and CAEN to COURSEULLES were opened after the bridge at CAEN over the River ORNE had been constructed. By 1 September a single line had been opened from CAEN to ARGENTAN via MEZIDON. After the capture of BRUSSELS a through rail route from just EAST of ROUEN to the area of BRUSSELS was found nearly intact, although it included a long single line stretch from AMIENS to ARRAS via DOULLENS. Work was immediately started by the FRENCH, assisted by transportation troops, on a bridge over the SOMME at AMIENS the lack of which was the cause of the break in the double line. The line from DIEPPE to the main route through AMIENS was ready by 6 September which was the day before the first coaster discharged in that port. It was decided to construct a train ferry terminal for "Zeebrugge" type ferries at DIEPPE in order to avoid having to import locomotives from the area WEST of the SEINE rail break. A new single line low-level bridge across the SEINE at LE MANOIR was completed by 22 September.

Both FRENCH and BELGIAN railway men were anxious to help in every way possible. The BELGIAN railways were in better condition and their central control in BRUSSELS was in full operation as except for the eastern portion of BELGIUM, the GERMANS were clear of the country. The stock of locomotives was very meagre, however, and a number of captured locomotives and wagons were inaccessible due to rail cuts. It was agreed that the area SOUTH of the SEINE should be operated by the military owing to the poor condition of the track and signalling apparatus while the area NORTH of the SEINE should be operated by the local railway authorities.

With the increase in length of the BRITISH rail operated L of C the priority hitherto given to the US for imported locos and rail stock had to be reversed as the BRITISH had insufficient locos SOUTH of the SEINE to maintain the L of C from the RMA. A transfer of locomotives from US to BRITISH control was arranged.

(d) stores
Until the cut in imports was ordered the average discharge of stores of all kinds varied between thirteen thousand and nineteen thousand tons per day, depending on the weather, the availability of coasters and the handling of ferry craft. On 14 August the millionth ton of stores was landed of which just under one third had been discharged at the artificial port. Up to this time in view of the urgency for delivery there had been little attempt to record the movement of stores once they had been landed. It was now decided that convoy notes for lorry drivers would be instituted which enabled the turnround of the lorries and the general flow of stores to be checked. Details of the loads were in broad terms except for pilferable cargoes which in addition to the details on the convoy notes, were on occasions specially guarded.

(e) IWT
As soon as the armies reached BELGIUM there was an immediate request for information on the canal systems. Due to a shortage of staff the reconnaissance of the canals took a considerable time but it was clear that IWT would shortly become a major factor in the clearance of stores and that an increase of both Movements and Transportation staffs would be required for this purpose.

12. RE Works

The transition from the semi-static period in the bridgehead to full mobility across FRANCE and BELGIUM produced many problems for the Works Directorate. In addition to the continued responsibility for works services in the areas behind the rear army boundaries large quantities of bridging stores had to be moved through ports and depots ; airfields, roads and pipelines and to be planned and constructed, bridges lifted and forestry work begun.

(a) general
Early in September HQ 11 L of C Area with 5 CE Works attached took over control of the area between the SEINE and rear army boundaries, while 12 L of C Area with 4 CE Works attached assumed responsibility for the whole BRITISH area SOUTH of the SEINE. This re-organisation involved the moves of several units, some of which, such as airfield construction units, were not fully mobile, but all the moves were accomplished in time to meet their expanding commitments. In August the import of engineer stores steadily increased to a total of 90,500 tons but as stated earlier in this phase imports during the following month were drastically cut. The constantly changing tactical situation resulted in heavy demands for certain types of stores such as bridging and oil stores and these had to be imported at the expense of normal maintenance supplies. Some idea of the volume of work can be gathered from the fact that 5 ESBD handled 4,015 tons in one day in August. Fortunately, a considerable quantity of enemy engineer stores was captured, especially in the BRUSSELS area and the majority of this booty consisted of constructional stores as well as a good supply of machinery and electrical apparatus. With the opening of CAEN and DIEPPE in September and the abandonment to 21 Army Group by armies of engineer stores dumps in the rear areas that they evacuated, another ESBD was required to take over the stores transit depot at DIEPPE and to establish an ESBD in the area of BRUSSELS. Despite the considerable difficulties of maintaining contact with the stores representatives of the armies, an even flow of bridging and other operational stores was maintained and no hold-ups or shortages were experienced during the advance.

(b) roads and bridges
With the enlargement of the bridgehead and consequent reduction in density of traffic, road maintenance became very much easier to accomplish. Work proceeded in accordance with the final plan for the RMA and a new class 70 bridge was erected over the River ORNE, but the progress of the armies, coupled with demolitions by the enemy created an immense demand for bridging material in the forward areas. To meet this as many bridges as possible on the minor roads in the L of C were dismantled and subsequently re-issued to armies. In all, nearly three thousand tons of bridging was recovered by this means. It was also decided to maintain only two of the four main forward routes. These were as follows:-

Class 70 route BAYEUX-CAEN-LISIEUX-EVREUX-PACY-MANTES (with class 40 branches to ELBEUF-PONT DE L'ARCHE-LES ANDELYS and VERNON).
Class 40 route BAYEUX-DOUVRES-TROARN-PONT L'EVEQUE-ROUEN.

A class 70 road from MANTES-GASSICOURT which had a class 70 Bailey bridge on barges spanning the SEINE was continued via BEAUVAIS, AMIENS, ALBERT, ARRAS, DOUAI, TOURNAI, LEUZE and HAL to BRUSSELS. The route via VALENCIENNES in the US area was used during the construction of the class 70 Bailey bridge at TOURNAI and the BRITISH army had right of way on this route. Across the SEINE class 40 bridges were completed and maintained at ROUEN, ELBEUF (two), PONT DE L'ARCHE, LES ANDELYS and VERNON (two). With the exception of the bridge at ROUEN which used existing piers of a demolished bridge, all these were Bailey bridges on pontoons. In September another class 40 dry Bailey bridge was erected at ROUEN. Altogether the number of bridges being maintained at the end of September on the L of C was 135 Bailey bridges and 21 of improvised types.

(c) airfields
The construction and maintenance of airfields became a serious problem during this phase. AGsRE moved forward with the armies and it was only by maintaining close liaison that it was possible to ensure that maintenance apparatus was moved up to the airfields in time to be of use. In some cases airfields were constructed and occupied but were discovered almost at once to be of little operational value as the armies had advanced out of range of fighter aircraft. On the whole it was found that repairing captured enemy airfields, even though they had cratered concrete runways, was more satisfactory than trying hastily to construct new airfields by laying surfacing materials on unused ground. Dust continued to be a nuisance but by spraying a mixture of naval fuel oil and diesel oil it was largely abated. By the end of August twenty-three airfields were in use, ten of which had runways made with SMT, two with PBS, two with repaired concrete and nine without any special runway material. Only one permanent airfield was required - at CARPIQUET. Three more airfield construction wings RAF arrived in the theatre and it was decided not to bring in a fourth. Some of the wings were temporarily employed on road construction work in addition to the maintenance and construction of airfields.

(d) bulk petrol installations
In August and September a total of approximately 152,500 tons of bulk spirit was received and 110,900 tons issued. The total distance of the pipeline laid was approximately 360 miles, carrying 7,500 tons within its length in addition to tankage capacity amounting to 53,000 tons. By the end of September the following RE work had been completed:-

PORT EN BESSIN
(i) Storage for 11,000 tons of MT fuel and 4,000 tons of aviation spirit.
(ii) Eight inside berths were in operation and cross-connected.
(iii) One six-inch pipeline was laid to CHERBOURG, a distance of sixty miles with intermediate pumping stations each with 1,200 tons storage at CHERBOURG, MONTESBOURG and ISIGNY.
(iv) One six-inch pipeline was laid to COLOMBES (fifteen miles) in order to provide
aviation spirit. Filling arrangements were completed at seven airfields.

main pipelines
(i) One of the three six-inch pipelines laid from PORT EN BESSIN to BLARY, a distance of nine miles, was extended to JURIGNY (seven miles) where 4,800 tons of MT storage was installed with jerrican and road tanker filling points, and two were continued to DARNETAL near ROUEN a further 107 miles and across the SEINE. Here a 600 ton tank was installed and rail and road filling points completed.' This was extended by one six-inch pipeline to FORGETTES (four miles) where 600 tons storage and a can filling point were provided.
(ii) At PETIT COURONNES, SOUTH of the SEINE, the system was connected into rehabilitated tanks of 10,000 tons capacity.
(iii) Intermediate storage tanks were established at:-

BRONAY - 8,400 tons
BILLY - 2,400 tons
LISIEUX - 2,400 tons
BRIONNE - 2,400 tons

Booster pumping stations were also installed at the last three places mentioned and at PETIT COURONNES.

(e) quarries
Until the end of August lack of equipment seriously hampered the work of the five quarrying companies. Quarries were being operated at LE TRONQUAY, CAEN, FALAISE and LOUVIERS and all quarry operations came under direct control of the Director of Works. An average of 7,000 cubic yards per day of road material was being produced at the end of this phase.

(f) water
Water had to be supplied to all hospitals, PW camps, convalescent depots, NAAFI institutions and laundries etc. Nine boreholes were successfully sunk yielding an aggregate of 36,000 gallons per hour. 14 AOD in the RMA was supplied from a civilian well. The water for CAEN came from the springs at MOULINES, but extensive repairs had to be carried out to the main between BRETTEVILLE SUR L'AIZE and TILLY LE CAMPAGNE where the reservoir also had to be repaired. A temporary supply of water for locomotives at CAEN railway station was provided from a well until the main system was repaired.

(g) electricity and cold storage
In August it became clear that an organisation to repair and operate large power stations for military purposes in towns and ports was essential. The establishment for this was approved on 16 September and known as 163 CRE (Power). CAEN power station was brought into operation on 20 September and provided electricity for the operation of port cranes, capstans, industrial plants and depots in the RMA. In addition to erecting fifteen ten-ton refrigerating plants at ARROMANCHES, the existing refrigeration plant at CAMBES, near CAEN, was utilised after a generating set and the necessary refrigerant and chemicals had been installed. At OSTEND and ANTWERP cold storage facilities sufficient for 21 Army Group needs were found to be available and were hired, the supply of refrigerants and fuel etc. being a military commitment.

(h) forestry
HQ 8 Canadian Forestry District with five CANADIAN forestry companies and commanding two forestry companies RE was operating during this phase. The CANADIAN companies were located in the forest of CERISY in the US zone and the RE companies in the areas SOUTH of BAYEUX and CAEN. 24,000 tons of sawn timber, piling, poles and pickets were made in addition to 15,000 tons of firewood.

(j) WINTERISATION
At the end of July HQ 21 Army Group called for the requirements for winterisation of depots and roads in order to enable them to function throughout the winter. The principles were as follows:-

(i) Essential hutting should be provided for storage.
(ii) Minimum scales of hutting for living accommodation for personnel to be provided.
(iii) Hutting should be provided for hospitals, depots, HQ and NAAFIs. Messing arrangements etc would be under canvas.

This produced the following requirements:-

Hard standings - 1,109,000 sq ft
Covered storage - 3,093,400 sq ft
Hutting - 3,353,425 sq ft
Roads within depots - 204 miles

By 22 August, however, it was seen that the advance was going so well that except for 14 AOD, winterisation would not be carried out as it was anticipated that the advance base would shortly be developed in the LE HAVRE-ROUEN area. In mid-September a modified winterisation programme was approved. It was decided to winterise only two hospitals and such other essential installations as would remain in the RMA even after the establishment of the advance base which was now to be in the area of BRUSSELS. To help in this the issue of one thousand Nissen huts was authorised and arrangements were made for the forestry companies to provide floors for them from local timber resources.

13. Transportation

Until the middle of August there was no great change in the activities of the Tn Service as unloading continued across the beaches and through MULBERRY and the small ports in the beach head in preparation for the expected advance NORTH. But when the break-through to the SEINE took place, followed by the advance through FRANCE and BELGIUM into HOLLAND, Tn were faced with two big problems. Firstly, a long rail L of C from the RMA across the SEINE forward into HOLLAND had to be organised, and secondly, in order to shorten the L of C and bring supplies by a shorter route through ports that would be able to operate right through the winter, the Channel ports had to be opened. By the end of September both these tasks had been successfully tackled and a rail L of C existed from the RMA right through to EINDHOVEN. The port of DIEPPE was open and the ports of OSTEND, BOULOGNE and ANTWERP were being made ready to accept shipping, although the use of ANTWERP depended on clearing the SCHELDT estuary of hostile elements.

The development of the rail L of C focused from the very start on the development of CAEN which had to become the main traffic and locomotive centre in spite of the damage that had been sustained there. Energetic action had to be taken to repair yards, sidings, workshops and locomotive sheds, communications and signals. This was followed by the opening of the railway line to SERQUIGNY and to the SEINE and later railway construction troops were spread out all along the line to SERQUEUX and forward into BELGIUM. For this four railway construction and maintenance groups and fourteen railway construction companies had been brought over into the beach-head in readiness.

Throughout North-East FRANCE bomb damage at rail centres had been extensive and had been combined with serious demolition SOUTH of the SEINE, although NORTH of the river the demolitions were less widespread. A large number of bridges were down in the BRITISH zone in FRANCE and damage to installations and track was heavy.

The problem, from a 21 Army Group point of view, was a dual one. In the first place the most profitable route for repair had to be selected and in the second place the actual work of repair had to be organised utilising BRITISH resources and manpower and whatever assistance could be obtained from the FRENCH and BELGIANS. The first part of the problem involved the use of a very wide range reconnaissance which was found extremely difficult to control and coordinate owing to the extremely bad communications and also to the acute shortage of transport.

It was decided, owing to the destruction of all bridges across the SEINE, to establish railheads SOUTH of the river with a road link across the river and railtails somewhere NORTH of the river. This system was a makeshift to close the gap until the SEINE bridge at LE MANOIR was constructed on 22 September. This bridge although 520 ft long was successfully completed in fourteen days. Two main bridges were also down across the SOMME, but it was found possible to by-pass this damage by a diversion at DOULLENS. Apart from this it was possible to get the L of C completed right through to BRUSSELS with the exception of a major bridge at HAL which was reconstructed by the BELGIANS.

In spite of the efforts of the railway operating organisation it was not until the end of September that the railways of FRANCE and BELGIUM began to show signs of settling down to provide any kind of reliable service. Communications were bad, particularly in the AMIENS arrondissement but after very close collaboration with the SNCF and the SNCB, the main trunk links and control circuits were nearly completed by the railway signals staff by the end of September.

The operating service was short of stock and locomotives due to an inadequate allocation of the engines being imported on allied account through CHERBOURG, but this problem had been gradually solved by the end of September. The opening of the DIEPPE train ferry on 29 September finally overcame the problem of locomotive shortage, since locomotives for BRITISH use could thereafter be delivered direct to the BRITISH sector in accordance with a prearranged programme.

Amongst the most awkward of problems was that of coal, all of which was being imported from the UK principally via CAEN and CHERBOURG, and the coal traffic required for moving trains NORTH of the SEINE was taking up paths across the SEINE which could ill be spared. Every effort was being made towards the end of September to arrange for coal to be provided from FRENCH sources in the mining area of the NORTH.

To tackle the problem of organising a rail L of C which was operated entirely by BRITISH troops in some sectors, by FRENCH and BRITISH in another and entirely by FRENCH and BELGIAN personnel elsewhere, great flexibility of organisation was essential. It was found necessary by mid-September to drop the standard railway operating group and railway unit organisation in the area SOUTH of the SEINE and to set up a divisional superintendent's office at CAEN. At the same time the head of the railway branch left BAYEUX, where HQ 21 Army Group Rear remained, and went forward to ROUEN where it could maintain some contact with TRANCO. ROUEN had been selected as the base from which to send out the necessary railway construction reconnaissances and it was also suitable for the central control of railway operating. Nevertheless it was soon found that it was necessary to have a railway operating headquarters further forward and a group HQ moved to AMIENS. As soon as BRUSSELS fell a railway staff was set up alongside the SNCB in that city.

In the area SOUTH of the SEINE the actual operating itself was complicated and difficult as it was a very bad section of line to work, so that at times it was not possible to attain the agreed programme. The following are some of the particular difficulties encountered; first, a spate of rail breaks between CAEN and MEZIDON which was due to the effects of shelling; second, accentuation of traffic-working difficulties by engine failures and hot axleboxes, particularly on the US double-headed through trains; third, there was congestion in the CAEN yard and in the RMA area due to limited siding capacity, loading points and depots; fourth, there was a shortage of engine power due particularly to insufficient numbers of BRITISH locomotives and insufficient shed facilities to handle the locomotives at CAEN.

NORTH of the SEINE, however, apart from the problems of water supply and repair of lines, the greatest difficulty encountered was that of re-organising the railway operating service in collaboration with the FRENCH and later with the BELGIANS. Though the railway operating units could be used for this type of work they had been designed to operate railways rather than to assist others to do so, and their organisation was not altogether suitable for the latter task.

The second half of the problem on the Tn side was to develop the Channel ports as quickly as possible and thus relieve the strain on the L of C. It was not possible to open up CAEN as a port until the end of August, but other facilities were found to be adequate and, as a precaution, work continued on the winterisation of MULBERRY. Preparations were made well in advance for opening each of the ports as they were captured. Reconnasissance parties were sent forward together with Royal Naval parties, the port commandant and sub-area representatives. They took with them a basic key plan to work from and were ordered to produce a final plan for the complete development of each port. For this work the port construction and repair groups and port operating groups were utilised. Representatives of 21 Arm y Group kept in closest contact with them in order to make the maximum possible use of facilities and resources at the disposal of 21 Army Group and to ensure that the planning of shipping and the shipping of stores could be modified to conform to the actual situation in each of the ports as they were captured. The port of DIEPPE was captured on 2 September, by 7 September ships were being discharged there and by the end of the month a maximum of 7,200 tons in one day was being discharged and cleared by rail and road. The capture of BOULOGNE and OSTEND did not however provide two additional ports immediately as they were both in a very damaged state. All three ports were heavily demolished, blocked and mined, but in many cases demolitions were inexpertly and incompletely executed. The factors which were most important in preventing these ports from opening quickly were mine clearance and the removal of block ships in the entrance. ANTWERP was taken by the end of the month but could not be operated because the SCHELDT was heavily mined and the GERMANS still occupied the river approaches.

The shortage of MT experienced by all in this phase had a very direct bearing on the administration and functioning of Tn units. With the advance most of the units had to change their location at least once if not twice and the movement of all these units with their impedimenta produced problems of the greatest complexity. Not one of the Tn units was fully mobile and about 550 lorry and 100 transporter lifts additional to unit transport were required to move Tn units and equipment to the places where they were required to work. Tn units could not, therefore, be moved with complete flexibility from place to place and in some cases were not able to get down to their work as quickly as was desirable.

With the extension of the L of C from ARROMANCHES to EINDHOVEN the Tn Service became extremely difficult to control largely due to difficulties of communication. On the move of HQ 21 Army Group to BRUSSELS the DDTn (Ports) became directly responsible for the development of OSTEND and ANTWERP and through HQ 11 L of C Area for DIEPPE, LE TREPORT, BOULOGNE and CALAIS while MULBERRY B, PORT EN BESSIN, CAEN and OUISTREHAM continued to be developed under the supervision of HQ 12 L of C area. The railways and stores organisations also moved to BRUSSELS leaving a divisional area organisation at AMIENS and a railway operating group at CAEN. The Tn Service was thus suitably disposed to prepare the build-up during the winter for the attack on GERMANY.

14. Postal

The most important aspect of this phase from the Postal point of view was the problem created by the rapid lengthening of the L of C. Corps and divisional postal distribution centres moved forward sometimes at one and two day intervals and the maintenance of a regular daily service to and from the RMA presented many difficulties. A postal service for units grounded at various points on the L of C and machinery for the disposal of mails of disbanded units and formations had also to be provided.

The establishment of so many APOs on the L of C led to a serious shortage of postal personnel. This was to some extent alleviated by the employment of civilian labour on duties such as sorting of home-going mail which could not lead to breaches of security.

During the period there was a number of non-flying days due to bad weather, but in each case a double load of mails was successfully carried by the next day's aircraft. In order, however, to provide for prolonged stoppages of flying, arrangements were made to transfer mails to surface routes as necessary. The stage was eventually reached where a split of the air lift for mail became essential and separate lifts were devised for units of the rearward area and units of First Canadian and Second British Armies. It was also possible in connection with this revision to arrange air transport of mails posted and due for delivery within the theatre.

On 10 September DIEPPE was adopted as a port of entry for mail for units in the forward area and from 25 September mail for units of the RMA was brought in at CAEN instead of ARROMANCHES (MULBERRY). In conformity with the general administrative policy a decision was taken to move 8 Base APO to ANTWERP upon the freeing of the port, and this was completed by 26 September. A rear element of 8 Base APO was left at CREPON to provide a base postal installation for the RMA, and the general area SOUTH and WEST of the River SEINE.

15. Supply and Transport

(a) supplies
This phase of the operations in North-West EUROPE did not provide any major supply problems of a technical nature. The main problem experienced in common with all planning sections, was the difficulty of forecasting future operational moves due to the constantly changing tactical situation.

The FS bulk ration had almost entirely superseded Compo packs by 21 July and plans for fresh items to take the place of the tinned equivalents were in hand. In order to provide suitable cold storage for imported meat, insulated meat pits and ten-ton portable cold stores were constructed in the neighbourhood of ARROMANCHES.

The shipment of all fresh vegetables was successful, but required a great deal of detailed supervision in DIDs. The baking of bread was somewhat delayed due to the lack of sites with suitable water supplies, and also to delay in shipping the necessary equipment, but by 5 August bread was issued to nearly all troops. Later it was impossible for bakeries with the armies to keep up with the advance and maintain their output at the same time. In the case of the L of C, contracts were placed with civilian firms in order to ensure full scale provision of bread for all L of C troops.

The import of supplies was averaging about 2,600 tons per day and by 5 August stocks based on a feeding strength of 700,000 represented some twenty-seven days supply. These stocks were held in RMA EAST and WEST depots which were fifteen to twenty miles apart and were worked independently, each area being controlled initially by a CRASC Supply Units who was responsible for GHQ supply units including BSDs, DIDs, field butcheries and bakeries in his area. This, however, proved too great a task and on 15 August CRASC 19 Supply Units took over responsibility for the field butcheries, bakeries and two DIDs which dealt exclusively with coal and fresh vegetables. This re-organisation effected a great improvement in both areas.

Early in August it was decided when making the bids for the period D+94 to D+103 that the tactical situation and the stocks on the ground justified the introduction of commodity loading in accordance with the original maintenance plan. However, the greatly changed situation as the time for receipt of these supplies approached had strained the transport system to its limit. It was hoped, however, to relieve this by shipping the intake of maintenance through Channel ports and a last minute attempt was therefore made, in vain, to revert to balanced ration loadings for this period. In point of fact failure to revert to the balanced ration system was of little consequence as when the armies began their advance all drawing of fresh rations practically ceased, the major issues being Compo, except for captured stocks. A considerable quantity of the latter was available. At OSS in HOLLAND 11,000,000 pounds of frozen beef and 850 tons of tinned meat were uncovered. 550 tons of meat were also found in the area of BRUSSELS, in addition to a large number of miscellaneous items which were used in substitution for items in the BRITISH scale. For five days Second Army subsisted on captured stocks without having to touch first, second or third line reserve holdings. In the latter half of September all units in FRANCE received full daily issues of frozen meat from cold storage facilities at ROUEN and AMIENS.

Demands from armies for roadhead replenishments were based on a seven days cycle, armies submitting detailed breakdown demands with priorities two days before each period. The aim was to deliver six days balanced rations and one days balancing items. This scheme was slow in getting into operation, mainly due to rail transport difficulties and the impossibility of reconciling receipts with despatches. The problem of distribution began to be easier from 9 September when DIEPPE opened, becoming available as a base for First Canadian Army and a modest rail lift became operative to the SEINE railheads. During the critical period in the first fortnight of September, 600 tons were flown to the BRUSSELS area from UK for Second Army.

(b) transport
The build-up in the bridgehead had increased to such an extent since D-day that due to congestion on the roads certain transport units had been phased back. Early in August, however, these were again called forward in anticipation of a large scale advance.

On 6 August in response to a request from HQ 21 Army Group one three-ton and one six-ton GT Coy were loaned to the US armies for an agreed period of eight days. Despite the fact that a third GT Coy was loaned, it was not possible to release these units until 4 September when the transport crisis on the BRITISH L of C was at its height. A DUKW company was also loaned to the AMERICANS for use on the UTAH beaches for six weeks.

From 22 August onwards more and more transport had to be provided to enable the armies to stock their roadheads. Although it had been originally planned to establish roadheads at distances of fifty to one hundred miles apart and to stock them up to a maximum of five days holdings of all stores, this system had to be modified owing to the extreme rapidity of the advance. First Canadian Army economised in transport by setting up an advance section of No 3 Roadhead, thirty miles further on near BOUGTHEROLDE. As transport became available stocks in No 3 Roadhead at LISIEUX were moved forward and this advance section became the base of the First Canadian Army up to the line of the SOMME. With the opening of DIEPPE the transport allotted to First Canadian Army from HQ 21 Army Group resources amounted to eight three-ton companies.

Second Army formed temporary "cushions", the first of which was established South-West of FALAISE and preceded the opening of No 4 Roadhead EAST of RUGLES. On 19 August prior to the stocking of No 1 Cushion, Second Army had six equivalent three-ton GT coys from GHQ resources under their command. By 26 August this number had increase to fourteen and on 2 September, exclusive of two platoons of army tank transporters converted for load carrying, thirty-nine equivalent three-ten GT coys were under their command.

By the middle of September the BRITISH L of C had lengthened to three hundred miles, almost double the distance on which the allotment of transport to 21 Army Group had been calculated. Until the development of rail and port facilities, therefore, the road maintenance lift had to be increased by every possible means.

The decision to cut imports into the RMA to seven thousand tons per day already mentioned in para 5(b) released eight DUKW companies for conversion into normal GT coys and also a number of GT coys employed on beach clearance. At the end of September only three DUKW companies remained as such, of which one was on loan to US Army.

In August Second Army followed the example of First Canadian Army and by welding on to each trailer a base and sides of airfield track converted a company of forty-ton tank transporters into load carriers. First Canadian Army had previously converted one platoon. These modified transporters could lift sixteen and a half tons of supplies, thirty-six tons of ammunition, ten tons of POL or five hundred jerricans, which meant a very considerable lift for a three platoon company.

An extra lift of between five and six hundred tons was added to the pool by bringing five GT coys up to their full WE and by the issue surplus to WE, of an additional thirty three-ton reserve vehicles to each of four GT coys. In addition, one hundred and fifty-four 800 gallon tankers were issued early in September to supplement the seven bulk petrol transport companies employed on forward maintenance.

On 16 September eight US truck companies commenced to run from BAYEUX to BRUSSELS delivering five hundred tons of petrol per day. On 20 September they were employed on the maintenance of the two US airborne divisions which took part in operation MARKET GARDEN.

Further assistance came from the release of AA RASC transport platoons and six platoons of twenty-nine and three platoons of twenty-two three-ton vehicles were formed from first line AA transport. Two ten-ton GT coys were further equipped with five-ton trailers.

The decision by Second Army to ground certain formations in the advance released considerable amount of first and second Tine transport for local work, thus enabling GT coys to continue in the maintenance lifts.

In mid-September War Office agreed to loan an additional seventeen GT coys to 21 Army Group. Five arrived before the end of this phase, the remaining twelve were expected to arrive preloaded with supplies or petrol before 3 October.

The ever increasing transport required for Civil Affairs was an added handicap to the maintenance of the armies. Between 26 August and 6 September five thousand tons of food and medical supplies from Civil Affairs depots at BUSSY and LUC-SUR-MER were transported to PARIS.

On 9 September First Canadian Army formed No. 5 Roadhead SOUTH of ABBEVILLE at the same time as DIEPPE was opened. This roadhead and the opening of the SEINE railheads on 13 September, coupled with an increased allotment of two additional GT coys on 16 September allowed First Canadian Army to maintain itself to the DUTCH frontier, and to clear approximately three thousand tons per day from DIEPPE.

On 6 September Second Army began stocking No 6 Army Roadhead in the area of GRAMMONT. When trains began to run in limited numbers from the RMA the dual problem arose of continually balancing the rail capacities on either side of the SEINE and lifting by road the balance of the six thousand tons per day required by that army for its maintenance and stocks. HQ 21 Army Group, therefore, assumed responsibility for the control of all transport and set up the organisation entitled TRANCO at AMIENS on 19 September. By 25 September orders had been issued for the regrouping of the GT coys in the DOULLENS and ELBEUF areas NORTH and SOUTH of the SEINE. In each of these areas two CsRASC each commanding a group of companies were placed. Of these one was responsible for road patrol and the organisation of staging camps, while the other called "Control" was responsible for reporting daily, by wireless, availability of transport in the area and movement of all maintenance convoys through the report centre established on the main "up" and "down" routes. Control CsRASC also operated at the RMA, at No 6 Army Roadhead, and at DIEPPE. The co-ordination of transport allocation was then exercised by TRANCO, based on "Q" priorities given to Second Army demands. A loading bill was sent out daily by wireless or telephone forty-eight hours in advance to controlling HQ.

(c) vehicle maintenance
During this intense period of activity the maintenance of vehicles inevitably had to be reduced, but partly due to the majority of vehicles being new no serious ill effects ensued. A major fault occurred in the engines of K-5 4x4, three-ton Austins, 1,400 of which, as well as all the replacement engines, were found to be defective and to have piston trouble.

(d) Air freight
When BRUSSELS and ANTWERP were reached, maintenance by air became imperative and a HQ CRASC transport column trained in air freight organisation was transferred from the RMA and placed under command of Second Army. By 13 September this HQ with two DIDs had handled 6,352 tons of stores. The tonnages of air freight increased throughout the month, during which an average of between four hundred and five hundred tons a day was achieved.

Early in September bulk petrol was delivered to LILLE by means of long range tanks of Liberator aircraft but this experiment was abandoned as it was wasteful both in petrol and aircraft.

(e) petrol
At the beginning of this period imports of POL were averaging 4,500 tons per day of which fifty per cent was in bulk against an average daily consumption of POL products of 2,000 tons per day. The restriction of movement in the bridgehead reduced petrol consumption to a minimum and by 5 August the stock of MT 80 was 66,000 tons representing thirty-three days stock. All petrol units that were required for the bridgehead had arrived by 5 August but eight bulk petrol transport companies were phased in by 25 August in anticipation of the advance across the SEINE.

As First Canadian Army and Second Army were based on RMA EAST and RMA WEST respectively all issues to armies were by pack, but at the same time L of C units were commencing to receive their petrol in bulk which released jerricans for the impending advance.

During August the physical distribution of petrol to the armies caused no difficulty until the crossing of the SEINE. Meanwhile, the intake of bulk petrol through PORT EN BESSIN was approximately 2,300 tons per day with a similar amount arriving in pack. The consumption during the second half of August had doubled and stabilised at approximately 4,000 tons of all products per day. Forward distribution was effected during the early stage of the advance by transporting packed POL stores by road from the RMA to No 3 and No 4 Roadheads. In order to increase the bulk petrol lift, Q (AE) authorised the issue of seventy, and in early September a further eighty-four, additional 800 gallon tankers to the bulk petrol companies to be held surplus to establishment. Between 5-10 September a total of 2,308 tons of packed MT 80 was delivered by air to the BRUSSELS area. On 9 September rail service from the RMA to the SEINE was opened and the first 750 ton train was despatched to BERNAY on the same day.

The progress of the pipeline continued and on 16 September bulk petrol lorries started loading at BRIONNE for the armv filling areas which were at this time at NEUFCHATEL and GRANDE VILLIERS. 'By 18 September the pipeline was extended to the PETIT COURONNE installations at ROUEN where 160,000 empty jerricans had been collected. Simultaneously a filling area under GHQ control was opened at DARNETAL to utilise the very large number of empty jerricans left in the area. DARNETAL besides being the pipehead NORTH of the SEINE also became the rail tank car filling point as the rail was developed. The first line of PLUTO had been laid from the ISLE OF WIGHT to CHERBOURG. On 13 August pumping of water commenced and by 24 August water pumping tests on the second line were proceeding at a rate equal to approximately 145 tons per day.

During September approximately 4,000 tons per day was required for the force, and although 2,000 tons per day could be accepted in bulk at PORT EN BESSIN, the balance was required to be stored at an advanced port in order to economise in transport. OSTEND, liberated on 9 September, was the port chosen and the first tankers were discharged there on 29 September. Stocks of packed products in the UK were now so limited that imports of packed POL had to be reduced in October to the production rate of 350 tons per day.

16. Printing and Stationery

Throughout this period the two BRITISH advanced stationery depots served Second Army and L of C respectively while the CANADIAN depot, whose arrival had been delayed, started to serve First Canadian Army and CANADIAN units on the L of C during the early part of August.

In order to keep pace with the advance of Second Army a mobile detachment of the advanced stationery depot was formed which moved forward to each of the corps areas in turn. A timetable was arranged so that units could collect from the mobile detachment at an agreed point in the corps area and as this system effected a considerable saving of unit transport it was continued until Second Army crossed the SEINE. Second Army depot was established in BRUSSELS and limited issues were started on 15 September. The CANADIAN depot moved forward to ANTWERP about the same time.

On 26 August the Base Stationery Depot was called forward and took over the reserve stocks of the Second Army depot and L of C depot in the RMA.

10 Special Heavy Mobile Printing Section and a mobile detachment of 2 GHQ Printing Press arrived in the theatre on 6 August and were set up at Rear HQ 21 Army Group where they started to print such matter as GROs, C-in-C's messages and propaganda leaflets. An undamaged printing works was discovered in CAEN on 18 August and the main body of 2 GHQ Printing Press was brought out on 6 September to operate it. The unit started to produce work on 7 September but within three weeks moved to BRUSSELS where it took over a plant on 24 September.

Publications produced in the theatre were distributed by 12 Publications Depot to all formations and units while those produced in UK, such as General Staff publications were distributed by 6 Publications Depot until it moved overseas on 17 August. Thereafter all publications were distributed in the theatre.

17. Ordnance

(a) ordnance build-up
On 16 August 14 Forward Trailer Section opened for issue at ST MARTINS in the KMA. This unit had been specially stocked to supply MT spares to L of C units who lacked the Ordnance Field Parks of formations. 17 AOD relieved of this load was then able to concentrate on supplying the fighting formations.  14 FTS consisted of forty-one four-ton trailers fitted with bins to carry small MT spare parts and sixty-nine bulk trailers for larger components viz. engines, axles etc. Although it was potentially a mobile unit it was not necessary to move it from the original site until a major move was made in September to the area of BRUSSELS.

Meanwhile 14 AOD was being rapidly developed and in order that it could open on 14 September, the target date, extensive use was made of Pioneers, civilian labour and prisoners of war. The planned figure for the initial stocking of 14 AOD was twenty-three thousand tons of all types of stores but owing to the delays in shipping actual receipts fell short of this figure by some five thousand tons. A school of instruction was set up to train civilians in ordnance procedure, and what must have been the first passenger train service in liberated EUROPE was initiated for the benefit of 14 AOD to convey their civilians from CAEN to AUDRIEUX. 17 AOD closed down as an issuing depot and its remaining stock of BMPs LRs and other stores were placed under the control of COO, 14 AOD. The personnel of 16 AOD who were operating with 17 AOD were transferred to 14 AOD and the depot Decame known as 14/16 AOD.

During this period one base laundry, three base hospital laundries, one base industrial gas unit, four army industrial gas units, twenty-one BRITISH and six CANADIAN mobile laundry and bath units, seventeen port ordnance detachments and fourteen port ammunition detachments arrived in the theatre ready to operate in the advance base and the Channel ports as soon as they were liberated.

At the end of August personnel of 15 AOD arrived in the theatre and later, after the capture of ANTWERP, moved forward from the RMA to recce sites for an advanced base ordnance depot in BELGIUM.

In order to shorten the L of C 17 Stores Transit Depot moved to DIEPPE on 17 September to receive detail issue stores from the UK main base depots for the armies and L of C.

(b) equipment
There were no major problems concerning the maintenance of formations during the period in the bridgehead, as distances were short and it was therefore possible to obtain urgent requirements within a few hours dependent upon the availability of stores at the depots and field parks. Certain difficulties, however, were experienced in the supply of particular equipment, notably artillery, due to mechanical defects appearing after sustained action and prematures of ammunition, but these were overcome by obtaining urgent replacements and spares by air from UK. A programme for the re-organisation of field artillery in the assault corps was arranged during August. Seven regiments equipped with SP 105 mm guns were converted into 25 pr regiments. All stores and equipment required for this were brought over from UK together with a detachment of personnel of 15 AOD to set up a special re-organisation park to receive back the old equipment and issue the new.

The equipment rendered surplus by the disbandment of 59 Division and one brigade of 49 Division was received into 14 AOD which opened up special returned stores parks to handle the vast amount of equipment involved. Here the equipment was sorted, repaired and reissued to other units.

Surplus vehicles were received into returned vehicle parks for servicing and re-issue.

(c) maintenance during the advance

As distances between formations and the RMA increased, army roadheads moved forward to form dumps of selected fast moving stores readily accessible to the fighting formations, and also to receive stores in transit from the RMA. The supply of stores, however, was entirely dependent upon the availability of transport.

After the break-out from the NORMANDY bridgehead both armies were maintained by road convoys from depots in the RMA to the ordnance maintenance companies at army roadheads. At the same time a special stores convoy unit to carry forward stores of extreme urgency was formed from 15 FTS, a part of 15 AOD. Subsequently, after the armies had entered BELGIUM, stores were despatched by rail to railhead SOUTH of the SEINE and re-loaded on to railtail NORTH of the SEINE. This operation was supervised by ordnance railhead detachments.

The distances now separating the armies from the RMA made it necessary to increase the holdings of ordnance stores at army roadheads; 15 Stores Transit Sub Depot was therefore moved forward to Second Army roadhead to augment No 1 Ordnance Maintenance Company. 17 FTS was also moved up to hold an operational reserve of stores well forward in the Second Army area. Similarly, dumps had to be opened for the benefit of those L of C troops who by this time had also moved forward to areas considerably distant from the RMA.

(d) vehicle parks
Owing to the very limited space in the RMA, as many as three or four vehicle parks were operating on the same site although independently of each other. Throughout the campaign army vehicle parks moved up in support of their formations and other vehicle parks were located at points along the L of C to control vehicles being ferried to armies.

At times a very considerable strain was placed on vehicle parks during the advance so that it was necessary to employ all available drivers, including military reinforcements and civilians to ensure that advanced parks were constantly stocked with vehicles for onward delivery to the armies.

Vehicles from UK were diverted to the Channel ports as soon as they were opened and 15 and 17 Transit Vehicle Parks were established at OSTEND and BOULOGNE respectively. With the setting up of the advance base in BELGIUM approximately eight thousand light "A" and "B" vehicles had to be brought up from the RMA and to assist in this heavy commitment No 1 Canadian Vehicle Company was brought over from the UK in September.

(e) ammunition
It was found necessary to establish intermediate ammunition dumps along the line of advance in addition to maintaining dumps already in the army roadheads. These dumps were initially replenished from the RMA but as soon as DIEPPE was operative 3 BAD moved forward to receive ammunition through that port for First Canadian Army. Nevertheless, ammunition still had to be obtained from the RMA and any surpluses that First Canadian Army had were handed over to Second Army. Although the expenditure of artillery ammunition during the advance was comparatively low, heavy demands were made on arrival in the BRUSSELS area for replenishment of AFV natures and SAA.

Artillery natures were in short supply in the forward areas and formations were restricted to drawing half 21 Army Group rates per day. It was necessary at one stage to despatch 112,000 rounds of 25-pr by air from UK but the situation was improved by the discovery of 80,000 25-pr HE shell (without cartridges) at LOUVAIN which had been excellently maintained by the GERMANS since 1940.

18. REME

Shortly after the capture of CAEN, three advance base workshops were established in field sites in the area of the CAEN-BAYEUX road. The chief commitments at this stage were the conversion of certain AFVs to personnel carriers, assistance in inspection and repair of artillery equipment of RA regiments undergoing re-organisation, conversion of tank transporters to load carriers, vehicle recovery and backloading. Recovery resources were used with the primary object of keeping roads clear for fighting troops and supplies and most of this work was done under army control in order to relieve corps of responsibilities in rear of their areas. Back-loading into workshop sites and collecting points took second priority and had to be done at night. All "crocks" were back-loaded to corps backloading points (CBPs), the priority being firstly repairable vehicles, then BRITISH "W" (write-ofF) "crocks" and lastly enemy vehicles. As these dumps of crocks were collected during the advance, third line workshops were dropped off and worked on them until nothing worth repairing remained. This policy of setting down third line workshops at intervals on the line of advance was found to work well but due to the distances involved control was extremely difficult, although the wireless net proved invaluable and was the only way in which "crock" states could be obtained. During this period third line workshops were controlled and moved entirely by corps headquarters. It was found that handling "crocks" and operating the CBPs should be primarily the responsibility of workshops rather than recovery units, and that it was better to use the latter for ferrying crocks and for their responsibility to cease after off-loading. Classification and cannibalisation were more effectively controlled by a foster unit such as an armoured troop workshops rather than by recovery units.

During the rapid advance armoured brigade workshops were faced with the alternative of keeping up with their formations and doing no work or being left far behind. Infantry brigade workshops did not have quite the same difficulties as there are three in a division and they were able to carry on by "leap-frogging" each other. It was realised that when independent armoured brigades are under command of a division REME technical control must be direct by the Corps DDME and not through the divisional CREME. This policy also applied in respect of the recovery companies, technical control being exercised by the DDME and administrative control by CREME corps troops. This direct contact with brigade REME co-ordinated by mutual liaison between divisional CsREME and brigade EMEs speeded tank recovery and repair to a considerable degree.

By mid-August a CANADIAN fourth line workshop opened in the REME area at LA DELIVRANDE thus allowing third line workshops which had previously been carrying out jobs of a much heavier nature than usual to proceed with their norm al work. At the same time the tendency for large scale cannibalisation began to diminish.

Third line workshops found it necessary to be every bit as mobile as brigade workshops. Second Army's third line workshops had been fully mobile since the early days and able to move without help, given thirty-six hours notice. A recovery section always moved with them carrying forward as many spares as possible to counteract the difficulty that Ordnance were experiencing in making issues over such distances. First Canadian Army tackled the problem differently. Their third line workshops were never under corps control during periods of rapid movement, on the assumption that they could not be expected to have good production figures if moved too rapidly, nor could corps properly administer them if they were many miles in the rear. In fact they never had more than fifty per cent of third line workshops under corps control even under static conditions.

Recovery units had an extremely unpleasant task in clearing up areas after battles, particularly in the case of the FALAISE gap. Here they had to recover thousands of tanks, vehicles and guns, chiefly GERMAN, in an area where there were some eight thousand dead horses and thousands of enemy dead still unburied. Recovery vehicles were employed to take away these dead horses for disposal by Pioneers and prisoners of war and over two hundred carcasses were recovered from the River DIVES alone.

In the BRUSSELS area workshops were able to find first class accommodation for the first time, which was particularly fortunate as during early September all second and third line workshops were working at full pressure on very heavy vehicle repair programmes. In order to assist the forward echelon workshops and to serve the advance base area 2 Canadian and 21 Advance Base Workshops were brought up from the RMA to the advance base area at the end of September. At the same time an additional advance base workshop was landed over the beaches. In view of the length of the L of C and the battles still in progress for the Channel ports, this workshop was sited at ARRAS.

To support the operations for the capture of LE HAVRE and the reduction of the Channel ports, third line workshops were moved across the SEINE on 1 September with a view to establishing a REME area near REUVILLE. But the weather broke at this period and the plan had to be abandoned, workshops having to seek individual hard standings and accommodation such as railway stations which were not being used. With the fall of LE HAVRE and the clearance of the coastal belt REME were able to carry out "make and mend" for the first time since the break-out. The opening of the Channel ports required REME assistance in maintaining the continuous stream of vehicles coming off the ships on their journey to the reserve vehicle parks and vice versa for "dead" vehicles on their way back to the UK. The task of loading vehicles and tanks into cargo ships was extremely difficult and it was often necessary to lower modified bull-dozers into the ships for manoeuvering tanks into position.

REME preparations for the advance into HOLLAND were governed by the fact that the formations involved were starting from points often as much as fifty miles apart and that four different axes were being used, To cover each approach axis a series of CBPs, each with third line workshops support was established. In response to 30 Corps Commander's request for a maximum delivery of tanks to fighting formations the whole of the REME transporter resources were despatched on 13 September to VERNON and AMIENS to bring up repaired tanks. Together with a few tanks from the ANTWERP workshops and the output of second line workshops this resulted in over eighty tanks being delivered in five days.

The terrain of the operation was very bad tank country, being low lying, offering negligible cover and intersected by innumerable waterways. Consequently heavy tank casualties were expected and two third line workshops and three heavy recovery sections were therefore made available. In actual fact the tank casualties proved very light as the burden of the heavy fighting fell on the infantry. Thus the REME resources were found to be more than adequate. However, during the advance into HOLLAND on practically a single axis, road clearance became of major importance and the recovery sections were kept fully occupied. It had been expected that there would be a heavy third line workshops commitment during this advance which might well have occurred had ARNHEM been captured but owing to the short duration of the operation it did not arise.

When the tempo of the battle slackened, second line workshops were able to embark on an extensive engine change programme assisted by detachments of craftsmen from third line workshops, as it was considered that second line workshops yielded quicker and more fruitful results than third line. In return, the latter often accepted second line work when conditions were favourable and second line workshops hard pressed.

19. Claims and Hirings

Executive control over claims and hirings on the Continent was vested jointly in Deputy Directors at HQ L of C and HQ 21 Army Group working under the supervision of Director and Hirings until he assumed full responsibility on his arrival with HQ 21 Army Group. As operations progressed a satisfactory Claims and Hirings organisation was evolved, consisting on the one hand of static district offices and on the other representation at army and corps HQ. District offices were established at CAEN, FLERS, BRIONNE, ROUEN, DIEPPE, AMIENS, LILLE, BRUSSELS, BRUGES and ANTWERP during this period. The Director found it necessary to appoint an Assistant Director Claims and Hirings both for FRANCE and for BELGIUM, each of whom was responsible to the Deputy Director at HQ L of C. The Deputy Director at HQ 21 Army Group controlled the Claims and Hirings detachments at Second British and First Canadian Armies, while the Director was responsible for the overall policy and supervision in the army and L of C areas.

The principal question of policy to be decided at this stage was the degree of financial and administrative assistance to be given by the FRENCH authorities in the matter of hirings, requisitions and claims. Care was taken to ensure that the UNITED STATES authorities were kept fully informed, both the different political agreements which GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES had concluded with FRANCE necessitated independent negotiations by the representatives of the respective countries.

During August agreement was reached whereby demands for accommodation were made on the FRENCH local authorities and the FRENCH Government assumed financial responsibility towards its own citizens for the payment of accommodation requisitioned at BRITISH request. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, all hirings records held by the Directorate were handed over to the FRENCH on 30 September. Inherent to these negotiations was the definition of an operational area. Clearly it would be wrong to pay "rent for the trenches", but on the other hand the rapid movement of modern warfare and the extensive use of aircraft made it impracticable to consider that an operational area could be bounded by a static line such as an army or corps rear boundary. After much discussion, it was agreed by all parties that an operational area should be defined as all that area occupied by troops under the command of corps and engaged on active operations. It was agreed that in such an area and for the period of active operations the occupation of land and buildings would take place without any formalities either before or after entry.

Discussions were also initiated with the FRENCH in regard to a claims agreement under which it was sought to attach to the FRENCH certain financial obligations arising out of claims by virtue of a Mutual Aid agreement, but these negotiations did not mature until a much later date.

The BELGIAN authorities were not sure what conditions they were likely to meet in their own country and so a tentative agreement had been concluded with them whereby the Claims and Hirings Directorate would make hiring agreements and pay claims on lines similar to those arranged with the FRENCH prior to D-day. Shortly after the liberation of BRUSSELS, however, it became apparent that the BELGIAN Government was functioning much better than had been expected and discussions were begun with a view to effecting a retroactive agreement similar to the new one with FRANCE. Again the closest liaison was necessary with UNITED STATES authorities.

The speed of the advance and the large number of troops located in BELGIUM caused an acute shortage of accommodation and Claims and Hirings officers in static offices in BELGIUM rendered assistance to the "Q" staff in finding accommodation for the troops. A satisfactory agreement was made whereby accommodation previously occupied by the GERMANS was frozen for BRITISH use. A right of appeal in case of hardship was given to the BELGIAN owners and although it was exercised on many occasions the vast majority of such requisitions went unchallenged.

During the months of August and September 6,721 requisitions of real estate were recorded and 3,422 claims were disposed of out of a total of 5,875.

20. Labour

As the armies moved rapidly across northern FRANCE and into BELGIUM an acute shortage of military labour was felt throughout the L of C. In addition to the existing commitments in the RMA which still had to be catered for, the early weeks of this period coincided with the arrival of the last L of C depots which required their allocation of companies, while in the newly liberated territory there were bridges to construct, railways to repair, and the Channel ports to operate. Two examples of unexpected labour demands which had to be met quickly, were the provision of companies to work for the AOD and to operate the railhead-railtail on the SEINE. It had been hoped to employ civilian labour in the AOD, but as the civilians were not available in sufficient numbers up to eight and a half pioneer companies had to be diverted there from other tasks. On the SEINE where stores in transit were often handled four times between railhead and railtail, eight companies were employed SOUTH of the river and seven on the NORTH side. Another factor which contributed to the scarcity of labour, was the necessity to throw off sections on the line of advance to clear up, guard and move forward the residue of roadheads and cushions.

At the beginning of this phase the supply of civilian labour could not make up for the deficiencies of military labour. The lack of civilians was due to the fact that 21 Army Group was operating in a thinly populated agricultural area from which the best and youngest workers had been sifted by the enemy. Moreover, many of the remaining able-bodied men who in normal times might have formed a labour reserve were now playing a vital operational role within the Maquis organisation. At the end of the period, however, the strain on labour resources was eased by the use of the liberated manpower of industrial northern FRANCE and BELGIUM. On 1 August 21 Army Group employed only 2,600 civilians but by the end of September there were 13,200 civilians working for the military (of which one in every three was a skilled man).

Early in August FRENCH pioneer companies started forming, the first of which was ready for work in mid-August. A decision which greatly eased the situation was to retain prisoners of war on the Continent to work under the direction of the Director of Labour. If this latter decision had not been made it would have been necessary for HQ 21 Army Group to press SHAEF for permission to recruit civilians from the AMERICAN zone, and there was in point of fact an instruction governing these circumstances which had been foreseen in the planning period. Similar conditions, however, did not arise again during the campaign and SHAEF never had to decide on priorities between the US and BRITISH. The evacuation of prisoners of war partially ceased in the second week of August and soon afterwards eight thousand GERMAN prisoners were employed in the L of C area. PW camps were situated near base installations and prisoners were employed on a day-to-day basis under BRITISH pioneer supervision. Late in September this form of labour was made more mobile by forming forty PW companies around BRITISH cadre staffs for deployment in the L of C where the labour situation demanded.

21. Veterinary and Remount

Authority was received for the mobilization of one Veterinary and Remount Conducting Section for the BLA and the unit arrived in the early part of September. It was located at LE BEC HELLOUIN, SOUTH of the SEINE, and its primary role was to collect and treat battle casualties.

The FALAISE gap yielded a large number of GS wagons but very few horses. It was evident that the expected capture of a great many horses would present difficulties, however, so a request was made for one veterinary hospital and one remount depot to be despatched to BLA as soon as possible.

In FRANCE five thousand captured horses were distributed to local farmers while in BELGIUM a number of abandoned horses were registered and collected. In September the movement of all horses was stopped in order to prevent them from going to butchers in the black market.

22. Salvage

The Salvage resources during this period were greatly strained as units were required in the large areas uncovered by the advance while plenty of clearance still remained to be done in the original bridgehead. In addition, with the lengthening of the L of C and the constant changes of roadheads and cushions, evacuation to the base salvage depot which was established at CAEN on 12 August became increasingly difficult.

Such large quantities of materials were abandoned in the FALAISE area that a HQ based on HQ 197 Infantry Brigade was established with Service components including No 17 Field Salvage Unit to cover that area. The first reception area was established at BRETTEVILLE SUR L'AIZE, but it later moved to TRUN where it remained until December. This organisation proved most satisfactory and resulted in the recovery of large quantities of stores and equipment, while the provision of PW labour after the initial stages greatly eased the manpower problem.

In order to obtain some control over captured stores, a depot was opened at CORMELLES at which the captured stores and vehicles could be centralised. This catered for the area SOUTH of the SEINE. The territory NORTH of the SEINE had to be left to the best efforts of the Services concerned but they were assisted by Q (Mov) routing loads of salvage to AMIENS where, after inspection by the area salvage officer, they could be directed to the appropriate Services depot. A salvage unit was available at SALEUX for unloading and sorting mixed loads.

A serious shortage of jerricans resulted from units abandoning them in their speedy advance across FRANCE. Collecting them and transporting them was difficult as the cans were scattered far and wide but the salvage of these containers was made a matter of top priority.

A salvage collecting centre unit taken from L of C was due to be landed in the early stages of operation MARKET GARDEN in order to collect parachutes and other valuable dropping equipment before they could be stolen, as had happened in the D-day operations. Owing to operational and weather conditions the arrival of this airborne unit was delayed, but meanwhile the salvage unit with 30 Corps had moved forward with the ground forces and done excellent work within the area into which the corps had advanced. The equipment salvaged was returned to BRUSSELS by road and thence to UK by air.

A base salvage depot was opened at ANTWERP on 26 September but being sited on the ALBERT canal was hindered for several days by enemy mortar fire from the opposite bank.

At the close of this phase the total tonnage re-issued by Salvage since D-day amounted to 21,840 tons including ammunition.

23. Fire

During the advance through FRANCE and BELGIUM four fire fighting companies were employed, two each by First Canadian Army and Second Army, and in each case one company was deployed in corps FMCs and the other in army roadheads. Other companies were moved from the RMA to AMIENS where they could be called forward for re-deployment when necessary. In addition, one FF company was placed under command First Canadian Army for opening the port of DIEPPE so that operation of the port was at no time hindered by the many small fires which occurred.

When HQ 7 and 8 Base Sub Areas moved into ANTWERP and OSTEND respectively, each had one FF coy in close support to deal with the numerous fires started by the enemy before abandoning the towns. In OSTEND the work was hampered by mines and booby traps which inflicted casualties on AFS personnel and by the fact that the enemy had removed the civilian fire-fighting equipment. The FF coy at ANTWERP, in addition to extinguishing a large number of fires, contributed many hours of pumping in the port area to enable the docks to be repaired and to assist RN port parties in clearing obstructions and salvaging sunken craft. In order to repair the dock gates more than two million gallons of water were pumped from the KRUISSCHANS SLUIS under continuous mortar and small arms fire, but no casualties were suffered among AFS personnel.

Operation of the ports of CAEN, DIEPPE, ANTWERP and OSTEND proved the desirability of the early appointment of AFS port fire officers to supervise fire precautions, co-ordinate all FF units and to take charge of fire fighting operations.

Many fires occurred due to the tapping by FRENCH civilians of the bulk petrol line which was in operation from PORT EN BESSIN to the SEINE and a system was evolved whereby every case of damage to the pipeline was reported immediately to the nearest AFS station.

During this phase static fire service control centres were established at DIEPPE, AMIENS, ANTWERP and OSTEND.

Due to the rapidity of the advance and the frequent moves of corps FMCs and army roadheads, the problem of water supply was a difficult one and AFS units were called upon to improvise static reserves.

The total number of fires attended by AFS units during this phase was two hundred and fifty of which eight were major fires and twenty-six due to enemy action.

24. NAAFI/EFI

As the armies moved forward towards BELGIUM, and the lines of communication were stretched, EFI began to feel the handicap of lack of sufficient transport for taking even the essential supplies forward, as on a forward movement of this magnitude very little army transport could be made available for EFI use. But DIEPPE was now functioning as a port through which small quantities of stores began to trickle. This, coupled with the supplies coming through CAEN, where the base canteen depot situated in a hastily patched up barracks lay close to an invaluable railway, was an important step forward for the handling of imports, which, by the end of August had amounted to a value of £3,247,000.

To deal with the increasing commitments, EFI reinforcements were being drafted over from time to time and late in July the first draft of ATS/EFI arrived. During September 11 HQ EFI moved from SULLY to BRUSSELS.

25. Reinforcements

(a) reinforcements from UK
At the time of the break-out units were almost complete to WE since reinforcements in adequate numbers had been immediately available in the bridgehead to replace the heavy casualties which occurred during the fighting there. The casualty rate during the pursuit was low, and replacement of men was, therefore, not as urgent a problem as was the provision of transport for essential petrol and ammunition. In consequence reinforcements accumulated in NORMANDY until 7 September when HQ 21 Army Group asked the War Office not to send any further drafts unless specially called for. The approximate numbers of reinforcements despatched from UK to NW EUROPE during this period were:-

BRITISH - 38,900
CANADIAN - 16,700
ALLIED - 1,120

(b) shortage of infantry
Owing to a shortage of infantry, a decision was taken on 16 August to disband 59 Infantry Division and one brigade of 49 Infantry Division. Certain units thus released were broken up and the personnel used to make up the shortages.

(c) reinforcement groups
Six reinforcement groups - 101, 102, 103, 104, 105 and 2 Armoured, had been allotted to 21 Army Group. 101 and 102 Gps had already landed during the first phase: 104 Gp arrived in the BAYEUX area in August, while 105 and 103 Gps landed in September and were situated at DIEPPE and CORBIE respectively. 2 Armoured Reinforcement Group controlled 2 Armoured Replacement Unit which in turn was responsible for forwarding RAC reinforcements through the Army, Corps and Forward Delivery Squadrons. The other reinforcement groups were deployed so that 103,104 and 105 in the L of C fed reinforcements forward to 101 and 102, which were under command of Second British and First Canadian Armies.

The reinforcement groups consisted of a varying number of reinforcement holding units each designed to hold 1,500 individuals in addition to a permanent staff of ninety-nine. All the RHUs however, were not entirely occupied with handling reinforcements, for some were used to hold downgraded personnel, psychiatric cases and immatures.

(d) movement of reinforcements
Until mid-September all movement of reinforcement personnel within FRANCE and BELGIUM was carried out with the limited road transport available. About 14 September a daily personnel train was scheduled to run from CORBIE, near AMIENS, to DIEST. On 16 September the first personnel train was arranged to run from DIEPPE to AMIENS and on that day also reinforcements travelled by rail from BAYEUX to AMIENS. But regular movement of personnel by rail was not possible until a later date.

(e) control of reinforcement demands
A reinforcement section consisting of one AAG, one DAAG, one Staff Captain and twelve clerks, which with two advanced reinforcement sections from GHQ Second Echelon had landed in the previous phase, established itself alongside HQ 21 Army Group Rear when the latter landed at the beginning of August 1944. Its function was to control the supply of reinforcements from the reinforcement groups in the L of C to the reinforcement groups under command of both armies, to consolidate demands for personnel and to submit them to GHQ Second Echelon in UK. By the middle of August it was clear that although the Advance REFORSECS were able to deal with the posting of reinforcements to units and the demanding of replacements the main reinforcement section with HQ 21 Army Group Rear was being overwhelmed with personnel matters which were not entirely connected with reinforcing, such as transfers and disposal of downgraded or psychiatric cases. It was therefore decided to send out the Organisation and Selection of Personnel branches from GHQ Second Echelon. They arrived on 14 September and assumed the name of REFORSEC together with the functions of the original reinforcement section. They also dealt with all personnel matters affecting transfers, disposal of downgraded cases, reversions to UK, postings to units not under command of armies and the consolidation of demands on the War Office. These demands were submitted fortnightly and were based on the WE less first reinforcements and the authorised holding of a reserve of 24,000. They were compiled from the weekly strength returns sent to Advance REFORSECS by formations and units under command of armies and direct to REFORSEC in all other cases. REFORSEC therefore acted as an advanced element of GHQ Second Echelon.

26. Discipline

(a) military prisons, detention barracks and field punishment camps
By 25 September five field punishment camps and one military prison had arrived in the theatre. These were initially established under canvas, but a part of the military prison was later accommodated in CAEN civil gaol. Two FPCs were placed under command Second Army, and one under command First Canadian Army. During August and September the WEs of these penal units were revised and increases in strength were authorised. Authority was also given for the formation of another military prison to accommodate 500 SUS. There was a scarcity of buildings suitable for these units, and the problem of covered accommodation was still unsolved at the end of September.

(b) absentees and deserters
Difficulty was encountered in returning to their units absentees and deserters who were apprehended in the rear areas. Units taking part in operations were unwilling or unable to spare good NCOs and men to escort an absentee or deserter who would probably be of no use to them in battle. On 17 September over 100 soldiers were under arrest, awaiting trial in the town guard rooms of CAEN and BAYEUX and at 7 FPC. These were sent forward by rail to Second Army and First Canadian Army on 19 September, escorts being provided from reinforcements.

By mid September the large numbers of absentees and deserters awaiting trial in 21 Army Group made it apparent that special arrangements would have to be made to accommodate them. Consequently it was decided to employ 36 RHU, which opened in a new capacity on 25 September at RYES, as a sorting, holding and despatching centre for absentees and deserters apprehended both in the UK and in the field. The urgency for setting up a special organisation to deal with this problem is illustrated by the fact that within five days of opening the RHU held 135 men on charges of desertion and absence without leave. The whole of the original staff of 36 RHU, plus extra personnel to act as guards, was employed on this task, while officers to act for the defence and prosecution of the accused, together with a captain, legal staff, and a permanent president were attached to the RHU for the disposal of cases either summarily or by courts martial.

(c) court martial centre
On 13 September an order was issued for the setting up of a Court Martial Centre which began to function in October. During the disbandment of 59 Division a permanent president and a captain legal staff, were appointed to deal with all outstanding cases affecting soldiers of 59 Division. Soldiers awaiting promulgation were sent to 3 Military Prison. Soldiers of 59 Division who were arrested after the disbandment were handled by 36 RHU.

(d) courts martial
The number of soldiers convicted by courts martial for the period was as follows:-

The above figures include trials at reinforcement groups which resulted in the following convictions for absence and desertion:-

Trials at 103 and 105 Rft Gps in the UK accounted for the vast majority of these cases, these groups being responsible during that period for dealing with absentees and deserters apprehended in UK. The fall in the number of trials at reinforcement groups during September was caused by the movement of both these groups overseas.

(e) self-inflicted wounds
Special orders were published setting out the procedure for dealing with cases of self-inflicted injury. The procedure entailed segregation of these soldiers in one hospital in the theatre, and if for any reason it was necessary to evacuate a soldier to UK very careful documentation was carried out to make certain that be would be returned when fit to undergo trial.

27. Prisoners of War

(a) the retention of PW in the theatre for labour purposes
Until early August no PW were retained in the theatre except for a small number of "protected persons" who were employed in the medical care of enemy PW at medical units. At the beginning of August authority was given to HQ L of C to retain in this theatre up to 40,000 PW for labour purposes.

On 24 August 18,135 PW were being held in PW camps as a labour pool and by 4 September the number had increased to 27,214.

(b) evacuation of PW
On 4 September it was decided that the number of PW to be held for labour purposes should be reduced to 20,000. On 12 September this target was further reduced to 14,500. This made necessary the immediate evacuation from the theatre of approximately 12,000 PW in addition to the daily captures which were then greatly increasing.

Shipping was available but War Office was having difficulty in finding accommodation in the UK. Arrangements were finally made to evacuate at a greatly increased rate (5,000 per day for the period 13-19 September inclusive and thereafter 2,500 daily). On 19 September only 23,000 remained in the RMA.

ARROMANCHES continued to be used as the PW evacuation port but DIEPPE was later also utilised for the same purpose. In spite of the constant evacuation at the agreed rate, about 50,000 PW were being held in the theatre at the end of September. Up to that date approximately 90,000 had been evacuated.

28. Chaplains

The Chaplains branch in common with all other Services found the shortage of transport a particularly heavy handicap at this time. Each chaplain had to take under his care more than one unit, and as all units were moving fast and frequently, padres had to make many long journeys in order to carry out spiritual ministration to the troops.

29. Medical

(a) build-up of medical base
In the early part of this phase the build-up of general hospitals continued in the medical area centred on RANCHY near BAYEUX. The personnel of hospitals arrived according to programme but the build-up was nevertheless disappointingly slow due to delays in the arrival of equipment. This was shipped separately and owing to bad packing often proved deficient of small but essential items. With one exception all hospitals at this stage were tented. The supply of water was a major problem and even after a water pipe line had been constructed water carts were engaged full-time in delivering water within the hospital area.

Major medical installations in the bridgehead on 26 July amounted to twelve CCSs and nineteen general hospitals. In addition three Base Depot Medical Stores had arrived for the supply of medical equipment. By 26 September another seventeen general hospitals and two additional base depot medical stores had arrived.

One of the results of the slow build-up was that the policy of retaining patients in the theatre could not be carried out as early as it was originally intended, and consequently during this period all patients who were fit to travel and who were unlikely to return to duty in one week were evacuated to UK.

(b) medical layout prior to the break-out
Before the break-out First Canadian Army had two BRITISH general hospitals of 200 bed size at LA DELIVRANDE, which, aided by a 600 bed hospital at REVIERS, handled all casualties of 1 Corps. 2 Canadian Corps casualties went straight from the CCS area at ST GERMAINE to the main hospital area at BAYEUX. About 20 August the two 200 bed type general hospitals moved to the ST GERMAINE area which then became the nodal point for rearward evacuation from First Canadian Army. Second Army casualties coming back from FALAISE by-passed ST GERMAINE and went straight back to BAYEUX. In the main medical area Second Army hospitals remained closed in readiness to move forward.

(c) medical layout and channels of evacuation of casualties during the pursuit

(i) from the line of the SEINE
When the break-out occurred the evacuation line lengthened and a period of rapid movement and development of an air shuttle service began. The battle of CAEN in August threw a great strain on the available number of hospital beds, but after the collapse of the enemy at FALAISE the picture changed completely. The heavy spate of casualties was for the time being finished but nearly 5,000 civilians were transferred from CAEN to other civilian hospitals, which movement fully occupied the ambulance car companies. During the pursuit although only small rearguard actions were fought a great strain was put on the chain of evacuation: the great difficulty at this stage was lack of transport to bring hospitals forward sufficiently early. This lack of transport was common throughout the Services and was inevitable in view of the nature of the operations.

As far as FALAISE and just beyond, all corps casualties were cleared by ambulance car company to BAYEUX. As the distance increased it was necessary to introduce staging posts and to obtain extra assistance from 227 MAC (8 Corps). By the time the SEINE was reached the distance was far too great for large-scale evacuation by road, though a few cases were staged back via RUGLES and FALAISE. Most of the cases, however, were held by the general hospital which had opened at CAILLOUET until they could be evacuated by air from EVREUX. On 5 September an ambulance railhead opened at MEZIDON, but four days later moved forward to LISIEUX. Daily ambulance trains were organised from there to BAYEUX.

(ii) from northern FRANCE and BELGIUM
During the pursuit to the DUTCH frontier hospitals moved rapidly along the axes of both of the armies and by continually leap-frogging each other, ensured that the major medical services were always within reach of the forward troops and obviated the need for evacuating over long distances. After the advance had gone beyond the SEINE and until BRUSSELS was reached, the chief method of evacuation was by Sparrow aircraft to the BAYEUX area, (the Sparrow flight consisted of six obsolete bomber Harrow aircraft). The first air evacuation centre was at EVREUX, but this was soon moved forward to AMIENS where patients awaiting evacuation were held in the general hospital. A few casualties were also evacuated from AMIENS by road to ROUEN, where a base hospital was established and a small number were sent by air from AMIENS direct to UK. When BRUSSELS was reached there was at first only one way of evacuating and that was by air. Most of the cases went by Dakota aircraft to UK or were ferried by Sparrow to AMIENS. At a later stage casualties were despatched from BRUSSELS by rail. When the DIEST area was opened the air shuttle evacuation service operated from DIEST to BRUSSELS and at the end of September was extended to EINDHOVEN. The main method of co-ordinating casualty air evacuation was by direct liaison between DDsMS armies and the senior medical officers with the RAF groups. So rapid was the advance and so far were the corps removed from HQ Second Army that the DDMS had great difficulty in keeping the RAF fully informed of his requirements. During the latter weeks of this phase steps were taken to set up a medical area at DIEPPE and later at OSTEND. Evacuation WEST of the SEINE was planned to cease on 16 September when a daily hospital carrier service to UK from DIEPPE was instituted, but in fact it continued for approximately another week to enable the hospitals in BRUSSELS and AMIENS areas to be cleared in time to receive the expected heavy casualties of the ARNHEM airborne operation.

(iii) evacuation for operation MARKET GARDEN
The medical scheme for this operation reverted to the policy adopted in the beachhead of evacuating casualties from the theatre as quickly as possible. By 17 September two hospitals, both of 200-bed capacity, were established at DIEST, while another stood prepared in BRUSSELS, available either to open in an emergency on to move forward. A FDS was established in the DIEST area to assist the two hospitals. The staging of casualties back to the medical area was under corps arrangements, while to assist in handling US airborne sick and wounded, an AMERICAN evacuation hospital and ambulance company was sited at BOURG LEOPOLD. The holding capacity of the Second Army medical units when operation MARKET GARDEN started was far below that required to accommodate the estimated influx of casualties. To overcome this problem of limited hospital accommodation 500-700 casualties were evacuated daily by air from BRUSSELS to UK, and in addition a rail lift to AMIENS for 200-300 daily was organised. An ambulance train formed from recaptured BRITISH and BELGIUM stock and staffed by BELGIAN Red Cross personnel made its first run from BRUSSELS to AMIENS on 20 September. To help in the evacuation of forward areas an additional, ambulance car company was put at the disposal of the DDMS Second Army for the operation.

(d) casualties evacuated to UK
During this period a total of 26,039 casualties was evacuated to UK by sea and 20,964 by air.

(e) wounded PW
Many concentrations of wounded PW were over-run in BELGIUM. PW hospitals were opened at AMIENS, BRUSSELS, ANTWERP, and later at BOURG LEOPOLD, staffed by collecting all available GERMAN protected personnel.

(f) stores and equipment
When the move forward began the advanced depots medical stores were re-sited in accordance with the new positions of the corps which each served, but the system of supply based on geographical layout had to be altered to meet rapidly changing conditions. The advanced depots medical stores could not move at the speed required to maintain a satisfactory supply system. To overcome this, mobile elements were formed from the depots, consisting each of two three-ton lorries and a supply of medical equipment. The mobile element was attached to the forward CCS of the corps normally served, and proved a satisfactory answer to the problem.

Following the battle of the FALAISE gap the moves of the advanced depots medical stores were long and frequent. One was retained at AUBIGNY to supply units in the rear, while the others were "leap-frogged" forward into BELGIUM. Two of those depots moved up to NIJMEGEN and EINDHOVEN in support of the MARKET GARDEN operation. Depots were based for maintenance on base depots medical stores at BAYEUX and at DIEPPE.

(g) general health of troops
Towards the end of July and in the early days of August there was a marked increase in enteritis and diseases of the digestive system. This was undoubtedly caused by the large increase in the fly population, due to the very crowded conditions in the bridgehead, and to the existence of hundreds of unburied carcasses of cattle. In September as troops moved forward into unsoiled ground there was a distinct drop in the incidence of enteritis. A certain amount of malaria made its appearance, some of which was probably caused by troops transferred from the ITALIAN theatre.

The rate of VD rose from .43 per 1,000 per month in August to .74 per 1,000 per month in September.

An outbreak of typhoid fever which was immediately localised occurred in HQ 6 Gds Tk Bde. Seventy-three cases were reported up to 26 September, all from Brigade HQ. This was the only real epidemic of the campaign so far and was believed to be due to a carrier in contact with the HQ personnel.

30. Pay

As the area of liberated territory increased certain changes were made in organisation. The most important of these was in the role of the Forward Base Pay Offices. These units had been originally designed as advance sections of Command Pay Offices, with the primary function of paying bills in forward areas and to act as repositories of bulk supplies of currency to which corps and divisional cashiers returned at intervals to replenish their treasury chests. During this period it was found that corps and divisional cashiers could not be spared for these journeys, and money was therefore delivered to Forward Base Pay Offices, and these in turn fed forward to corps and divisional cashiers. At the same time the payment of bills was decentralised to all cashiers.

A PRI, deposit account scheme was instituted by which units were enabled to draw, deposit and transfer from their regimental funds sums within specified limits. The system allowed the PRI to hold the minimum in cash in the field and to draw funds from the nearest field cashier on production of a PRI pass book. This reduced the possibility of loss of regimental funds to a minimum and proved a great convenience to the account holder. Over two thousand PRI deposit accounts were opened and hundreds of thousands of transactions passed through the ledger accounts maintained in Command Pay Offices.

The army's initial requirements of BELGIAN currency were estimated at a thousand million francs. This sum was requested from UK in August, but owing to sea transport difficulties the consignment did not arrive until 5 September. On the same day pre-loaded vehicles went forward to Rear HQ Second Army, and on the morning of 7 September advances were issued to corps and divisional cashiers. It was imperative that FRENCH francs in possession of the troops in BELGIUM should be exchanged immediately on crossing the border, because the difference in the purchasing power of the BELGIAN and FRENCH francs had already led to black market dealings in currency. To counteract these practices, cashiers had been provided with a secret authority to draw funds in an emergency from banks, and on 5 September, Guards Armoured Division cashier drew 3,500,000 BELGIAN francs from the National Bank of BELGIUM.

BELGIUM, and particularly BRUSSELS, possessed large stocks of attractive goods, and the rate of expenditure of the armies doubled in a few weeks. The sterling equivalent of total currency transactions handled by army cashiers during this period equalled £388,000,000. Deficiencies arising from overpayments etc amounted to £2,000, approximately .0005 per cent of the total amount handled.

The speed of the advance of the armies and the ever lengthening L of C led to supplies of currency being sent from UK by air. Supplies of DUTCH guilders and GERMAN marks were flown forward on 6 and 11 September in preparation for the future. In all, £5,500,000 in BELGIAN francs, £4,750,000 in DUTCH guilders and £ 3,250,000 in allied military marks were sent in this way.

On 25 September the cash reserves housed in the radar station at DOUVRES, which then amounted to the sterling equivalent of £32,250,000 were transferred to PARIS and deposited with the National Bank of FRANCE.

On 26 September the supply of currency in bulk was taken over by the various Currency Sections set up for this purpose by Supreme Headquarters. For distributional convenience, the Pay Services 21 Army Group continued to supply funds to the RAF and certain of the allied contingents ; adjustment was effected through the currency sections.

To relieve the pressure on army resources, the fullest possible use was made of civilian banks which for cash duties were for a time unofficially incorporated in the Pay Services. Cashiers opened army bank accounts in BAYEUX, ROUEN, AMIENS, LILLE, PARIS, BRUSSELS and ANTWERP. Post Offices, NAAFI/EFI etc. were encouraged to pay in their takings to these bank accounts wherever their location made it feasible.

31. Provost

(a) traffic control
With the first signs that a crack in the GERMAN defence was developing, it became apparent that a large-scale advance must be planned for, including the crossing of the SEINE. Therefore, six additional traffic control companies were phased in, all of which arrived before 8 August. On 21 August, Second Army and First Canadian Army each had four TC coys under command, and seven were under command HQ L of C. As the length of the pursuit increased, a request was made to the War Office for four more TC coys and six additional (VP) coys. This request was met in October.

There was a big signing problem on each of the four main administrative routes, together with the various roadheads and depots which were opened up as the armies advanced. The signing of routes within roadheads proved to be one of the most important of provost tasks. Experience showed that one full TC coy is required for the control of a roadhead supplying three corps. It was found that it was better to have one company permanently allotted for this tasks as the type of signing required was different from that normally employed on main administrative routes. The best solution was found to be to allot distinctive coloured arrows to each main commodity. The roadhead TC was responsible for signing to the depots and the depot commander responsible for signing inside his depot.

(b) discipline
In the early stages of the advance, a number of reports of looting were received. SIB investigated and found conclusive evidence that GERMANS in retreat had been guilty of most of these crimes. It was arranged that SIB, with representatives of Claims and Hirings, should enter important towns immediately behind forward troops in order to investigate without delay all reports of ill-discipline. The policing of liberated towns was a major commitment, which increased as the advance continued, and the responsibility for which was taken over by the CMP allotted to L of C.

(c) channel poets
Of the Channel ports that were liberated DIEPPE was the only one to be opened immediately and Provost had to handle large numbers of transit personnel, most of whom were reinforcements.

(d) crime in liberated aReas
Crime of varying natures began to develop in the liberated areas, particularly in the larger towns. Black market activities increased rapidly, and investigations often showed that WD property was the subject of such dealings. A number of civilians were apprehended for tapping the petrol pipeline, and others for improper possession of WD stores. Civilians arrested were handed over to the civil police for disposal. The crossing of the FRENCH-BELGIAN frontier was followed by an outbreak of illegal dealings in the currencies of the two countries, and also by a certain amount of smuggling - particularly tobacco, cosmetics and liquor. Provost kept close contact with Intelligence, local police and customs officials in dealing with these crimes.

In BRUSSELS and ANTWERP, where large numbers of troops were in contact with large civil populations, Provost were successful in reducing the activities of racketeers of all types.

The police authorities of both FRANCE and BELGIUM were most friendly and willing to co-operate, but in the case of the former the activities of the GERMAN occupying forces in FRANCE had disorganised them and prevented them immediately reaching their full efficiency.

(e) special duties

(i) Military police were included in the escort provided for the Commander of the FFI on his entry into PARIS, and remained with him for about a fortnight.

(ii) Two sections of provost were detailed for special duties in connection with the airborne operation at ARNHEM. They were in addition to the Provost forming a normal part of the airborne formations, and were included in what was planned to be the airborne FMA. Although they landed successfully the eventual withdrawal of 1 Airborne Division prevented the full development of the project.

32. Education

Daily production and delivery of news broadsheets was continued by all formations to keep troops up-to-date with the news, the arrival of newspapers from home having proved erratic during periods of quick movement. The production of these broadsheets, and other activities to supply news to the troops, was the principal function of the educational service at this time.

A small supply of FRENCH and GERMAN "From Scratch" books became available from War Office, together with a limited number of FRENCH and GERMAN dictionaries.

8,000 copies of the ABCA map review "The Western Gates" were reprinted to meet the demand for map reviews.

Early in September, Education branch Second Army published a guide sheet to BRUSSELS which had a very wide distribution. In conjunction with the provost staff, an information room was set up near the Gare du Nord, BRUSSELS. A warrant Officer, AEC was in charge and answered enquiries in connection with visits to places of cultural and general interest.

33. Graves

The frequent moves of corps throughout this phase made the work of the GRUs attached to them very difficult. Before graves could be located and registered as a result of the receipt of burial returns, the GRUs would have to move on again, sometimes for a distance of 120 miles. Consequently the number of non-registered graves, particularly in the area NORTH of the SEINE up to the BELGIAN frontier, began to accumulate. It was not until after the entry into BRUSSELS and ANTWERP that it became possible to deal with graves location and registration methodically.

34. Welfare

(a) equipment
Welfare stores continued to flow into the theatre, and in addition, large stocks of captured enemy stores became available. Of these latter, 100,000 packs of playing cards, ten tons of writing paper and envelopes, and brushes of all kinds were distributed, while hotwater bottles, Eau de Cologne, powder and scissors were handed over to the medical authorities. 100,000 books were received as a gift from a publishing firm in UK.

(b) clubs and canteens
A mobile canteen control committee was set up (with representatives from EFI, 2 TAF and CVWW) to control the allocation of mobile canteens. The normal scale to forward formations was three per armoured division and four per infantry division. Forward troops were always given first priority for canteens. The YMCA and BELGIAN Red Cross Society opened canteens immediately after our troops arrived in BRUSSELS, and on 25 September Toc H opened the first static club. HQ of CVWW moved to BRUSSELS in September, and the United Services Welfare Centre was acquired.

(c) live entertainment
The original five all-male "Stars in Battledress" parties were replaced by six new parties including ATS personnel. Assistance and equipment was given in the forming of eleven divisional and other parties within the theatre. Stage equipment, draperies, scripts and song books, amplifying sets, etc, were issued to units. In all, 150 gramophones and 13,100 records were distributed.

During the period, ENSA built up a total of twenty-four mobile parties and twelve rediffusion vans and opened fourteen garrison theatres. Six FRENCH-BELGIAN parties were employed with ENSA.

(d) broadcasting
Broadcasts from NW EUROPE included mention of army welfare activities, a "Stars in Battledress" broadcast in the "Transatlantic Spotlight" programme and contributions to the Allied Expeditionary Forces programme of the BBC.

(e) cinemas
By the end of the phase, ENSA was running twelve garrison cinemas and the Army Kinema Service a hundred mobile Cinemas.

35. ATS

The first ATS personnel to arrive in the theatre landed at ARROMANCHES on 12 August 44 with HQ 21 Army Group. There were 400 in the party - one ATS group HQ and three companies - the auxiliaries being employed as cooks, orderlies, clerks and drivers.

36. Civil Affairs

During this phase when towns and large territories were being liberated very rapidly, Civil Affairs proved of the greatest assistance to the fighting formations. Their detachments were always well forward and by maintaining contact with the local authorities on matters concerning curfew, blackout, restriction of movements and finance they relieved the staffs of those formations of much anxiety. It is of interest to note that one Civil Affairs detachment under command 30 Corps was conferring with national and local authorities in BRUSSELS in the early morning of 4 September, the day after its capture. An advanced increment of the Civil Affairs staff was established in that city on 10 September. In all, Civil Affairs in the field was now represented by two Base Port Depots, eight Inland Depots and four Civil Affairs Groups, all of which were under command either of one of the two armies, or of HQ L of C.

During "MARKET GARDEN" three Civil Affairs detachments were included with the forward troops, to be located at NIJMEGEN, ARNHEM and APELDOORN in the event of these places being occupied.

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Last modified: August 27, 2008