MCHS 0514 - Administrative History of 21 Army Group - 6 June 1944 - 8 May 1945

The book provides an account of the administrative problems that faced the staff and services of HQ 21 Army Group during the period and the ways in which they were surmounted. The whole book is reproduced here to show the entire context within which Movements operated. That would be too much for one website page so it has been split as follows:-

Chapters I to III

Chapters IV and V

Chapter VI and Appendices    -    This page

CHAPTER VI

ADMINISTRATIVE LESSONS FROM THE CAMPAIGN

1. General

Every campaign that is fought either provides confirmation that the principles upon which it has been waged have proved fundamentally correct or that new measures need to be introduced, in some cases possibly only to meet special considerations. It is thought, therefore, that a short chapter presenting the main administrative lessons learnt from the campaign in North West EUROPE will prove of interest and value.

The experiences of the campaign once more confirmed that the established principles on which administration is based were sound. The application was, however, in many cases changed very considerably from previous practice. It was confirmed time and time again that the principles of Foresight and Flexibility were of paramount importance and within that framework varying methods of practice could be employed with success.

PART I - "A" STAFF AND "A" SERVICES

2. Layout of the "A" Staff

Considerable difficulties arise when Army Group HQ is split into Main and Rear, especially when they are long distances apart. Although there is a very strong argument for "A" Branch to be located with G (SD), which must be with Main HQ, there are at least equally strong arguments against divorcing the "A" Branch from the other administrative branches and the services. Although it did not prove altogether satisfactory owing to the difficulty of future planning on the "A" side, it was the practice for "A" Branch to remain with Rear HQ with forward links on a skeleton basis at Main HQ.

In a campaign where GHQ Second Echelon has to remain static, it is essential that REFORSEC should break off and be located alongside "A" Branch, as soon as the latter moves forward. It must be continually in touch with First Echelon, in order to be fully informed as to the reinforcement policy, and then be ready to be a jump ahead on the implementation of that policy. It must, in addition, be in constant - more than daily - touch with the Advance Reforsecs at Armies.

3. "A" Staff Officers

Unfortunately "A" staff work is unpopular, partly because the work done by "A" staff officers is not generally understood. This again arises mainly from the fact that it is difficult to teach "A" staff work at a school. The result of the above is that there is no doubt that "A" staffs have not received their fair share of high quality young staff officers. This has had an unfortunate effect, the extent of which is difficult to measure. As a generalisation, "A" staffs have been adequate to keep the machine running, but there have not been enough officers in them with the foresight and vision to think ahead. This criticism applies in ascending degree from lower to higher formations.

"A" staffs at higher formation HQ, viz, Corps and Armies, have not been large enough to carry out properly the full duties which they ought to have performed. This was particularly noticeable in HQ of a Corps, which had only one DAAG and one Staff Captain up to VE day. It is submitted that there is a strong case for a Corps to have had an AAG, with one DAAG for Organisation and one for Personal Services, and probably one Staff Captain for each side. In the same way Armies should have had a Colonel "A", with an AAG for Org and an AAG for PS.

4. Reinforcement Organisation

(a) reinforcement groups
The war establishment of these units was drawn up on the basis that an appreciable proportion of work on training and administration would be carried out by the reinforcements held in these units. Experience has shown that this is an ideal which can practically never be achieved, owing to the speed with which reinforcements pass on from RHUs. Even if this speed is not great at any moment, the future position can never be forecast and the CO can never therefore plan ahead for the use of his "held" personnel. The most noticeable increases which were found necessary were to give each sub-unit a second-in-command and each a posting officer at the HQ.

(b) THE ALLOTMENT OF A REINFORCEMENT GROUP TO ARMIES
An Army reinforcement group proved a great success and is essential. First Echelon must, however, ensure that they do not lose control of the flow of reinforcements generally by allowing Armies to dissipate large numbers on ad hoc requirements.

(c) transport for reinforcements group
It is vital that reinforcement groups are permanently allotted, or have on their WE, a certain amount of transport. The days wasted in reinforcements groups and the failure to get reinforcements up at the right time was solely due to the deficiency of transport which had constantly to be remedied in ad hoc ways.

(d) officer appointments in the reinforcements organisation
It is a great mistake to post to GHQ Second Echelon, Reinforcement Groups and Transit Camps, officers whom War Office either have failed to place before, or who are brought out of Record Offices for an "airing" or promotion. This happened in the preparation of "OVERLORD", and was only put right after a very heavy reorganisation and upheaval. It is realised that fighting soldiers are not available normally at the beginning of a campaign, but a sprinkling of such officers would pay a handsome dividend. Enthusiasm should be the key word in these organisations and the result would be invaluable to the reinforcing machinery.

5. Reinforcement Policy

(a) The object of a reinforcement policy is to produce the right number of men at the right place and at the right time. To do this properly, it is essential that there should be some information as to the drafts which may be expected a month or so ahead. It is likely that any campaign carried out by the British Army will start with an inadequacy of manpower. It is also likely that this position will get worse as the campaign proceeds. Manpower planning has therefore as one of its most important aspects, the making of recommendations as to when it is necessary to break up units to provide replacements for others. Unless there are very large reserves in the theatre (and this is unlikely) the Staff must have at hand a long-term forecast of the drafts which may be expected so that man-power planning and consequent reorganisations can be carried out in the best possible manner.

(b) No 10 Holding and Selection Centre was a great success, but should have been set up as soon as BELGIUM became the Advance Base. This would have avoided the improvised method adopted for sorting out ex-hospital down-graded cases and would have placed such men to better advantage.

6. "A" Personal Services

(a) trials by courts martial
In spite of the simplified procedure required by FGCsM it was found that under the conditions of mobile warfare great delays were unavoidable in bringing offenders to trial. These delays were caused by, firstly, the difficulty and lack of opportunity in investigation of offences, convening of courts and procurement of witnesses, and secondly, the severe strain imposed on units in providing, under battle conditions, suitable officers as members of courts. This had the effect of large numbers of men under arrest being held by units whilst awaiting trial, which was an embarrassment to the unit and bad for morale. It was therefore found expedient to put the following measures into force:-

(i) An Army Group FGCM Centre was formed, capable of holding soldiers in arrest both before trial and when awaiting committal, and, of investigating and trying cases that would otherwise have had to be done by formations. A permanent president and, latterly, an officer of JAG's staff were attached to the Centre. It is recommended that one such Centre should be provided for each Army in the field.

(ii) A pool of permanent presidents was formed to relieve units of the burden of providing suitable senior officers to sit as presidents of FGCsM. It was found that by reason of the experience of the permanent presidents, disposal of cases was expedited and trials were conducted in a more satisfactory manner from the judicial point of view.

(b) review of sentences
It was found that the stress of work imposed on formation staffs by modern battle conditions was such that they were unable to keep pace with many routine matters, amongst the most important of which was the review of sentences of soldiers committed to Army Group penal establishments. This had the effect of delaying the release and return to duty of soldiers under sentence.

It was also apparent that many of the "battle" crimes such as cowardice, desertion, "leaving post", and insubordination, were committed on the spur of the moment, often under great stress, by soldiers who were not naturally military criminals and who, given another chance, might well make good. Accordingly, a Review of Sentences Board was set up to review the cases of all soldiers sentenced to six months detention or over for the "battle" crimes mentioned above. The Board was empowered to suspend sentences and make recommendations for the future employment of the soldiers. It was presided over by an experienced senior officer (Brigadier) who was assisted by a psychiatrist. The Board was a success and in over seventy-five per cent of the cases reviewed, the soldiers were returned to some useful employment, the majority going back to front line duties where they made good. It is recommended that a Review of Sentences Board should be provided on the scale of one for each Army in the field.

(c) short leave centres and rest centres
Whenever the battle became static, it was found advisable to establish formation rest centres, where those who had experienced the greatest strain during battle could have 48 hours in better conditions. Thus centres were established on the coast even before the breakout from the NORMANDY bridgehead. These formation centres require to be sited reasonably close the front, within four hours by road, at the most attractive recreation centre available. A formation centre can be arranged at short notice, and can be moved forward without difficulty, if kept on simple lines.

At a later stage the establishment of a well-organised Short Leave Centre, under Army Group control, is necessary in order to give the maximum number of men an occasional short period in really pleasant surroundings. Short leave vacancies are much appreciated, and do a great deal to keep morale high during periods of discomfort and boredom such as occurred during the winter 1944-45.

(d) broadcasting
The number of wireless sets of all kinds with a force which can pick up civilian broadcasts is now so large that there is a steady demand for a special programme. If the theatre of war is close to the UK, a programme from home (such as the AEF programme) is most successful. In more distant theatres, however, reception of programmes from home can seldom be relied on, and transmitting stations within the theatre become a necessity.

(e) war crimes investigation
The machinery for the investigation of War Crimes, recording allegations and arresting War Criminals must be set up as soon as it is apparent that the enemy is committing breaches of the Laws and Usages of War.

The procedure for reporting such breaches must be known at all levels, and steps taken to ensure that during rapid advances particularly, adequate details of alleged offences are recorded and handed over with any persons arrested for War Crimes.

Any individuals or teams employed in War Crimes investigation must be well supplied with transport.

7. Enemy Prisoners of War

In long advances where it is appreciated that the number of prisoners captured will be numerous, a PW camp to hold 10,000 should be attached to each Army, as was done in the case of Second Army in its advance from NORMANDY to BELGIUM.

There is no war establishment for an Army PW camp, and it was found necessary to form an ad hoc Army camp to hold up to 5,000. This resulted in a strain upon Provost. An Army PW camp on a WE is considered necessary.

Control of the flow of PW from Army to Army Group camps and their subsequent evacuation by sea cannot satisfactorily be delegated to L of C owing to limited information on the L of C. Base Camps from where there is no further evacuation should be placed under command of L of C.

One camp should be kept in reserve with suitable mobile equipment to enable it to be pushed forward very quickly, one of its tasks being to take over the site and holding of an Army camp or cage.

Communication to PW camps utilised for transit is of utmost importance to ensure ease of evacuation and to give adequate warning of arrivals.

Close liaison with G (Int) is essential in ascertaining estimated captures.

War dogs can usefully be employed during evacuation of PW and in supplementing guards in camps.

8. Chaplains

While numerically the War Establishment of chaplains can be called satisfactory, the fact that the number granted has to be split up to give denominational representation creates many difficulties. Denominational representation has been given to ensure efficient care of each soldier by a padre of his own Church but, in practice, the present War Establishment presents grave denominational difficulties and renders impossible adequate chaplaincy services to any one denomination. In practice, for instance, a Roman Catholic chaplain returns to the nearest larger medical installation and the battalion with whom he has been living is left without any kind of chaplain when the battalion goes into the attack. Complaints have been received from members of the free Churches who, because they understand that their own padre is available to give them attention, feel neglected when that attention is not forthcoming. It is proposed that if denominational representation is attempted on active service then the numbers of chaplains granted on the War Establishment must be increased for each denomination. On the present War Establishment the numbers allotted presuppose that any brand of chaplain "fills the bill". Unfortunately, denominational differences are real and cannot be glossed over even to meet the need arising from an insufficient War Establishment.

This campaign has demonstrated to the full the need for a centre of spiritual refreshment and rest to which chaplains can be sent. Living in the midst of men engaged in the physical activities of War, their function remains very largely in the mental and spiritual. In addition to retaining their own initiative, vision and spiritual poise in the midst of the hazards and crudities of battle, it must be recognised that a chaplain in his non-combatant role must meet constant spiritual and mental demands of no mean order. He must be capable of giving spiritual counsel and encouragement to all. From time to time therefore it is found necessary for every chaplain to have a period of two or three days which can be spent in a quiet and devotional atmosphere if he is to retain both the spiritual-mindedness and the clear vision which his job demands. From the early days of the campaign a "St. Georges House" was established and fulfilled this need.

Communion wine and wafers should be supplied officially through RASC channels and made easily available to every chaplain.

It is obvious that every chaplain must be mobile but to find the make of car which is most suitable for his purpose has been a problem throughout the campaign. It is considered that a car of the size of the Austin Utility, but more stoutly built, with a more highly-powered engine and with four-wheel drive, would be the kind of vehicle most suitable for a chaplain in the field.

Respect for our dead and the morale of the living make adequate provision for burials an essential in war. In many cases the immediate burial of the dead has been carried out in too haphazard a manner. With the increase of mobility and movement in war, there may often be occasions when special arrangements for the clearance of battlefields have to be made, even to the extent of helping units to bury their own dead.

A possible solution would be the provision of special burial units. This is not however recommended, as it is not considered that such units would be justifiable from the manpower aspect. Instead, ad hoc arrangements may have to be made on special occasions, such as at FALAISE.

In very many cases the initiation and supervision of burial parties have fallen to the lot of chaplains. It is the chaplains duty and privilege to perform the Service of the burial of the dead. Even though the chaplain's main duty is with the living, it must be accepted that on occasions a large proportion of his time has to be devoted to dealing with burials.

9. Medical

(a) general
OVERLORD was the first campaign in which the Medical Services were organised on the scale of units and WEs recommended by the Hartgill Committee. It was therefore the first full test of the organisation. The broad principles of the organisation stood the test well but it early became evident that there was somewhere too much weight forward and not quite enough in Corps and Army areas. Certain recommendations as a result of experience in the early months of the campaign were put forward and agreed by the War Office Standardisation Conference in December 1944.

(b) field dressing stations
Infantry divisions were allotted two as divisional troops. It was rare that all FDSs in Divisional, Corps and Army areas were fully employed. In rapid advances many had to be left behind and their transport used to assist the move forward of the heavier units such as CCSs and General Hospitals.

was considered adequate and agreed.

The FDS has fulfilled many roles from holding minor sick, exhaustion cases, acting as the nucleus of an Advanced Surgical Centre, PW Hospital, VD Treatment Centre, to forming Camp Reception Stations on the L of C. In this latter role it is definitely wasteful in personnel.

Experience has shown that although the Advanced Surgical Centre based on a FDS is definitely second best to the CCS, its value in a rapid advance, or very mobile warfare is considerable.

(c) light field ambulances
Each Armoured Brigade not an integral part of an armoured division was allotted a Light Field Ambulance. Experience has shown that the requirements of the independent Armoured Brigade operating with a division can be met from divisional resources and its Light Field Ambulance is often redundant. It does, however, require a Light Field Ambulance if operating in an entirely independent role. It is considered and has been agreed that a scale of one Light Field Ambulance to every two Armoured Brigades not in an Armoured Division is adequate. These are held as Army Troops and allotted as required. They also form a very useful reserve in the hands of the DDMS to meet unexpected situations. This reorganisation was effected early in 1945 and proved successful.

(d) casualty clearing stations
From the very beginning of the campaign it was necessary to attach a FDS to a CCS to increase its capacity by filtering off the lightly wounded and sick. An increase in nominal capacity from 50 patients in beds and 70 on stretchers to 100 in beds and 150 on stretchers was recommended and it is still felt this is ideal. The Standardisation Conference modified the increase to 80 in beds and 120 on stretchers but agreed to an increase of general duty MOs, to the restoration of Nursing Officers (QAIMNS) on the WE, and to minor increases in domestic transport. The value of sufficient fully trained nursing sisters in forward units has been proved beyond doubt.

CCSs were allotted on a scale of two per Corps as Corps Troops and one per Army. This rigid arrangement proved wasteful and uneconomic, and greater flexibility was achieved by making all CCSs into Army Troops, and allotting them as required by DDMS Army. This arrangement allowed the weight to be applied where it was most needed without argument from Commanders about losing their basic units.

In set battle CCSs are best used in pairs or more, receiving alternately, with a buffer FDS for light cases and sick in the same area. Forward surgery is carried out best in the CCS.

(e) field and special surgical units
The value of small complete mobile surgical units has been unquestioned.

It has been found from experience that FSUs are normally best employed at CCSs but when occasion demands they can be attached to a FDS forward in the Corps areas to form an Advance Surgical Centre. A CCS should be moved forward to take over as early as possible.

To avoid misconceptions which arise from the title of all these specialised units which are not administratively independent, they should be called "teams" and not "units".

(f) general hospitals (200 beds)
Throughout the campaign these units were in practice used as CCSs and their place could well have been taken by CCSs. They require more transport to move and have so low a surgical potential that FSUs had always to be attached. The real value of a General Hospital of this size would be with a small force or to serve small but distant or isolated garrisons. Their mobile opthalmic sections were of the highest value in saving manpower by issue of spectacles in forward areas, but these could have been attached, and on occasions were, to CCSs with equal effect.

(g) general hospitals (600 and 1200 beds)
The major lessons concerning the use of large general hospitals are:-

(i) The 1200 bed General Hospital is too big to be efficient. Adequate accommodation in buildings is difficult to find, control in scattered buildings is difficult. The amount of transport required to move the unit always caused difficulties in provision. The largest hospital in the field should not be bigger than 1000 beds.

(ii) During mobile warfare or in moving a base, hospitals can most easily be moved by allotment of at least a GT Coy to Medical. By using the same company in a phased programme vehicles are constantly employed and movement more efficient.

(h) convalescent depots
The usefulness of Convalescent Depots was late in becoming effective in the campaign owing to the inadequacy of their equipment. No provision is made for adequate tentage when buildings are not available. Beds or bunks have to be obtained locally as accommodation stores. Both ought to be carried by the unit as part of its AF.G.1098 equipment.

The value, as a means of saving manpower, of small convalescent depots, eg for 1000 men, in Army areas has been proved. Attachment of a FDS for minor sick or exhaustion cases really converted these into light casualty treatment and rehabilitation units. A composite unit on the lines of the Light Casualty Hospital would be even more valuable.

A flaw in the organisation of Convalescent Depots was the absence of wings for officers. It was apparently agreed that officers would be taken care of, during convalescence, either by voluntary organisations such as Red Cross Hostels, or by permitting them to go on sick leave. It is obviously wrong that the Army should rely, in part of its personnel recovery system, on outside organisations ; it is even more wrong to consider that sick leave is an adequate substitute for the planned and organised rehabilitation work of a Convalescent Depot. All Convalescent Depots ought to have officer wings.

(j) transfusion services
The organisation of the Base Transfusion Unit with its forward sections or Blood Banks forward with Armies requires little modification, but Blood Banks do require more transport to maintain constant touch with every Corps and to collect blood from forward airfields.

Field Transfusion Units are best employed at CCSs but are also attached to FDSs forming Advanced Surgical Centres. They should be renamed "teams".

(k) specialist services
There are a certain number of basic specialists on the WE of every General Hospital but in addition four per hospital may be selected from any of the following categories : surgeon, physician, orthopaedic surgeon, dermatologist, neurologist, ophthalmologist, oto-rhino-laryngologist, psychiatrist or venereologist. The number of each category present with the force depends on its size and function. These additional specialists were originally posted to a particular General Hospital which also carried the necessary specialist equipment. The moves and deployment of the hospitals rarely correspond with the requirements for moves and deployment of the specialist by areas. Specialists therefore have to be attached to hospitals other than those on whose WE they and their equipment are held. This leads to considerable administrative confusion as the officers and equipment are often away from the unit to which they are posted for an indefinite period. The original unit still has to account for the personnel and equipment without any control over their moves and attachments.

It is felt that some central pool of specialists controlled by a small administrative HQ would be an infinitely more satisfactory basis for these specialist services. The specialist could then be attached to any hospital and would take his equipment with him, as at present, but the accounting would all be centralised at Pool HQ. Such a unit would also solve transport, problems and might include the advisers in the various specialities. The specialists pool or unit might be extended to include the special surgical teams e.g. neuro-surgical, maxillo facial, chest surgery, and their equipment.

During the campaign five 100 bed venereal disease expansions to general hospitals were employed from the very beginning with the British Corps and Second Army as the specialist element of VD treatment centres. These centres have proved a real necessity but the expansions forming them have been accounted for by a multiplicity of general hospitals who have never seen the expansions concerned. The special VD treatment personnel could also be administered by the Specialist Pool. In this way only one unit HQ would be dealing with attachments and detachments and would relieve every general hospital of much unnecessary administrative work.

(l) medical establishments in the L of C
Two field ambulances and a varying number of FDSs have been employed in the L of C either for MI Room or Camp Reception Station work. Useful as these units are both as a reserve and for providing extra transport, they are uneconomical in medical manpower for the tasks they usually undertake. Consideration should be given to an allotment of Camp Reception Stations for work on the L of C in place of the L of C Field Ambulances. The extra FDSs will not be available on the new scale of allotment.

(m) evacuation

(i) Ambulance cars require to be completely redesigned. At present they are merely modifications of 1914-18 types.

(ii) To allow flexibility MACs which were allotted as Corps Troops were converted to Army Troops for the same reason as CCSs.

(iii) Air evacuation is most satisfactory when a definite number of aircraft is allotted for casualty evacuation. The "Sparrow" flight, which was controlled by Principal Medical Officer 2 TAF and used for the shuttle back from forward areas so successfully, was always more reliable than the utilisation of Transport Command aircraft, which arrived at uncertain times and in varying numbers.

(iv) The holding unit for casualties awaiting air evacuation is best formed by an Army unit close to the airfield concerned. It can be provided with surgical and other specialist facilities and can better cater for patients held up by delays in evacuation than the RAF unit on the airfield. The RAF unit need only be of waiting room type, holding for an hour or two. There must be the closest communication between the Army and the RAF unit both by telephone and personal liaison.

(v) During battle, evacuation by all means from Army areas has to be controlled by a single officer with a small staff. ADMS Army Troops is a suitable officer for the task but should establish himself in the Army medical area for the period of the battle.

(n) forward supply of medical equipment
It was found necessary to form a mobile element of Advance Depots Medical Stores by attaching two lorries 3-ton to each of these units. These lorries carried a store of essential supplies. By this means Corps could be supplied during long advances when it would have been impossible to move forward the whole Advance Depot in sufficient time.

In Army areas the introduction of Detail Issue Dispensaries attached to a central FDS for Regt MOs was entirely successful.

(o) forward stocks of stretchers and blankets
Medical disaster is never surer than when adequate stocks of stretchers and blankets are not maintained well forward. This is an old and tried principle but was proved once again during the campaign when owing to lack of transport Second Army was deprived of its reserve during its advance into BELGIUM. Only by sacrificing part of an ammunition lift was the balance restored when disaster seemed imminent. Massive air evacuation leads to a constant drain rearwards and replacement has to be by ground transport, unless aircraft are allotted for purely medical use.

(p) provision of hospital beds for the force
In OVERLORD beds for only four per cent of the force were in the theatre and not six per cent is originally planned. In fact, on the number of casualties handled and with the excellence of evacuation, beds for three per cent of the force would have been adequate. It must not be forgotten however that casualties were relatively light and the sick rate unexpectedly low. Had either gone up to the estimate planned before the campaign started, all the available beds would have been required.

(q) standardised medical and surgical treatment
The laying down of standard forms of treatment for common injuries and diseases by clinical memoranda produced by the consultants and advisers gave a continuity of treatment throughout all medical units. Although this tended to be dogmatic it did mean that the sick or wounded man who had to pass through many medical units and by many doctors was able to have a constant form of treatment wherever he went. The success of the system fully justified the means and is one of the major lessons of the campaign.

(r) mobile dental units
The use of Mobile Dental Units enabled practically all kinds of dental work to be done in the forward areas. As a result, it need never have been necessary for men to go more than a few miles from their units to receive dental treatment.

To avoid administrative confusion the word "team" should be submitted for "unit" or "section."

10. Pay

(a) organisation
It became apparent early that a greater degree of decentralisation of control than was originally planned was necessary. Decentralisation became increasingly important as the L of C lengthened when it was necessary to provide Pay representation on the HQ Staff of L of C to control Area and Sub-Area Cash Services which could not be supervised efficiently from HQ Pay Services, Army Group.

(b) supply of funds
The practice of Field Cashiers travelling along congested roads to replenish their "war chests" was uneconomical in time and manpower. The service for the supply of cash had to be re-organised to provide for the flow of money forward.

To implement this forward flow, it was necessary to establish dumps of currency at convenient points forward, and to regard bulk supplies of currency in the same light as other supplies of war materials.

(c) exchange
Where Armies are operating over two or more countries, exchanges will form a major part of the work of Area and Field Cashiers, involving in addition the repatriation of very large sums of currency. This commitment had not been sufficiently appreciated and special measures had to be taken to cope with it, including the employment of civilian cashiers.

(d) control of exchange
Black market activities in currency far exceeded anticipation. Special measures were needed to check illegal transactions and in the early stages these measures were only partially successful because they were improvisations to deal with a situation which had not been planned for.

(e) accounting
The experiment of transferring units and formations on to the Active Service System of Accounting prior to landing on the Continent proved most successful. Officers and Imprest Holders were fully conversant with the method of obtaining funds in the field and many had made personal contact with their formation cashier.

In consequence the pay work of units was reduced to a minimum during the difficult initial period and accounting for expenditure proceeded smoothly for the commencement of the operation.

11. Provost

(a) operational duties
The necessity for the closest liaison between Provost and other Services was continually made apparent, and smooth-working arrangements with flank formations, particularly of allied Armies, were again proved necessary.

Unless the Provost staff are kept fully informed of all developments, they will be unable to give the assistance in traffic control of which they are normally capable, in periods of rapid change in operations and forward supply movement. The flooding of the MAAS and the confused conditions at the beginning of the ARDENNES offensive illustrate these points.

The development and use of the CMP Signal Company was undoubtedly justified through the campaign.

(b) base duties
Three points need stressing in the work of the Provost Service in Base Areas.

(i) The ability to turn out a huge quantity of road and depot signs so that new advance bases, as they are set up, are signed in the minimum time.

(ii) A flexibility in training which enables units to change quickly from the different duties necessary in operational and base areas.

(iii) The combined training of the three wings of the CMP - Pro, TC and VP - so that units can be inter-changeable in such duties when necessary.

This campaign was the first operation in which there was a sharp division of Provost personnel into three categories, Provost, Traffic Control and Vulnerable Points. This separation leads to lack of flexibility, as it is obviously desirable that every officer or man serving with or in the CMP should be capable of undertaking all Provost functions. This division into categories was only accepted owing to the shortage of manpower of the right medical category for the highest qualities, ie the Provost Wing. This division should only be accepted if the manpower situation makes it inevitable. Its effects are as unfortunate as would be the division of Infantry into units suitable for service in active Divisions and units only suitable for a holding role.

12. Education

(a) personnel
The Education Service suffered, during the operational period, from lack of personnel. This was particularly noticeable in forward formations, where the war establishment provided only one SO Grade III at Divisional HQs and no AEC representation at lower formations.

What is desirable, in the matter of provision of Education personnel, will however have to be adjusted according to the availability of manpower. It may be necessary to provide formations with something considerably less in Educational staff than they would wish.

War Office approval was given in March 1945 for the appointment of one Captain AEC for each Brigade. Although this increase was recognised as essential, it was not found possible, owing to the shortage of officers, to implement it fully before VE day.

(b) transport and G1098 stores
The provision of transport and G1098 stores was also inadequate, particularly as regards tentage and wireless receivers. This added to the difficulties of the already overworked AEC officers and wasted a considerable amount of time. Arrangements should be made for the maintenance and provision of the spare parts for wireless sets.

(c) dissemination of news

(i) By Formation News Sheet
This method proved efficient and was enthusiastically received by all formations. The only constructive criticism made by units, was the general shortage of Home News. A closer liaison between War Office or Army Group and the BBC could, in future, satisfy this need.

(ii) By Talks to Troops
This matter is closely linked with the question of personnel. More could have been done if Brigades had been provided with AEC officers on establishment.

(d) books
The provision of small unit libraries is strongly recommended as the best method of satisfying the insistent demand for good reading material. The contents of such libraries should be mixed, both instructional and for entertainment. There is no provision in the transport of units for the carriage of such libraries; they must therefore be small, when they can be accepted as an overload of equipment.

The provision of mobile libraries is of great value, especially in assisting smaller units which are unable themselves to carry unit libraries.

Units should be encouraged to spend a proportion of their funds on books from the Central Services Books Depot. The Education Service can help by informing units of the books which are available from this source.

13. Graves

(a) maintenance of temporary cemeteries
Armies and L of C must be prepared to arrange the maintenance of temporary formation cemeteries until they can be taken over by the Graves Service for concentration, or by the Imperial War Graves Commission as permanent cemeteries.

(b) layout and development of permanent cemeteries
The layout and development of permanent cemeteries during active operations was left almost entirely to officers commanding GRUs who could not really be spared for this work. Special cemetery construction units should be formed for this purpose under the supervision of a qualified officer.

(c) burials
There may be occasions on which clearance of the battlefield becomes an important factor as it did at FALAISE. In such circumstances, the normal procedure of formations and units being responsible for the burial of their own troops, and for the burial of enemy troops found in their area, is quite inadequate. It will then be necessary to make arrangements for some special organisation to take over this task for the Graves Service has not the resources to carry it out. The special organisation needed will obviously depend on the size of the problem. It will be necessary to put the HQ of some unit or formation in charge of the operation, and to provide that HQ with the necessary units to execute it.

(d) allocation of graves registration units
The rigid allocation of Graves Service Units to formations was not successful when rapid advances were made, for there was considerable delay in the registration of graves. Graves registration should be set up on an area basis with all Graves Registration Units under the control of Army Group HQ. This would enable Graves registration to be maintained during active operations.

 

PART II

Q (MAINT) AND ASSOCIATED SERVICES

14. Q (Maint)

(a) system of maintenance
The campaign confirmed what had already been learned in the Desert and in other campaigns in this war that the previous system of maintenance was no longer applicable. In previous wars the system adopted for maintenance of an army was that its requirements were delivered daily by pack train, or similar means, to a railhead or other forward delivery point. Reserves were held at the base or advanced base and only small balancing reserves were held in the forward areas. This method was possible since the requirements of the forces operating were fairly constant and the supply of ammunition was the only item which needed constant revision. It was thus possible for the contents of the pack trains to be regulated by routine demands placed through Service channels.

To-day the requirements of forces in a theatre of operations vary considerably with the circumstances of their employment. In particular, the requirements of petrol, ammunition, engineer and ordnance stores vary enormously according to the operations either in progress or envisaged. Further, the switching of a formation from one Army or Corps to another at short notice has become usual.

As a result two major changes have become necessary: firstly, the necessity for holding stocks of all major items well forward; and secondly, the importance of close control and co-ordination by the Staff, as opposed to the Services, of the maintenance arrangements. The necessity for these changes has been apparent in all theatres in spite of very different conditions. Over a long L of C supplying fast-moving Armies it has been found impossible to communicate orders for the daily pack train either with accuracy or in sufficient time. Moreover, under these conditions reliance cannot be placed upon the punctual arrival of convoys.

The system of maintenance should therefore allow the greatest flexibility and be designed to enable success to be exploited without delay. Further, it must admit of control by the staff of all the administrative installations upon which its formation depends, in conformity with the ever-changing priorities. In order to meet these requirements the Field Maintenance Centre was evolved.

(b) field maintenance centre
The necessity for the Field Maintenance Centre was confirmed throughout the campaign. It was proved essential to have a place where reserves could be held under the control of Corps to compensate for interruptions in the chain of supply and to give the necessary margin to overcome the inevitable inaccuracy of a demand placed some time in advance.

(c) army roadhead
The necessity for an Army Roadhead was conclusively established. This is in fact an advanced depot area under control of an army, designed to give it the necessary administrative flexibility and to provide the source of supply for FMCs.

(d) divisional administration
The degree to which divisions concentrated their administrative units in an administrative area varied widely. Most of them concentrated their administrative units when they could, but with frequent moves either from one Corps to another or during a rapid advance, the differing requirements of the various services often made concentration impossible. Armoured divisions in particular tended to move their administrative units individually.

(e) scale of reserves
The campaign established the necessity of watching the scale of reserves held forward both in Army Roadheads and FMCs. Two major factors affecting this question are the possibility of enemy interference and the liability, particularly in FMCs, of having stocks scattered during a rapid advance. In fluid warfare neither Army Roadheads nor FMCs are secure. It is necessary, therefore, for the Chief Administrative Officer at each level to be in close touch with his Commander so that the risks of these stocks falling into enemy hands can be determined. In fact, throughout the campaign there was seldom any anxiety that the enemy might be in a position to make effective counter strokes, and in consequence the reserves held forward were far larger than would otherwise have been the case. As a general guide these forward reserves should be held to a minimum.

Operational urgency in the initial siting of FMC's usually made it impossible for Army to take over stocks remaining after Corps had ceased to use the FMC. As a result stocks in FMCs were usually maintained at two or three days' supply so that the FMC could be cleared by the Corps itself.

(f) estimation of requirements
The campaign confirmed the desirability of permitting forward formations to demand what they required to be brought forward to their installations. In view of the fast moving nature of the war and the difficulty of communications, it was necessary, wherever possible, to meet these demands of formations without question and to make adjustments subsequently. Nevertheless this system made it much easier for a formation to over-insure and any tendency to over-insurance had to be continuously checked. Among the-many examples of such possible over-insurance were the calculating of MT turnround at too low a figure, the under-estimating of the petrol mileage per gallon and the ignoring of such hidden reserves as large quantities of unbalanced rations.

(g) priorities of movement
One of the most important lessons of the campaign was the vital necessity for the Staff to exercise the closest control on the movement of material and equipment. In view of the constant changes in priorities and the fact that transport facilities are seldom sufficient to meet all requirements, the decision as to priorities was of vital importance to successful administration. The allocation and control of transport and the major stores requirements are the responsibility of "Q" (Maint). The priority of movement was, therefore, decided by this section of the Staff.

(h) control of administrative resources
The nature of the campaign made it essential to ensure that administrative resources were at all times allocated to produce the maximum efficiency and flexibility. The "Q" Staff had continuously to adjust requirements in ammunition, petrol, bridging, airfield construction and ordnance stores in conformity with the varying priorities. In general, the resources were placed at the disposal of Armies but from time to time it was necessary to withdraw administrative resources, particularly transport, to Army Group control for operation under Army Group or for re-allocation between Armies and the L of C.

(j) control of transport
The campaign established beyond all measure of doubt that all road transport must be regarded as a pool. It is generally true to say that the maximum economy and flexibility was achieved when control of the allocation of road transport was retained by higher authority, although its operation will usually be controlled by lower formations. Corps nearly always required assistance from divisions in stocking the FMC. In order to make the fullest use of second line transport it was necessary to make first line transport come back for unit requirements rather than to deliver them to unit lines.

(k) ammunition supply for deliberate operations
A tendency to over-insure was noticeable in plans for dumping ammunition. Experience showed that formation First and Second Line transport was usually well able to maintain supply to the gun positions at any reasonable rate and the Staff normally limited the quantity to be held.

RE Works

(a) general
It is important to appreciate that 21 Army Group was given first priority and that the campaign took place in the fifth year of war when production was as its maximum. Hence the Engineers under the Director of Works lacked nothing and were further aided by the fact that so many installations were found intact. Considerable FRENCH and BELGIAN manpower was also available.

(b) organisation
The Director of Works' representatives in the L of C, District or Area are responsible for all Works Services in the area allotted to them, and such areas should as far as possible be made to correspond with administrative areas.

(c) relations between CE and D Wks and army group
The arrangement whereby the CE is the Engineer Adviser to the "G" Staff, and D Wks to "Q" operated satisfactorily The CE, however, must be conversant with the engineer effort throughout the Army Group as he is responsible for the allocation of personnel and stores between field formations and Works Services.

(d) works services in army areas
Works Services in Army areas will be controlled by CE Army but it will usually be found convenient for the rear engineer boundary of the Army to be located in advance of the rear administrative boundary of the Army in order to relieve the CE Army of as much Works responsibility as possible.

(e) airfield construction
Approximately 17,000 all ranks were employed almost continuously on airfield construction in 21 Army Group. Of these 6,000 were in Army units and the remainder in RAF Works Units. This organisation requires changing and the RAF also recognise this fact. In view of the magnitude of the force involved and the importance of the work, a special WE for HQ (Airfields) AGRE and Airfield Construction Groups is fully justified and should be given consideration.

(f) L or C units
The Army Troops Company is mobile, possesses an E and M element, and is the best engineer unit of its kind for the L of C. The ideal would be to replace all Artizan Works Companies by Army Troops Companies but it is doubtful if this could be achieved. An alternative suggestion is a "stepped up" Artizan Works Company with an E and M element, more equipment and transport.

(g) roads
The main source of road trouble during operations (especially on roads barely two-way), is the destruction of the haunches. Every effort must be made to provide modern equipments to affect rapid road repair of road edges with least interference to traffic. Present equipments are inadequate and too slow.

(h) E and M
Progressively in every war E and M engineering becomes of greater importance. It is essential, therefore, that training is given both to officers and to other ranks in peace time, in these subjects, and to ensure that the WE's of Engineers include a sufficient number of E and M tradesmen. These numbers will tend to increase with mechanization.

(j) mechanical equipment and plant
The existing distinction between Mechanical Equipment and other plant is now illogical and has already been removed as far as spare parts are concerned. Plant varies from items requiring highly skilled operators and maintenance, to items which can be operated and maintained by any ordinary engineer unit. It is recommended that the Mechanical Equipment organisation should handle all equipment classified in the former category and that the latter should continue to be handled through the normal stores organisation. The classification of border line cases should be decided on their merits.

It is further recommended that the Mechanical Equipment organisation in each Corps, L of C Area, Army, L of C and Army Group should be self-contained as regards Command, Operating units, Pool Holding units, Transporter units, Spare Part Holding units. Each requires its affiliated REME workshop.

The CEs at Army Group, Army, Corps, L of C and L of C Area should each have a Mechanical Equipment staff.

The employment of all mechanized equipment must, however, be the responsibility of every engineer officer and not confined to a few specialists, who will always be necessary as technical advisers on new types of equipment.

(k) engineer stores
Engineer stores comprise a large percentage of the maintenance tonnage of a fighting force, the main tonnages being required for bridging, airfields, roads and pipeline schemes. Not only do engineer stores comprise large tonnages, but the items required are liable to fluctuate quickly according to the tactical situation, time of year, etc. It is extremely important to consider requirements with great care at frequent intervals in order to avoid either sudden shortages, or large surpluses due to over-insurance.

16. Postal

During the assault period the system of delivery of mail known as "prelocation" was found to be successful and units were able to receive mail on the far shore almost immediately on arrival. The system was based on units being notified in code, before departure, the APO from which they would first draw mail on arrival. Under the normal system of calling forward mail after a unit had reported its presence a delay of several days would inevitably have occurred.

A period of rapid advance results in a chain of unit concentrations being left behind on the axis of Armies and a surge forward of L of C units into the rearward portion of Army areas. This presents difficulties in maintaining a mail service for them, as they are far behind normal Army delivery installations and in advance of the L of C distribution network. The best solution was found to be the allotment of L of C postal units to Armies to provide for the rapid taking over of APOs on the axis of the advance. On completion of the advance the units reverted to L of C control with the APOs they had taken over.

The presence of RAF Groups which moved forward with the Armies called for mobile postal units on Divisional lines to maintain service to them. These were eventually provided on a new WE (Forward Group Air Formation Postal Unit) and proved entirely successful.

Base APOs are normally regarded as the point through which all mails to and from the theatre are passed, and at which correspondence posted within the theatre for delivery within it ("cross-post") is sorted and despatched. The former function being more important, Base APOs were sited in or near ports for the ready despatch and receipt of mails. However, in the case of 21 Army Group, the proximity of the theatre to the UK base permitted the despatch of letter mails from UK by air direct to Armies, thus by-passing the base APO. Similarly mails were sorted and despatched to UK direct by Armies and Corps, by-passing the base APO. Thus it was found that provided detachments were available at ports and airfields the base APO could concentrate on its cross-post function and could therefore be sited in the best position for establishing rapid mail links with all A/FPOs as it was no longer essential for it to be near a port. It was sometimes found convenient to site the base APO near an airfield as in view of the distances involved it was often possible to use air transport for cross-post mail.

The distance often separating armies from the base area led to the development of Army Mails Depots. These had always existed as concentration points for formation mails but in 21 Army Group they developed into subsidiary base APOs at which locally posted mail was sorted and from which "cross-post" mail was disposed of without the delay incurred by the normal procedure of passing it back to the base APO.

17. Supply and Transport

(a) operation and control of RASC units in beach group organisation
Special vessels are required for "floating control" when ships are anchored far off shore and RASC DUKW units must be prepared to run a ferry service for Tn personnel, stevedores and other essential personnel. There must be clearly marked seaward "lanes" between beaches and anchorages. The necessity for wireless between shore and floating controls to link up with individual ships and Port Operating Groups was proved.

(b) formation and employment of crane transport platoons within 21 army group
The operation of cranes is not normally a RASC commitment. When necessary, cranes should be included on the WEs of units within each Service, but RE should be the general operators of cranes. The formation of RASC crane platoons in 21 Army Group provided a pool of cranes to meet changing requirements of individual Services which was invaluable during periods of rapid advances.

(c) operation and control of RASC units in rear maintenance and transhipment areas
The operation of transhipment areas which are points of hand-over between two different forms of RASC transport, should be vested in the RASC and not Q (Mov), who should, however, in conjunction with "Q" representatives, control transfers between road/rail or rail/road.

(d) opening of a port
Reconnaissance parties must contain small RASC units and detachments for their own maintenance. S & T advice on road circuits in a base port is essential, and a S & T representative must be available for this purpose. Control points for GHQ installations (both for supplies and petrol) must be provided, as must sorting areas in depots to cope with mixed loads and avoid delay in turn-round of transport.

(e) control and operation of transport
DDsST Corps should be responsible for the stocking of PMSs from Army Roadhead. DDST Army should be responsible for the stocking of the roadhead from the L of C terminal. HQ 21 Army Group control of the long road L of C by means of a special staff set up (TRANCO) was justified and the only possible method in the circumstances. Since it is the only known example of such control it should be carefully noted as a possible peace-time instruction of RASC officers. In this connection, the need of long range wireless equipment for CsRASC of transport columns was proved.

(f) operation of a transport column on extended lines of communication
For long distance convoy control, the provision of jeeps instead of motor cycles is very desirable. The constant change of GT companies from the command of one transport column CRASC to another, has an adverse effect on the administration of these units and it is impossible for the commander to know the personnel in them.

(g) operation and control of corps troops RASC and FMCs
The most economical and efficient method of maintaining Corps troops is to allow them to draw direct from the DID and Petrol Depot in the FMC, with the exception of the Armoured Car Regiment, the LAA Regiment and the A/Tk Regiment which may very infrequently require the formation of a second line ad hoc platoon. Small units in Corps Troops may well draw two days' rations at a time in order to save an unnecessary number of splits. If this system of operation is adopted there is no case for the retention in the Corps Troops RASC companies of composite platoons.

It is necessary to have a total of five POL and supply units for use in forming FMCs so that "leap frogging" may take place and an additional supply unit be available for sundry duties.

Report centres at both roadhead and the FMC in good wireless communication with CRASC Corps Troops and DDST Corps, are essential.

When additional Army transport is allocated to Corps, it is preferable that companies or columns be allocated to operate under Corps (but still administered if need be by parent unit) rather than being allocated to carry out specified details for Corps since it prejudices flexibility and operation in stocking the FMC.

(h) operation of an armoured and infantry divisional RASC
Operations have proved that it is essential for the CRASC to have his own self-contained HQ. Every effort should be made to avoid splitting HQ CRASC but in an Armoured Division it will often be inevitable.

(j) operation of artillery companies and platoons
Sufficient four-platoon GT companies to lift second line requirements of AA regiments should be included in the Order of Battle and this transport allocated to formations as necessary. A BRASCO should be included in the WE of HQ AA Bde. The standard platoon of thirty three-ton task vehicles is sufficient for artillery platoon work.

(k) operation of RASC vehicles in medical units
RASC officers require more training in medical organisation and operation. The design of four-stretcher and two-stretcher ambulances has proved unsuitable and should be reviewed.

(l) operation and control of all RASC transport operating for the RE
Experience has proved the necessity for the homogeneity of vehicles in Bridge Companies. These vehicles should be 4x4. Officers who are to serve with Bridge Companies need certain specialist training. It has been proved desirable to allot a special CRASC to control all RASC units working for RE in a particular area.

(m) wireless equipment
The essence of control in all spheres of RASC activity is the provision of adequate communications. Wireless was found necessary for DUKW control over the beaches and in river crossing operations and for S & T control in the Armies and L of C. Future organisation must provide pools of Signals operated sets allocated on WE for the use of RASC HQ staffs at all levels as operations dictate.

(n) control and operation of station maintenance companies
The employment of station maintenance companies proved successful on the L of C. Mobile independent workshop platoons however, are required for employment in the Army areas and these should be held as a GHQ pool. The company of six sections as organised in BLA can maintain an average of 750 lorry units, and, when planning the number of companies for a force, the extent to which the transport on the Order of Battle will always increase throughout the campaign must be borne in mind.

(o) operation of tank transporter columns and companies
Modifications to transporters to enable them to be used as "heavy load" carriers must not interfere technically with vehicle maintenance which is already complicated.

Platoons and sections of tank transporter companies should be reduced by half. A company on this organisation would lift a complete armoured regiment. The minimum team for a tank transporter is three men because of the maintenance commitment and the extra fatigue caused by driving vehicles of this type.

(p) operation and control of DUKW companies in river crossing operations
Provided the various technical difficulties such as the ramps, provision of launches and good approaches to the river are met, there is no great problem in DUKW operation in river crossings. However, clear and comprehensive orders must be issued as to the priority of loads to be carried.

(q) operation and control of POL units in the L of C
Greater flexibility in the organisation of petrol units is required. The need will always arise for some form of static petrol supply capable of coping rapidly with the needs of convoys of vehicles which must be supplied simultaneously. It is considered that the petrol station company organisation fulfils this need most adequately.

(r) operation and control of supply units
In this campaign the Mobile Bakery has proved superior to the Field Bakery. Its operation could be much more efficient if sufficient fourwheel drive transport were allotted to make it fully mobile. The present nomenclature is misleading in that a Mobile Bakery is unable to move without the allocation of additional transport.

18. Printing and Stationery

The most important features to be taken into consideration when planning the requirements of printing units for an expeditionary force are the resources likely to be available in the theatre of operations and the distance of the latter from the main base. If no facilities exist and the distance is great it is essential that sufficient mobile plant be taken into the theatre to cope with all the work for the force. The mobile printing units provided for 21 Army Group in the initial stages were able to undertake all the urgent work required of them in the early days but the over-flow of other work was sent to the UK.

For a force of the size of 21 Army Group it is essential that at least one Advanced Stationery Depot should be in the theatre within a few days of landing. The first Stationery Depot of 21 Army Group did not arrive until the time that most units were extremely short of paper, forms and other items necessary for the production of operational matter, e.g. fire plans etc. It is impossible accurately to gauge beforehand the initial supply of stationery and forms which formations and units will require for a given period, as the consumption depends on certain unknown factors connected with the progress of operations.

Advanced Stationery Depots were provided in 21 Army Group on the basis of one for each Army and one for L of C. Experience of the campaign has shown that this is insufficient. The allotment should be doubled. The 21 Army Group Depots were at first increased to twice their normal size by the addition of civilians and subsequently more Depots were formed or obtained from CMF.

19. Claims and Hirings

It is important that Town Majors be experienced and well instructed if hiring procedure is to function smoothly.

In order that they may be deployed in accordance with the density of work, Claims and Hirings personnel should be operated on a "pool" basis.

The policy of despatching personnel to the theatre in groups to be split up on arrival caused administrative difficulties. It would have been simpler if the groups could have been smaller and more self-contained, and so composed as to use them either as entire teams to form the personnel for new district offices, or to go as complete units to supplement others already established.

20. Labour

The basic principle in planning and execution must be firstly, that all labour is used as a pool and not allotted piecemeal to specific Services, and secondly, that the Labour adviser to formations controls all types of labour - military, civilian or PW.

The pioneer units allotted to beach groups or similar organisations in an assault force will deviate from the pool principle until such time as a firm foot-hold is obtained. Accordingly, they should be "married" to their affiliated service units at concentration points before embarking and wherever possible should travel in the same vessel. All such pioneers should be of the highest available medical category, well trained and should go in fully armed on assault scales. As soon as practicable, the Pioneer Group Commander should institute the pool system of labour.

Pioneers in the rear areas should be replaced by indigenous civil labour at the earliest opportunity.

As the L of C lengthens selected enemy prisoners of war should be used as an organised labour force under proper supervision in the rear areas. PW/DP camps should be sited if possible in places where labour is most required.

Pioneer and organised PW units should contain a percentage of tradesmen.

Pioneers are usefully employed in providing administrative cadres for organising Allied Pioneer Units, DP or PW Labour Units and Mobile (civil) Labour Groups.

Provision must be made in the planning for adequate equipment for the formation of Allied Pioneer Units and for the provision of food, boots and protective clothing for civilian labour.

21. Fire

The original arrangements whereby advice on service and technical matters was sought by HQ Armies from AD AFS 21 Army Group proved unduly cumbersome. The appointment later of a DADAFS and a Fire Adviser AFS (WO I) to each Army HQ provided the necessary representation.

The tendency to regard AFS companies as L of C troops must be resisted. It was found that some companies must remain under command armies as they advance. Before the end of the campaign there were four AFS companies under command First Canadian Army and six under command Second British Army.

It is essential that one HQ Fire Fighting Company should be landed in each Beach Sub Area (or equivalent) with the first AFS units in order to assume responsibility for the setting up of a fire defence organisation.

The withdrawal of FF sections and subsections from transportation units, petrol depots, general hospitals etc. and their re-organisation into companies resulted in better service control of AFS units and personnel, and more economic employment of AFS resources.

The need for telephone communications under AFS control in ports, large towns and centres of military importance was apparent throughout the campaign. Provision should be made for a switchboard for each HQ AFS company and a switchboard for each military port controlled from a HQ Base Sub Area.

The provision of adequate reserve stocks of foam-making compound at strategic points under AFS control was found to be vitally necessary. AFS and RASC units G1098 stocks are insufficient to produce foam quickly and in sufficient quantity to be effective.

22. NAAFI/EFI

It is essential that Base Canteen Depots should always be stocked with a minimum of 28 day's supplies and that Bulk Issue Stores should carry fourteen days' supplies.

The NAAFI packs that were specially designed for the operation proved an excellent means of supplying troops in both the initial stages of the campaign and in isolated positions.

By quickly providing a limited canteen service mobile canteens proved most valuable to morale and therefore should be employed as early as possible in any operation.

EFI should be equipped with transport of common user type to facilitate maintenance, procurement of spares and replacements.

PART III - Q (AE) AND ASSOCIATED SERVICES

23. Q (AE)

(a) general
In general the normal procedure and planning was found to work admirably. Although the Base remained in the UK there appeared to be little reason for any departure from normal procedure. FFC rates of wastage in the large majority of cases were found to be correct.

It is extremely difficult to carry out any major re-organisation of units or disbandment of formations except in the Base, which in this case was not on the Continent.

(b) ammunition

First and second line scales of ammunition had to be drastically altered for the purposes of the assault and when the standard scales were subsequently used they were found in many cases to need revision.

For the purposes of calculating the holdings in the Advance Base, under GHQ control, the FFC rates were extremely accurate. A special rate was used for calculating holdings in Armies and Corps designed to cover expenditure during the peak period of a battle.

(c) vehicles

In the majority of cases the FFC rates for vehicles were correct. The early phasing in of replacement vehicles which competes with the phasing in of fighting formations is essential.

The supply of spare parts for MT vehicles is made more difficult by the lack of standardisation of makes, types, contract numbers, etc.

24. Ordnance

(a) ordnance organisation
The standard RAOC WEs were found in many cases to be seriously inadequate thereby forcing excessive dilution with civilian labour which resulted in inadequate supervision and loss of efficiency.

The Vehicle Companies RAOC at present in the standard WE of an AOD can be more effectively operated if divorced from the AOD and placed under separate command.

(b) ordnance stores
The scaling of Ordnance Stores in the beach maintenance packs on a formation basis is fundamentally wrong.

In order that Ordnance Stores Holding Units may be properly scaled it is essential that WEs and War Equipment Tables are frozen some time before the start of an operation.

The supply in the field of clothing and general stores is of equal importance to the supply of weapons, ammunition, vehicles etc., and in many respects more difficult owing to incalculable wastage rates.

The transport allotted for movement of high priority Ordnance stores is frequently inadequate and the provision of an Ordnance Stores Convoy Unit has been found to be essential.

While at the beginning of a campaign the system of maintenance of Ordnance stores must be automatic i.e. by periodic shipments of pre-calculated scales and quantities, it is essential at the earliest opportunity to change to the system of demanding actual requirements to prevent the building up of excessive stocks of slow moving or unwanted stores.

25. REME

(a) REME organisation
It is essential that Advance Base Units are made at least semi-mobile in the early days so that these units can operate within fourteen days of landing.

The provision of a major Ordnance Stores Holding Unit, such as a Forward Trailer Section, to provide spares for Advance Base Workshops was found essential.

It is essential that REME organisation is flexible. To attain this third line units were kept under Corps and Army control so that they could be switched as necessary to meet the load. In the case of a long advance it was possible to leap-frog third line units with second line units in direct support of divisions.

(b) repair
Except in an emergency the priorities for repair in GHQ installations should be changed as little as possible and preferably not less that once in two months. The repair policy was for repair by replacement of assemblies, repairable assemblies being backloaded to UK for overhaul. Although the average turnround time for such assemblies in fact proved to be six months the policy was sound.

(c) recovery
Backloading points were established in the area of each Corps and Army and were taken over by the formation in the rear as the battle moved forward. Workshops were fed with work from backloading points and at the same time equipment beyond repair was broken down by reclamation squads for spares.

(d) maintenance of replacement equipment
The load placed on REME for the maintenance of replacement equipment must not be underestimated. In particular, the performance of AFVs deteriorates considerably if they do not receive constant attention throughout their journey forward. There was a constant flow of vehicles and equipment into workshops for repairs which were due not to wear and tear but lack of maintenance.

PART IV   Q (MOV) AND TRANSPORTATION

26. Q (MOV)

(a) general
Facilities for movement by road, rail, air, IWT and sea never meet all requirements for military and civil traffic. Centralised control in the theatre is therefore necessary in order to make the most economical use of all means of transport. This is best exercised by a co-ordinating movement committee at GHQ, of which representatives of the National Governments concerned are members, as well as those from Allied Armies whose interests are affected.

Q (Movements) officers, wherever situated, must be prepared to carry out Movements Staff functions in conjunction with other administrative staff branches. This must apply right down to RTOs at railheads and in .particular to the co-ordination of transport, labour and other resources.

(b) ports
It is not really possible to destroy a port, as such. However severe the damage, the sheltered water and the inland communications leading from the port render it worthy of repair, and discharge to lighter, etc., can usually commence almost at once. It was invariably found that the limiting factor in the opening of a port was seaward access and not discharge facilities.

It is essential that sites for local depots are kept well clear of the port itself. Failure to do this results in congestion, culminating in the inability to discharge ships for lack of quay space.

When utilising a port to maintain forward troops direct, it is seldom possible to discharge to rail without sorting. Such sorting will inevitably slow down discharge and turnround of shipping and will cause congestion on the quays. This means that except for base ports (where time has not the same importance and base depots are rail served), it is usually necessary to discharge to MT for a short haul to the local depot where stores are sorted for transhipment to the forward areas.

(c) movement by rail
In order to get the best value out of forward railheads an Administrative Post consisting of Q (Movements), Q and S and T is essential, This organisation ensures flexibility in the control of the road transport, which is vital in obtaining the maximum tonnage from any heavy rail programme. Its control depends on good wireless communications between all centres concerned in the wide railhead area. Only by this means can really big tonnages be handled in the group of suitable railheads likely to be available to an Army in contact with the enemy.

A break in the rail L of C, such as might be caused by a series of demolitions or a major river obstacle, necessitates an organisation to control the transfer of stores from rail to road, and from road to rail again, beyond the break. This "railhead/railtail" organisation is somewhat similar to that of the Administrative Post required to control the Army railhead area. Such breaks in the L of C will only exist in the early days of an advance, and during this period the rapid unloading of trains is of primary importance since the rail facilities are not likely to be abundant. It was found necessary, therefore, to organise dumps at suitable points near the railheads, from which MT reloaded and transported to railtails. This double handling might appear wasteful but, in fact, at this stage of the campaign rail timings are so uncertain that the waste of trains and/or MT vehicles standing under load proved to be so great that dumping was the lesser of the two evils. As in the case of an Army Administrative Post in the railhead area, the efficiency of this organisation depended principally upon its communications.

The selection of base, or advance base depots, must be influenced to a great extent by the movement facilities serving them. It is imperative that the Movements staff are consulted about every one. Too often was the presence of a railway considered as providing adequate means of serving a depot, without reference to the staff qualified to judge its capabilities in terms of tons per day in or out, resulting in failure to handle the desired programmes.

An important function of Headquarters L of C Areas and Sub-Areas, is to ensure the even flow of men and material along the lines of communication. Whenever possible, therefore, headquarters should be Selected at the local centre of communications. This centre is invariably the site of the local Movements staff headquarters, frequently set up in advance of their areas and sub-areas, and failure of the latter to select the same site inevitably leads to difficulties in discharging this important function.

(d) movement by inland waterway
This extremely valuable means of movement is apt to be overlooked, both in provision of technically qualified staff and in adequate long term planning for its development. Although it does not possess the flexibility of rail or road movement it is particularly valuable in taking the strain off both these methods of movement in the rear areas where big tonnages can be achieved. It is a great advantage if base depots are water served, since ships can be discharged direct to barge and relieve the strain on other means of port clearance.

(e) movement by Air
There must be definite routes for the various types of traffic so that terminal and transit facilities can be properly organised. Temporary diversions are only acceptable in real emergency, since the constant switching of terminal facilities leads to disorganisation and bad service. It follows therefore, that the fewer administrative airfields operating, the more efficient the movement.

27. Transportation

(a) railways
There have been many lessons of a detailed technical nature as regards equipment and railway practice which are not suitable for inclusion in this history. One important feature, however, affecting the organisation deserves mention. The standard Tn unit organisation responsible to the Railways Directorate of HQ 21 Army Group is suitable for a certain type of L of C but becomes strained when applied to national railway networks. Great difficulty was experienced in providing a proper degree of control and co-operation with firstly the SNCF and later in succession, the SNCB, the NETHERLANDS State Railways and the Reichsbahn. The present Tn unit organisation lacks both the flexibility and mobility which are so necessary when assuming the responsibility of controlling a highly developed and complex railway organisation.

(b) ports and IWT
Many points of detail were learned during the campaign on the equipment and establishment of units, and these were put into effect by amendments to WEs and G.1098s; these, however, were mostly adaptations of standard organisations to local conditions.

The need was clearly established for great flexibility in Tn organisation to fit the extremely variable conditions that may be met with in captured transport systems. The necessity was proved for a pool of officers available for placing in the specialised and variant control organisations that must be immediately implemented when a civil transport system is incorporated in the L of C.

 

PART V  ARMY RELATIONSHIP WITH CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT

28. The campaign confirmed the fact that when operating in civilized countries the maintenance problems of modern Armies are to a large extent bound up with the maintenance of the civilians living in the operational areas and on the L of C. These civilians had to be retained in a reasonable state of health and be given adequate food and the bare necessities of life. If this had not been done they would have become an operational hindrance which would have curtailed the radius of action of the forces in the field. In order to administer the civilian population the import, manufacture and movement of certain essential stores for civilian use had to continue. These conflicted directly with the maintenance of military forces and priorities had to be decided constantly between the military and civil requirements.

In the later stages of the campaign as the requirements of Civil Affairs mounted, it became apparent that the existing Civil Affairs organisation was not large enough and had not sufficient resources to cope with the problem. It is doubtful whether it is sound policy to produce in the later stages of a war, with depleted resources in manpower, a new organisation which is designed to perform the combined functions of already existing Services. It would have been better if the requirements for Civil Affairs had been made the responsibility of the existing Staff and Services. As it was, it became necessary to hand over a large part of the import and holding of supplies, stores and equipment to Sand T and Ordnance.

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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C-1

NOTES:
1. The US Adm Staff Section left the HQ  when First US Army landed on the Continent.
2. The Petrol Section was disbanded in September 44.
3. During October 44 the Air and IWT Sections were interchanged and as a result of this regrouping of responsibilities movement entirely within the theatre was kept distinct from all other movement.
4. When HQ 21 Army Group was split into Main and Rear HQ, "Q" (Plans) worked with MGA at Main.
5. In November a special section of "Q" (Army Equipment) was formed to deal with enemy war material.

APPENDIX C-2

NOTE:  The above chart shows, in outline only, the increases required in the staffs to deal with the various post-hostilities problems. In the case of the "Q" and "Q" (Mov) staffs the increases were made by adding increments to existing sections and retaining the original framework. Within the "A" staffs, however, the new commitments were such that it was necessary to form special branches and sections additional to those previously operative.

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX F

APPENDIX G

THE ARTIFICIAL PORT AT ARROMANCHES

MULBERRY "B"

When Operation OVERLORD was first planned it was realised that it would be extremely difficult to obtain the degree of tactical surprise that would be necessary for a successful attack against the heavily defended Atlantic wall. The GERMANS had obviously appreciated that any operation of the magnitude requisite for such an invasion would entail the early capture of a port which could serve as a base. Accordingly they directed a large part of their defensive plan to the overwhelming protection of such areas. It had never been thought possible that maintenance for a force of the size involved could be carried out on an adequate scale over open beaches, and so a plan was conceived whereby a port could be constructed in the UK, towed across the channel, and located at the desired area of the coast.

It was originally planned that there would be two such ports known by the code words of MULBERRY A and MULBERRY B. However, during the storm of 19 Jun to 22 Jun, MULBERRY A in the American Sector was so badly damaged that, coupled with the loss of a large number of MULBERRY tows at sea during the storm, it was decided to abandon further work on it. All future components and whatever could be salvaged from MULBERRY A were concentrated on completing MULBERRY B.

In actual fact, experience in the operation proved maintenance over open beaches to be of far greater value than had been expected but the project of constructing these artificial, pre-fabricated ports on stretches of the FRENCH coast allowed the planners to have much greater freedom of action in their selection of the points for assault.

In addition to that great advantage, the MULBERRY with its sheltered water even in rough weather provided an insurance against the elements interfering with the maintenance of the force. For instance, during the storm quoted above MULBERRY B provided shelter for 155 minor landing craft which might otherwise have been severely damaged or destroyed and although the port was in no way complete, 7,265 tons were discharged during the four days of gale as compared with the total of 10,071 tons unloaded over all open beaches and other minor ports. The LST pier enabled vehicles to be landed dry shod and so effected a great saving in man-hours and materials required for waterproofing vehicles. LSTs were completely discharged in under half an hour at this pier which saved them from beaching and drying out. Beaching added considerably to the problem of maintaining them for continuous service and drying out meant a six hour wait for the tide thus greatly adding to the turnround of the LSTs. The evacuation of casualties was made much quicker and much more comfortable for the wounded by the fact that they could be transferred direct from ambulances to the hospital ships alongside the pierheads. Finally, the backloading of tanks and SP guns requiring heavy repairs was made much quicker.

The two main component parts of MULBERRY were breakwaters and piers. The breakwaters consisted of lines of concrete caissons known as PHOENIX, equipped with Light A A protection and ranging in size from 2,000 to 6,000 tons. These PHOENIX, each of which required two large tugs to tow it across the Channel, were sunk in depths of water up to 5.5 fathoms and their size was so arranged that as far as possible the exposed portion of the breakwater above the surface of the sea was of uniform height. Other breakwaters were provided by sinking blockships known as CORNCOBS in varying depths up to 2.5 fathoms. Each CORNCOB sailed across the Channel under its own steam to its final resting place. The havens of sheltered water provided by these breakwaters of sunken blockships were called GOOSEBERRIES.

The piers, known by the code name WHALE, were pre-fabricated, made up into tows some of which were about 600 feet long and towed across the Channel. At site these tows were built into pier roadways, the longest of which was three quarters of a mile. Pierheads consisting of floating steel pontoons were towed across separately and were attached to the ends of the pier roadways and hospital ships, coasters and barges berthed alongside them. Roadways and pierheads were free to rise and fall with the tide and provided a Class 25 link between the ship's side and the shore.

By D + 4 the first PHOENIX had been planted and the following day GOOSEBERRIES were completed so that it was possible for craft to discharge in sheltered water. 900 tons of stores were discharged across sheltered MULBERRY beach on D + 6. Survey and preliminary work for the WHALE piers started early on D + 1 and by D + 3 about 1,500 feet of the centre pier and 600 feet of the EAST pier had been built and the shore approaches constructed. By 15 Jun (D + 9) the EAST stores pier complete with one pierhead was ready to receive ships, although stores were not actually discharged over this first pier until 23 Jun. Due to the time taken to salvage necessary vital components from MULBERRY A the LST pier was not completed until 17 July.

At Annexure I will be found a plan of MULBERRY B as it existed on D + 90, and a sketch map showing the position of MULBERRY B in the BRITISH Sector at Annexure II. Annexure III is a chart showing the quantity of stores, personnel and vehicles unloaded through MULBERRY up to 30 Oct as compared with the total cleared through the beaches and other BRITISH ports.

ANNEXURE 1
TO APPENDIX G

MULBERRY B
on D + 90 Days

ANNEXURE 2
TO APPENDIX G

OVERLORD - British Sector
SHOWING POSITION OF MULBERRY B

ANNEXURE 3
TO APPENDIX G

ANNEXURE H

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX J- 1

APPENDIX J - 2

APPENDIX J - 3

APPENDIX K

APPENDIX L-1

APPENDIX L - 2

APPENDIX L - 3

NOTES OF GENERAL INTEREST ON THE TREATMENT
OF PSYCHIATRIC CASES DURING THE CAMPAIGN

1. The special psychiatric tasks during the campaign were (a) treatment of psychiatric casualties and development of the necessary organisation, (b) advising on the disposal of men temperamentally unsuited for certain employment, and (c) advising in disciplinary cases.

2.

(a) psychiatric casualties
The chief task of psychiatry during the early part of the campaign was the treatment of the acute psychiatric battle casualties, the so-called "Exhaustions", the incidence of which rose from nothing on D-Day to just over 20 per cent of all casualties during the third week of July. Subsequently it fell to just under 10 per cent for the remainder of the campaign. In Second British Army alone, cases of "Exhaustion" rose to over two thousand per week at the peak. By the end of August they had fallen to less than one hundred per week, and on only two occasions subsequently rose above three hundred cases per week. The ratio of men leaving the battlefield unwounded and without physical sickness to those who received wounds was always about one to ten except in some instances where formations were being committed to battle for the first time, when the rate rose to one to three.

(b) treatment in forward areas
Exhaustion cases arriving at RAPs were given an initial dose of sedative and evacuated to divisional exhaustion centres. Early in the campaign regimental MOs evacuated cases with too little discrimination but later realised their responsibility in preventing those who lacked battle experience or who were unwilling fighters from being evacuated through medical channels.

Divisional centres were organised in three departments. The first, where cases of poor prognosis were sorted and sent further back and where the remainder were kept under the influence of a sedative drug for 36-48 hrs. The second, where cases had two days of complete rest while the effects of the drug wore off. The third, where cases had two or three days of rehabilitation under increasing military discipline before return to duty.

Corps and army centres were similarly organised but here a definite part of the treatment was the psychiatric interview and brief psycho-therapy.

Throughout all stages of treatment the provision of general amenities and welfare facilities in a reassuring and comfortable atmosphere was of primary importance. The assistance of APTC and AEC instructors during rehabilitation was of tremendous value. It was easier to produce the atmosphere required in the tented centres in the beach-head than in the chilly and inelastic school buildings of BELGIUM and HOLLAND.

(c) organisation in forward areas
In the divisional areas a FDS run by general duty medical officers under the guidance of the corps psychiatrist formed the divisional exhaustion centre. In BRITISH corps areas the corps psychiatrist was attached to and worked with the FDS. The First Canadian Army attached to the FDS a small CANADIAN exhaustion unit which included a psychiatrist. In army areas, psychiatrists were attached and here the centre was normally sited near the army roadhead which facilitated disposal to the army convalescent depot and reinforcement holding units and reception from other army medical units. Reinforcement holding units and field punishment camps also provided a constant small stream of outpatients. Convalescent depots in the army area receiving short term convalescents were valuable means of saving manpower and over one hundred psychiatric convalescents were admitted each day for several weeks in July 44 to Second British Army's convalescent depot. First Canadian Army employed special employment battalions and also a convalescent depot for further rehabilitation of their cases.

This organisation came into being in the first six weeks of the campaign. Psychiatrists landed with the assault troops on D-Day. The first corps exhaustion centre opened on D + 8 and by the end of June all operational corps had centres operating. To deal with the heavy flow of psychiatric casualties three army centres were open at this stage and a large rehabilitation centre was taken over by a 1,000 bed convalescent depot in mid-July.

In June patients could only be held for 48 hours and only ten per cent were returned to duty without prior evacuation to UK. By the end of July it was possible to hold for seven days and between fifty per cent and seventy per cent were returned to duty.

(d) base organisation
One 600 bed psychiatric hospital was available for longer term cases and psychotics. It landed in two sections and in the early days could function only as an exhaustion centre. This hospital moved to the advance base in October, and was the filter through which psychiatric and psychotic cases were evacuated to UK. When conditions stabilised only ten to twenty per cent of admissions had to be evacuated to UK, including a very small fraction of the total psychiatric casualties occurring forward.

(e) Training
During the winter months three-weekly courses in clinical psychiatry for medical officers were held at the BRITISH psychiatric hospital. The object was to give a grounding in psychiatric diagnosis and treatment to officers who would subsequently be running divisional exhaustion centres, or taking over the clinical work at the corps centres. Courses lasting five days were also held continuously at the Second British Army exhaustion centre.

This educational activity was assisted by two valuable training films which were prepared for 21 Army Group from material collected in forward areas during actual battle. The first - "Field psychiatry for the Medical Officer", was about the psychiatric problems confronting the regimental medical officer. The second - "Exhaustion Centre", illustrated and explained the principles of first-aid psychiatry in forward areas, and gave a picture of the disposal of the more severe casualties evacuated to base.

3. Disposal of men temperamentally unsuited for certain employment

The disposal of men in a lower medical category or for whom specific employment recommendations had been made presented a large problem in the first six months of the campaign, and was in fact never adequately catered for until the arrival of No 10 Holding and Selection Centre in January 45. Prior to this, re-allocation was undertaken by 37 RHU, to which an increased staff, including a standing medical board and personnel selection teams, were added. This unit was, however, swamped with ex-hospital patients, predominantly psychiatric, needing re-posting, for which neither accommodation nor staff were available. The CANADIAN machinery for re-allocation was adequate (3 Canadian Re-allocation Centre), but the comparatively small numbers of vacancies for low category personnel caused a bottleneck, which was only partly solved by the use of special employment companies.

4. Disciplinary cases

The use of psychiatric examination in relation to disciplinary cases was extended in two directions. First, it was felt that the formal psychiatric report submitted in many cases was too rigid and narrow to be helpful to those who had to take action on it. Accordingly it was pointed out with success that one of the functions of a psychiatric report was to "assist the commanding officer or the convening officer in coming to a decision whether or not it is in the best interests of the service and the man that he should be dealt with by summary trial or by court martial, or as a purely psychiatric case".

Second, more use was made of psychiatric help in reviewing the cases of men under sentence of penal servitude for desertion and allied offences. Liaison on these matters between the "A" branch and the psychiatrist attached to Second British Army led to the development in November 44 of a board to review the cases of men who had served the first three months of their imprisonment. The board, presided over by the Brig A/Q was composed of the AAG and a psychiatrist. Between a quarter and a third of the men were referred for full psychiatric examination, and the usual action was taken on the category and employment recommendations made. The remainder were returned to duty in the line, with the exception of a small number of incorrigibles (who continued in prison) and a few men who were sent to hospital for investigation or treatment. The work involved was considerable and it was not the kind of work for which an operational formation, such as an army headquarters, is best suited. The making of provisional assessments of these soldiers was therefore delegated to military prison staffs on the L of C. who formed boards including local area psychiatrists. Under these conditions more careful estimation of intelligence and personality became possible. Finally, towards the end of the campaign, a 21 Army Group Review of Sentences Board was set up, presided over by a combatant brigadier, and with a psychiatrist as one of the members. This board toured the prisons at regular intervals. After deciding on the proper disposal of soldiers it took executive action to effect these disposals. Thus the whole business of reviewing the cases of men serving penal servitude was undertaken in a more uniform and scientific manner. In all 1077 cases were reviewed of which 861 were returned to front line duty or other useful employment.

APPENDIX M

CASUALTIES - BRITISH ARMY IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE
First and Second World Wars

MEAN MONTHLY RATES PER 1,000 STRENGTH
(Excludes "Wounded remaining on duty")

Percentage by types of battle casualties from D Day to VE Day
as reported at end of hostilities by GHQ Second Echelon for
21 Army Group and by CMHQ for Canadian Army

APPENDIX N

INCIDENCE OF CERTAIN DISEASES - MEAN MONTHLY RATE
PER 1,000 STRENGTH

British Commonwealth Forces*

+ 1914-1915 only.  Other figures not available.  * Includes Allied Contingents in 21 Army Group

DENTAL TREATMENT
British and Allied Contingents

EVACUATIONS

Total Evacuations through 21 Army Group Medical
Evacuation Channels (excl PW) 6 Jun 44 - 8 May 45

Medical Evacuations from NW Europe to UK expressed as Percentage of
Admissions to Hospitals (British Army only)

APPENDIX O

APPENDIX P

21 army group ammunition rates

APPENDIX Q

HOLLERITH INSTALLATION OF Q (AE) STATS HO 21 ARMY GROUP

Equipment

The setting up of the Hollerith Section of Q (AE) Stats branch, HQ 21 Army Group took approximately six months from the original application for the machinery to the delivery in May 44 of the mobile installations which were housed in three American semi-trailers towed by Chevrolet trucks. Mounting the apparatus in vehicles ensured not only mobility but also that it was always ready for use, the power being provided by one of the two 9 kw generators installed in 15 cwt trucks.

The equipment installed was as follows (see Annexure 1):-

No. 1 Semi-trailer - Machinery comprising a tabulator, a reproducer and two sorters
No. 2 Semi-trailer - Filing cabinets and interpreter
No. 3 Semi-trailer - Three punches and two verifiers.

After the occupation of GERMANY, additional captured machines were acquired from the Printing and Stationery Branch.

Staff

The original WE for the Section approved in March 44 was one officer (SO III) and twenty clerks. The installation was planned to undertake as its major work vehicle census records for 196,000 vehicles, and it was envisaged that the coding and punching of the vehicle detail cards would be performed by a civilian staff as the WE of the Section allowed only for maintaining the census and not for creating the original records. For the greater part of the time, however, it was not possible to obtain this civilian staff.

Progress of Vehicle Census

The "A" Vehicle Census, which eventually covered 40,000 vehicles, was mechanised first. The initial punching of the cards, begun in June 44, was completed in August, one week after the branch arrived in NORMANDY. By the end of September, the "A" vehicle side was working smoothly and thereafter produced regular weekly and monthly tabulations (see Annexure 2).

The punching of cards for "B" vehicles, a very much larger task, was begun towards the end of September, shortly after the branch was installed in BRUSSELS. Progress at first was slow and authority was obtained for employing BELGIAN civilians. Three trained punch operators were also posted to the branch from AG Stats, the War Office. By the beginning of January 45 approximately 90,000 "B" vehicle records were on Hollerith and the first Triannual Census, showing the position at 31 Dec was tabulated. The punching of cards for all vehicles held by units was completed in March, and this was followed by vehicles in workshops and in stock, the whole job being completed on 26 May 45. It was then possible to produce a second Triannual Census (as at 30 Apr) and over 300,000 WD numbers were tabulated—an increase of more than 50% over the figure for which the machinery and staff was originally designed.

Other Work

In addition to the Vehicle Census records, numerous other jobs were undertaken by the Hollerith Section. These included:-

(a) Production of a monthly Order of Battle in formation order and by arm of service for other sections of the branch.

(b) The recording of honours and awards by units and formations for Dep Mil Sec.

(c) The production of statistics for Medical branch.

(d) The analysis and tabulation of the results of Wireless Listener Research Enquiries for Welfare Branch.

Annexures

A schedule of the periodical tabulations undertaken by the Hollerith Section is shown at Annexure 2 and a sample list of "ad hoc" tabulations produced is shown at Annexure 3.

ANNEXURE 1
TO APPENDIX Q

Annexure 2
TO APPENDIX Q

Annexure 3
TO APPENDIX Q

APPENDIX R

APPENDIX S

APPENDIX T

APPENDIX U

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Copyright © 2005 Movement Control Association
Last modified: August 27, 2008